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March 04, 2026
President Trump’s former National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien recently wrote an op-ed about both the national security imperative of supporting the U.S. Strategic National Stockpile and the failures of the prior Administration to do so. I find myself in agreement with his points.
The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) is America’s health security backstop, the last line of defense from Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) attacks, such as Anthrax or Smallpox. The SNS also must be prepared to respond to pandemic disease threats that will overwhelm America’s healthcare system. I proudly served as the Director of the SNS for almost 13 years, under both Democrat and Republican Administrations. The SNS is the U.S. Government operation that you do not want to ever hear about, because if you are hearing or seeing the SNS in your daily life, it usually means something has gone horribly wrong to provoke our being there.
Today, you are reading about the SNS, because something has gone terribly wrong. In this case, it is that the SNS is losing its battle to be prepared for these threats. The SNS has long been the victim of gross underfunding, creating a tremendous gap in the response it can actually mount versus what is required to ensure preparedness.
The SNS is a great victim of misplaced priorities. Protecting the nation from the combined threats of CBRN attack and pandemic disease are both important goals. Under the Biden Administration, the SNS’ CBRN preparedness gap worsened, as the Biden team over-prioritized pandemic response and under-prioritized stockpiling to address biological and chemical threats. Under the Trump Administration, the President’s Budget proposed drastic cuts to the SNS and attacked biodefense vaccines, in both cases in the interest of politics. We cannot be prepared for only one scenario but rather we must be well prepared for all probable scenarios.
The Biden Administration’s mis-prioritization is a particularly striking juxtaposition: while the Biden Administration was requesting $20 billion in mandatory pandemic spending, in the very same Spend Plan, they proposed to eliminate Anthrax therapeutics entirely.
Actions under both Administrations have held overall stockpile levels at the SNS well below their requirements for preparedness, levels that continue to swiftly decline. The Government Accountability Office has repeatedly warned about this challenge, remarking that the SNS would be unable to effectively respond in the event of a crisis and placed its parent agency, the ASPR, on its High-Risk List.
The hardworking people of the SNS do the best they can with the little that they have, and yet, Congress after Congress and Administration after Administration continues to squeeze them even further. We have seen limited increases in appropriations in recent years, but they have still not been enough to meet requirements identified before 2020. As time passes and the money continues to not follow the need, SNS falls further behind in preparedness.
These planned cuts to biological defense spending have only emboldened our adversaries to develop offensive biological and chemical weapons programs. In December, reports emerged that Iran is attempting to include biological weapons, such as anthrax, into the heads of ballistic missiles. Just last month, front-page news showed federal authorities intercepting a CCP-connected biological laboratory, which was connected to another laboratory busted in 2022 that illicitly held high risk pathogens. Just last week, reports emerged that Russia used lethal toxins to kill Alex Navalny, which follows earlier reports about Russia expanding their biological weapons production facilities.
These threats are not only aimed at our warfighters and diplomatic personnel, but also the domestic civilian population. The Department of Homeland Security recently even released a report about the growing tide of disgruntled lovers using poisons to target their exes. The proliferation of AI tools, which may easily instruct users on how to develop biological and chemical weapons - which may then be disseminated through commercially available drones - have made the development and release of these weapons much more attainable for a nefarious actor.
Simply, the threat of biological and chemical attacks is greater than ever before, and yet, we are more underprepared than at any point in the past 20 years to deter and respond to these threats.
To their credit, some in Congress and the Administration have taken action to fix this problem. A bipartisan duo, Rep. Don Davis and Jen Kiggans, have led the charge fixing America’s anthrax vulnerabilities. President Trump nominated Dr. Bob Kadlec, a supremely qualified American, to lead the Pentagon’s biodefense programs. The first Trump Administration rightfully executed a series of critical actions that enhanced preparedness - such as moving the SNS from the CDC to the Office of the ASPR, to elevate its status and better integrate its response structure.
There is some traction now to fixing these problems, but Congress and the Trump Administration must do more to respond to this national security vulnerability, starting with:
https://www.realcleardefense.com/art...p_1168312.html
President Trump’s former National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien recently wrote an op-ed about both the national security imperative of supporting the U.S. Strategic National Stockpile and the failures of the prior Administration to do so. I find myself in agreement with his points.
The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) is America’s health security backstop, the last line of defense from Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) attacks, such as Anthrax or Smallpox. The SNS also must be prepared to respond to pandemic disease threats that will overwhelm America’s healthcare system. I proudly served as the Director of the SNS for almost 13 years, under both Democrat and Republican Administrations. The SNS is the U.S. Government operation that you do not want to ever hear about, because if you are hearing or seeing the SNS in your daily life, it usually means something has gone horribly wrong to provoke our being there.
Today, you are reading about the SNS, because something has gone terribly wrong. In this case, it is that the SNS is losing its battle to be prepared for these threats. The SNS has long been the victim of gross underfunding, creating a tremendous gap in the response it can actually mount versus what is required to ensure preparedness.
The SNS is a great victim of misplaced priorities. Protecting the nation from the combined threats of CBRN attack and pandemic disease are both important goals. Under the Biden Administration, the SNS’ CBRN preparedness gap worsened, as the Biden team over-prioritized pandemic response and under-prioritized stockpiling to address biological and chemical threats. Under the Trump Administration, the President’s Budget proposed drastic cuts to the SNS and attacked biodefense vaccines, in both cases in the interest of politics. We cannot be prepared for only one scenario but rather we must be well prepared for all probable scenarios.
The Biden Administration’s mis-prioritization is a particularly striking juxtaposition: while the Biden Administration was requesting $20 billion in mandatory pandemic spending, in the very same Spend Plan, they proposed to eliminate Anthrax therapeutics entirely.
Actions under both Administrations have held overall stockpile levels at the SNS well below their requirements for preparedness, levels that continue to swiftly decline. The Government Accountability Office has repeatedly warned about this challenge, remarking that the SNS would be unable to effectively respond in the event of a crisis and placed its parent agency, the ASPR, on its High-Risk List.
The hardworking people of the SNS do the best they can with the little that they have, and yet, Congress after Congress and Administration after Administration continues to squeeze them even further. We have seen limited increases in appropriations in recent years, but they have still not been enough to meet requirements identified before 2020. As time passes and the money continues to not follow the need, SNS falls further behind in preparedness.
These planned cuts to biological defense spending have only emboldened our adversaries to develop offensive biological and chemical weapons programs. In December, reports emerged that Iran is attempting to include biological weapons, such as anthrax, into the heads of ballistic missiles. Just last month, front-page news showed federal authorities intercepting a CCP-connected biological laboratory, which was connected to another laboratory busted in 2022 that illicitly held high risk pathogens. Just last week, reports emerged that Russia used lethal toxins to kill Alex Navalny, which follows earlier reports about Russia expanding their biological weapons production facilities.
These threats are not only aimed at our warfighters and diplomatic personnel, but also the domestic civilian population. The Department of Homeland Security recently even released a report about the growing tide of disgruntled lovers using poisons to target their exes. The proliferation of AI tools, which may easily instruct users on how to develop biological and chemical weapons - which may then be disseminated through commercially available drones - have made the development and release of these weapons much more attainable for a nefarious actor.
Simply, the threat of biological and chemical attacks is greater than ever before, and yet, we are more underprepared than at any point in the past 20 years to deter and respond to these threats.
To their credit, some in Congress and the Administration have taken action to fix this problem. A bipartisan duo, Rep. Don Davis and Jen Kiggans, have led the charge fixing America’s anthrax vulnerabilities. President Trump nominated Dr. Bob Kadlec, a supremely qualified American, to lead the Pentagon’s biodefense programs. The first Trump Administration rightfully executed a series of critical actions that enhanced preparedness - such as moving the SNS from the CDC to the Office of the ASPR, to elevate its status and better integrate its response structure.
There is some traction now to fixing these problems, but Congress and the Trump Administration must do more to respond to this national security vulnerability, starting with:
- Fully funding the SNS, to ensure America’s biodefense backstop is able to meet its full requirements
- Reauthorizing the lapsed Pandemic All Hazards and Preparedness Act, to codify new ASPR authorities that enable a swift response
- Supporting the American industrial base for medical countermeasures and other medical material with long-term procurement agreements, to ensure the sustainability and viability of a vital component of America’s biodefense enterprise
- Expanding interagency stockpiling efforts, particularly at the Department of Defense and Department of State, both to ensure preparedness for the warfighter and diplomats and to augment America’s industrial base sustainment
- Prioritizing the on-shoring and domestic production of medical countermeasures, to remove foreign supply chain vulnerabilities
- Incentivizing states to develop their own stockpiles to relieve burdens off of the SNS, particularly of products that may be rotated into commercial markets, such as antibiotics and PPE
- Ensuring America’s allies are aligned with our stockpiling strategy, to augment the domestic industrial base and expand global deterrence
https://www.realcleardefense.com/art...p_1168312.html