Tweet
H5N8 HPAI GLOBAL situation update
07 March 2018, 15:30 hours; Rome
Disclaimer
Information provided herein is current as of the date of issue. Information added or changed since the last H5N8 situation update appears in red. Human cases are depicted in the geographic location of their report. For some cases, exposure may have occurred in one geographic location but reported in another. For cases with unknown onset date, reporting date was used instead. FAO compiles information drawn from multiple national (Ministries of Agriculture or Livestock, Ministries of Health, Provincial Government websites; Centers for Disease Prevention and Control [CDC]) and international sources (World Health Organization [WHO], World Organisation for Animal Health [OIE]) as well as peer-reviewed scientific articles. FAO makes every effort to ensure, but does not guarantee, accuracy, completeness or authenticity of the information. The designation employed and the presentation of material on the map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO concerning the legal or constitutional status of any country, territory or sea area, or concerning the delimitation of frontiers.
Overview
Situation: H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) 2016 virus in Africa, Asia, Europe and Middle East with pandemic potential.
Confirmed countries*: Austria*, Belgium*, Bosnia and Herzegovina*,Bulgaria*, Cameroon*, China, Croatia*, Cyprus, the Czech Republic*, Democratic Republic of the Congo*, Denmark*, Egypt*, Finland, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, France*, Germany*, Greece*, Hungary*, India*, Iran (Islamic Republic of)*, Iraq*, Ireland, Israel*, Italy*, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea*, Kuwait*, Lithuania, Luxembourg*,Nepal*, the Netherlands*, Niger*, Nigeria*, Poland*, Portugal, Romania*, Russian Federation*, Saudi Arabia*, Serbia*, Slovakia*, Slovenia, South Africa*, Spain*, Sweden*, Switzerland, Tunisia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*, Uganda*, Ukraine* and Zimbabwe*.
Number of human cases: None reported to date.
x Reports of H5N8 HPAI events in Taiwan, Province of China, are not included in this update since the virus belongs to a genetically different strain.
* Countries in which the virus was detected in poultry.
Map 1. H5N8 HPAI events officially reported in Asia, Europe and Africa by onset date
Click to enlarge - Note: The large map shows confirmed H5N8 HPAI events observed since 01 October 2017; the small map in the insert shows confirmed events observed between 01 June 2016 and 30 September 2017
Map 2. Global context: H5Nx HPAI events officially reported worldwide between 01 October 2017 and 07 March 2018
Click to enlarge
Figure 1. Phylogenetic relationships of A(H5) clade 2.3.4.4 HA genes from WHO?s Vaccine Composition Meeting Report, February 2018 [reference]
Click to enlarge - There is considerable genetic diversity in viruses of clade 2.3.4.4. The A(H5N8) viruses cluster from the period October 2016 to September 2017 has HA gene segments that are phylogenetically distinct from the cluster of viruses isolated in Asia during the period in 2013-2014. Initially, H5N8 viruses have been reported mostly from Anatidae (wild and domestic), but since 2017 outbreak reports in domestic birds such as chicken and turkey have increased H5N8. Current viruses (e.g. viruses isolated in Italy) are genetically similar to those of 2016/17. Additional information: NA subtypes other than N1 are specified. The scale bar represents the number of substitutions per site. Bootstrap supports of topology are shown above selected nodes. A/Anhui/1/2005 (clade 2.3.4) is used to root the tree. Human viruses are in bold font. The available Candidate Vaccine Viruses (CVV) are in red. The proposed CVV is indicated by a red dot(?). The viruses tested in haemagglutination inhibition assay are indicated by hashes (#).
FAO's support to countries
Global level
Recent Publications
World Health Organisation. Antigenic and genetic characteristics of zoonotic influenza viruses and candidate vaccine viruses developed for potential use in human vaccines. [reference]. The document summarises the genetic and antigenic characteristics of recent zoonotic influenza viruses and related viruses circulating in animals that are relevant to Candidate Vaccine Viruses updates.
Scoizec A, Niqueux E, Thomas R, Daniel P, Schmitz A, Le Bouquin S. Airborne Detection of H5N8 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Genome in Poultry Farms, France. Front Vet Sci. 2018 Feb 13;5:15. doi: 0.3389/fvets.2018.00015. eCollection 2018. PMC5816786. [reference] To investigate the potential role of airborne transmission in viral spread, air samples were collected inside, outside and downwind from infected duck and chicken facilities. H5 avian influenza virus RNA was detected in all samples collected inside poultry houses. These findings are in accordance with the possibility of airborne transmission and question the procedures for outbreak depopulation.
Ma L, Jin T, Wang H, Liu H, Wang R, Li Y, Yang G, Xiong Y, Chen J, Zhang J, Chen G, Li W, Liu D, Lin P, Huang Y, Gao GF, Chen Q. Two reassortant types of highly pathogenic H5N8 avian influenza virus from wild birds in Central China in 2016. Emerg Microbes Infect. 2018 Feb 7;7(1):14. doi: 10.1038/s41426-017-0012-y. [reference] In this study whole-genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis in Hubei province revealed that three wild bird viruses clustered into a group of H5N8 viruses from Qinghai Lake and Europe. From these data, it can be concluded that wetlands and lakes in Central China may play a key role in disseminating H5N8 viruses between the East Asian-Australasian and Central Asian flyways.
Salaheldin AH, El-Hamid HSA, Elbestawy AR, Veits J, Hafez HM, Mettenleiter TC, El-Whab EMA. Multiple Introductions of Influenza A(H5N8) Virus into Poultry, Egypt, 2017. Emerg Infect Dis. 2018 May 17;24(5). doi: 10.3201/eid2405.171935. [reference] Four distinct influenza A(H5N8) viruses isolated from poultry were genetically characterized. Full-genome analysis indicated separate introductions of H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 reassortants from Europe and Asia into Egypt, which poses a serious threat for poultry and humans.
Recommendations for affected countries and those at risk
Please refer to the Update published on 11 October 2017 for a list of recommendations.
http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/progra...on_update.html
07 March 2018, 15:30 hours; Rome
The next update will be issued on 04 April 2018
Disclaimer
Information provided herein is current as of the date of issue. Information added or changed since the last H5N8 situation update appears in red. Human cases are depicted in the geographic location of their report. For some cases, exposure may have occurred in one geographic location but reported in another. For cases with unknown onset date, reporting date was used instead. FAO compiles information drawn from multiple national (Ministries of Agriculture or Livestock, Ministries of Health, Provincial Government websites; Centers for Disease Prevention and Control [CDC]) and international sources (World Health Organization [WHO], World Organisation for Animal Health [OIE]) as well as peer-reviewed scientific articles. FAO makes every effort to ensure, but does not guarantee, accuracy, completeness or authenticity of the information. The designation employed and the presentation of material on the map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO concerning the legal or constitutional status of any country, territory or sea area, or concerning the delimitation of frontiers.
Overview
Situation: H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) 2016 virus in Africa, Asia, Europe and Middle East with pandemic potential.
Confirmed countries*: Austria*, Belgium*, Bosnia and Herzegovina*,Bulgaria*, Cameroon*, China, Croatia*, Cyprus, the Czech Republic*, Democratic Republic of the Congo*, Denmark*, Egypt*, Finland, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, France*, Germany*, Greece*, Hungary*, India*, Iran (Islamic Republic of)*, Iraq*, Ireland, Israel*, Italy*, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea*, Kuwait*, Lithuania, Luxembourg*,Nepal*, the Netherlands*, Niger*, Nigeria*, Poland*, Portugal, Romania*, Russian Federation*, Saudi Arabia*, Serbia*, Slovakia*, Slovenia, South Africa*, Spain*, Sweden*, Switzerland, Tunisia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*, Uganda*, Ukraine* and Zimbabwe*.
Number of human cases: None reported to date.
x Reports of H5N8 HPAI events in Taiwan, Province of China, are not included in this update since the virus belongs to a genetically different strain.
* Countries in which the virus was detected in poultry.
Map 1. H5N8 HPAI events officially reported in Asia, Europe and Africa by onset date
Click to enlarge - Note: The large map shows confirmed H5N8 HPAI events observed since 01 October 2017; the small map in the insert shows confirmed events observed between 01 June 2016 and 30 September 2017
Map 2. Global context: H5Nx HPAI events officially reported worldwide between 01 October 2017 and 07 March 2018
Click to enlarge
Figure 1. Phylogenetic relationships of A(H5) clade 2.3.4.4 HA genes from WHO?s Vaccine Composition Meeting Report, February 2018 [reference]
Click to enlarge - There is considerable genetic diversity in viruses of clade 2.3.4.4. The A(H5N8) viruses cluster from the period October 2016 to September 2017 has HA gene segments that are phylogenetically distinct from the cluster of viruses isolated in Asia during the period in 2013-2014. Initially, H5N8 viruses have been reported mostly from Anatidae (wild and domestic), but since 2017 outbreak reports in domestic birds such as chicken and turkey have increased H5N8. Current viruses (e.g. viruses isolated in Italy) are genetically similar to those of 2016/17. Additional information: NA subtypes other than N1 are specified. The scale bar represents the number of substitutions per site. Bootstrap supports of topology are shown above selected nodes. A/Anhui/1/2005 (clade 2.3.4) is used to root the tree. Human viruses are in bold font. The available Candidate Vaccine Viruses (CVV) are in red. The proposed CVV is indicated by a red dot(?). The viruses tested in haemagglutination inhibition assay are indicated by hashes (#).
| Domestic birds species affected | ||
| Anas platyrhynchos domesticus (Duck) | Anserinae sp. (Goose) | Gallus gallus domesticus (Chicken) |
| Meleagris gallopavo (Turkey) | ||
| Farmed wildlife species affected (Private collections, displays or production) |
||
| Dromaius novaeollandiae (Emu) | Pavo cristatus (Peacock) | Rhea americana (Greater Rhea) |
| Grus paradisea (Blue Crane) | Perdicinae (Partridge) | Struthio camelus (Ostrich) |
| Numida meleagris (Common Guineafowl) | Phasianus colchicus (Common Pheasant) | |
| Wild Birds species affected | ||
| Involved in transmission |
||
| Anas clypeata (Northern Shoveler) | Anser anser (Greylag Goose) | Cygnus columbianus (Tundra Swan) |
| Anas crecca (Common Teal) | Anser brachyrhynchus (Pink-footed Goose) | Cygnus cygnus (Whooper swan) |
| Anas falcata (Falcated Duck) | Anser fabalis (Been Goose) | Cygnus olor (Mute Swan) |
| Anas penelope (Eurasian Wigeon) | Aythya ferina (Common Pochard) | Marmaronetta angustirostris (Marbled teal) |
| Anas platyrhynchos (Mallard) | Aythya fuligula (Tufted Duck) | Netta rufina (Red-crested Pochard) |
| Anas strepera (Gadwall) | Aythya nyroca (Ferruginous Pochard) | Tadorna tadorna (Common Shelduck) |
| Anas undulata (Yellow-billed Duck) | Aythyinae or Anatinae sp. (Wild Duck) | |
| Anser albifrons (Greater White-fronted Goose) | Bucephala clangula (Common Goldeneye) | |
| Accidental hosts |
||
| Alopochen aegyptiaca (Egyptian Goose) | Columbidae sp. (Pigeon) | Platalea leucorodia (Eurasian Spoonbill) |
| Anser erythropus (Lesser white-fronted goose) | Cygnus atratus (Black Swan) | Plectopterus gambensis (Spur-winged Goose) |
| Ardea alba (Great Egret) | Egretta garzetta (Little Egret) | Plegadis falcinellus (Glossy Ibis) |
| Ardea cinerea (Grey Heron) | Fulica atra (Common Coot) | Ploceus velatus (Southern Masked-Weaver) |
| Ardea melanocephala (Black-headed Heron) | Gallinula chloropus (Common Moorhen) | Podiceps cristatus (Great Cested Grebe) |
| Balearica regulorum (Crowned crane) | Grus grus (Common Crane) | Recurvirostra avosetta (Pied avocet) |
| Botaurus stellaris (Eurasian bittern) | Grus japonensis (Red-crowned Crane) | Somateria mollissima (Eider) |
| Branta canadensis (Canada Goose ) | Himantopus himantopus (Black-winged Stilt) | Spheniscus demersus (Jackass Penguin) |
| Bubulcus ibis (Western Cattle Egret) | Lonchura sp. (Munia) | Sterna hirundo (Common Tern) |
| Cairina moschata (Muscovy Duck) | Mycteria leucocephala (Painted Stork) | Streptopella senegalensis (Laughing Dove) |
| Calidris minuta (Little stint) | Numenius arquata (Eurasian Curlew) | Streptopella decaocto (Eurasian Collared Dove) |
| Charadrius alexandrines (Kentish Plover) | Numenius sp.( Curlew) | Sturnus vulgaris (Common Starling) |
| Charadrius dubius (Little ringed plover) | Passer domesticus (House Sparrow) | Tachybaptus ruficollis (Little Grebe) |
| Charadrius hiaticula ( Common ringed plover) | Pavo cristatus (Indian Peafowl) | Thalasseus bergii (Swift tern) |
| Chlidonias leucoptera (White-winged Black Tern) | Pelecanus onocrotalus (Great White Pelican) | Threskiornis aethiopicus (Sacred Ibis) |
| Ciconia ciconia (White Stork) | Pelecanus sp. (Pelican) | Tringa glareola (Wood Sandpiper) |
| Ciconiidae sp. (Stork) | Phalacrocorax carbo (Great Cormorant) | Tringa ochropus (Green Sandpiper) |
| Columba guinea (African rock pigeon) | Phalacrocorax pygmaeus (Pygmy Cormorant) | Turdus merula (Eurasian Blackbird) |
| Columba palumbus (Common Wood-Pigeon) | Philomachus pugnax (Ruff) | Turdus philomelos (Song Thrush) |
| Columbia livia (Rock Pigeon) | Phoenicopterus roseus (Greater Flamingo) | Turdus pilaris (Fieldfare) |
| Scavenger birds and birds of prey | ||
| Accipiter gentilis (Northern Goshawk) | Corvus cornix (Hooded Crow) | Larus argentatus (Herring Gull) |
| Accipiter nisus (Eurasian Sparrowhawk) | Corvus frugilegus (Rook) | Larus fuscus (Lesser Black-backed Gull) |
| Accipiter nisus (Eurasian Sparrowhawk) | Corvus sp. (Crow) | Larus marinus (Great black-backed Gull) |
| Asio otus (Long Eared Owl) | Falco cherrug (Saker Falcon) | Larus michahellis (Yellow-legged Gull) |
| Bubo africanus (Spotted Eagle-Owl) | Falco peregrinus (Peregrine Falcon) | Pica pica (Common Magpie) |
| Bubo bubo (Eurasian Eagle-Owl) | Falco tinnunculus (Common Kestrel) | Strigiformes (Owl) |
| Buteo buteo (Common Buzzard) | Falco vespertinus (Red-footed Falcon) | Sula capensis (Cape Gannet) |
| Buteo rufofuscus (Jackal Buzzard) | Haliaeetus albicilla (White Tailed Eagle) | Tyto alba (Common Barn-Owl) |
| Chroicocephalus ridibundus (Black-headed Gull) | Laridae (Gull) | |
| Corvus albidae (Pied Crow) | Larus argentatus (Herring Gull) | |
| Corvus Corax (Common Raven) | Larus armenicus (Armenian Gull) | |
| Corvus cornix (Hooded Crow) | Larus canus (Mew Gull) | |
| Note: For each bird species, common name, genus and species name are listed. Species in subcategories are listed in alphabetic order, by their Latin name.Note: For each bird species, common name, genus and species name are listed. Species in subcategories are listed in alphabetic order, by their Latin name. | ||
FAO's support to countries
Global level
- Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting February 2018 [link] and September 2017 [link]
- A webinar titled Intercontinental spread of H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza ? Analysis of the current situation and recommendations for preventive action, targeting national veterinary services and FAO regional and country teams, was conducted by FAO on 24 November 2016 [link]
- EMPRES Watch, September 2016: H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) of clade 2.3.4.4 detected through surveillance of wild migratory birds in the Tyva Republic, the Russian Federation ? potential for international spread [link]
- EMPRES news, 4 November 2016: H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza detected in Hungary and in the Republic of India H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza detected in Hungary and in the Republic of India [link]
- FAO Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia news, November 2016: Highly pathogenic avian influenza spreading in Europe, South Asia [link]
- FAO Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia news, September 2016: Emergent Avian Influenza virus detected in surveillance of migratory birds in Russian Federation (FAO Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia news [link]
Recent Publications
World Health Organisation. Antigenic and genetic characteristics of zoonotic influenza viruses and candidate vaccine viruses developed for potential use in human vaccines. [reference]. The document summarises the genetic and antigenic characteristics of recent zoonotic influenza viruses and related viruses circulating in animals that are relevant to Candidate Vaccine Viruses updates.
Scoizec A, Niqueux E, Thomas R, Daniel P, Schmitz A, Le Bouquin S. Airborne Detection of H5N8 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Genome in Poultry Farms, France. Front Vet Sci. 2018 Feb 13;5:15. doi: 0.3389/fvets.2018.00015. eCollection 2018. PMC5816786. [reference] To investigate the potential role of airborne transmission in viral spread, air samples were collected inside, outside and downwind from infected duck and chicken facilities. H5 avian influenza virus RNA was detected in all samples collected inside poultry houses. These findings are in accordance with the possibility of airborne transmission and question the procedures for outbreak depopulation.
Ma L, Jin T, Wang H, Liu H, Wang R, Li Y, Yang G, Xiong Y, Chen J, Zhang J, Chen G, Li W, Liu D, Lin P, Huang Y, Gao GF, Chen Q. Two reassortant types of highly pathogenic H5N8 avian influenza virus from wild birds in Central China in 2016. Emerg Microbes Infect. 2018 Feb 7;7(1):14. doi: 10.1038/s41426-017-0012-y. [reference] In this study whole-genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis in Hubei province revealed that three wild bird viruses clustered into a group of H5N8 viruses from Qinghai Lake and Europe. From these data, it can be concluded that wetlands and lakes in Central China may play a key role in disseminating H5N8 viruses between the East Asian-Australasian and Central Asian flyways.
Salaheldin AH, El-Hamid HSA, Elbestawy AR, Veits J, Hafez HM, Mettenleiter TC, El-Whab EMA. Multiple Introductions of Influenza A(H5N8) Virus into Poultry, Egypt, 2017. Emerg Infect Dis. 2018 May 17;24(5). doi: 10.3201/eid2405.171935. [reference] Four distinct influenza A(H5N8) viruses isolated from poultry were genetically characterized. Full-genome analysis indicated separate introductions of H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 reassortants from Europe and Asia into Egypt, which poses a serious threat for poultry and humans.
Recommendations for affected countries and those at risk
Please refer to the Update published on 11 October 2017 for a list of recommendations.
http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/progra...on_update.html