Cruise ship - Hantavirus - May 3+ - As of May 22 per WHO: 13 total cases, 3 total deaths - WHO considers the outbreak over (July 2, 2026)

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Transcript - Update on CDC’s Hantavirus Response – 6/24/26

Transcript

For immediate release: June 24, 2026 Length: 12 minutes 35 seconds
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Please Note: This transcript is not edited and may contain errors.

00:00:00 Operator

Mr. Haynes, you may begin.

00:00:09 Ben Haynes, CDC Moderator

Thank you Julie, and thank you all for joining us today as we wrap up our hantavirus outbreak response, Here to discuss the response is Dr. Brendan Jackson, the acting director of CDC 's Division of High Consequence Pathogens and Pathology. I'll now turn the call over to Dr. Jackson.

00:00:26 CAPT Brendan Jackson, M.D., M.P.H., Acting Director, CDC's Division of High Consequence Pathogens and Pathology

Thank you and good afternoon; this week marks the successful conclusion of CDC 's public health response to the hantavirus outbreak associated with the M/V Hondius cruise ship. On Sunday, CDC together with state and local health departments across the country ,completed the 42-day monitoring period for all U.S. citizens identified as having potential exposure to the Andes virus, and everyone is home safe.

None of the people being monitored developed hantavirus disease; for CDC, this marks the end of a complex public health response that involved partners across multiple states, federal agencies, health systems and international organizations.

But before I talk about the response itself, I want to recognize the people at the center of this effort.

Several weeks ago, my CDC colleagues and I were in Nebraska for the arrival of the passengers from the cruise ship. These passengers were navigating uncertainty, disruption to their daily lives, and concerns for themselves and their families. I'd like to thank them for their cooperation and commitment to protecting others.

Public health responses succeed because people step up when asked to do something difficult. The people involved in this response did exactly that, and we are grateful for their partnership and collaboration. The outcome is good news for them, their families, their communities, and for public health.

From the beginning, our goal was to identify potentially exposed people, provide appropriate monitoring, and support and reduce the possibility of further transmittal.

And CDC was engaged at every step of the response.

Following notification of the outbreak, we worked closely with international partners, provided guidance and information to affected Americans, deployed staff to the Canary Islands to meet U.S. passengers, supported their repatriation to Nebraska, coordinated monitoring and assessments after their return, and worked with state and local health departments to identify and monitor additional U.S. residents that may have been exposed.

Throughout the response, we also provided regular updates and resources to the public, elected officials, and public health partners.

I also want to recognize the extraordinary efforts of our state, tribal, territorial, and local public health colleagues as well as our healthcare partners, other federal agencies, and international counterparts. Their professionalism, coordination and dedication were critical throughout this response.

Although monitoring activities in the United States are now complete, CDC 's scientific work related to this outbreak continues.

CDC scientists recently returned from Argentina where they worked with Argentine public health and epidemiology partners to better understand the origins of this outbreak, including trapping and testing rodents in areas connected to the outbreak, to help identify potential sources of Andes virus transmission.

The information gathered through this work will help us better understand Andes virus and strengthen strategies to detect prevent and respond to future outbreaks.

This is an important reminder that public health responses do not end when an immediate threat passes. We continue to learn from every event, and those lessons help improve preparedness and protection for people everywhere.

We're thankful that all monitored us contacts have completed the monitoring period without developing disease.

Public health is often most visible during moments of uncertainty. This week we can recognize something equally important: a successful outcome made possible by cooperation, science, and the commitment of people who chose to put the health of their communities first. This is what public health looks like when it works: people across communities, states and countries coming together to detect a threat, respond quickly, and protect lives.

Most people will never see the outbreaks that are prevented or the illnesses that never occur, but that is exactly the point.

Thank you.

00:04:14 Mr. Haynes

Thank you, Dr. Jackson. Julie we are ready to take questions.

00:04:19 Operator

Thank you if you are a credentialed member of the media you would like to ask a question during the call please press star one on your touch tone phone press star 2 to withdraw your question you may queue up at any time.

One moment please. Our first question comes from Pien Huang with NPR; your line is open.

00:05:32 Pien Huang, NPR

Hi; thanks for taking my question. Now that the quarantine is over, I wanted to ask about the experience of Angela Perryman. She was not allowed to leave the quarantine facility even though the CDC medical review supported her release to home quarantine. I'm wondering what were the reasons for that and whether that sets a precedent for the future.

00:05:54 Dr. Jackson

Great question. So, I'll say this was a complex response involving many federal, state, and local partners. A decision was made across the federal government about the monitoring requirements for passengers returning home after their stay at the National Quarantine Unit. CDC worked with state and local partners to tailor monitoring based on the resources available in each jurisdiction.

00:06:17 Mr. Haynes

Next question, please.

00:06:23 Operator

One moment for the next question.

Our next question comes from Mike Stobbe with The Associated Press; your line is open.

00:06:36 Mike Stobbe, Associated Press

Hi thank you for taking my question; you said that you had sent some CDC people to Argentina to work on, among other things, investigating the origin of the outbreak. I was wondering how many CDC-ers went and what's the current best understanding of the origin of the outbreak is.

And also, could you tell us the total cost of the quarantining operation of the University of Nebraska: how much, how much money taxpayer money was spent on that. Thank you.

00:07:10 Dr. Jackson

Thanks for the questions. On the last one, about the cost, I would have to defer to colleagues at the Agency for Strategic Preparedness and Response, as they maintain the contract related to quarantine, so would defer to them there. Related to the trip to Argentina, there were 2 disease ecologists, actually from the division that I work in, the Division of High Consequence Pathogens and Pathology, that traveled down to Argentina where they met one of the CDC assigned or the CDC assignee down that works in Argentina.

And they worked directly with investigators in that country. They were trapping rodents. Unfortunately, all the ones that they identified were, were negative, based on preliminary information so far. In terms of the likely source of exposure, I think that's something that's really still under investigation.

We know that, that, and these virus is prevalent throughout certain parts of Argentina, and we're really trying to better understand where those places might be, where it might be, areas where it has not been fully detected, in ways of helping to protect the people that live in that country and visit it as well.

00:08:14 Mr. Haynes

Next question, please.

00:08:17 Operator

Thank you; our next question comes from Allison Young with Healthbeat; your line is open.

00:08:22 Alison Young, Healthbeat

Hi. I'm hoping you can talk a little bit about what the terms and conditions were for allowing some of the passengers to undergo home quarantine in their home states, and in particular, I'm hoping that you can talk a little bit about the reports that some of the passengers, or many of them, were required 24/7 home monitoring, and, and a little bit about what were the public health and scientific justifications for that level of monitoring.

00:09:01 Dr. Jackson

Yeah, absolutely. I'll just reiterate that this was a complex response, and it involved a lot of federal, state, and local partners, as you've referenced, so the decision about monitoring was made across the federal government. And that was both in terms of where they were monitored and in terms of what the monitoring requirements look like.

00:09:25 Ms. Young

Can you say anything about what your knowledge is of the scientific basis for 24/7 monitoring?

00:09:36 Dr. Jackson

You know, I think again, just referring to the fact this was a complex response that involved a lot of federal, state, and local partners, and that decision was made across the federal government about the monitoring requirements.

00:09:47 Mr. Haynes

Next question, please.

00:09:50 Operator

As a reminder to ask a question please press star one; one moment.

Our next question comes from Anthony Stitt with Healio; your line is open.

00:10:12 Anthony Stitt, Healio

Hi thanks so much for taking my call. There were 3 deaths as a result of this outbreak; there are a few other cases as well. What's the health like of those cases, of the people who survived, other long term health issues with them, at all or are they completely healthy right now?

00:10:35 Dr. Jackson

It's a good question. I'll just, as you, as you all know, none of the Americans who were involved in this outbreak became ill, and so all of those passengers were residents of other countries, and there's a coordinated effort to help understand that the illness courses of those people. And I expect more information to come out in that in the future.

00:11:01 Mr. Haynes

Our next question, please.

00:11:06 Operator

One moment for the next question. Our last question comes from Jennifer Calfas with Wall Street Journal, your line is open.

00:11:21 Jennifer Calfas, Wall Street Journal

Great; thank you all for doing this; we really appreciate it. I just, I'm not quite sure how much more you can say on this, but I wanted to ask more about the 24/7 monitoring where some of the former passengers able to return home because their states had agreed to monitor them 24/7, and were others denied because of states either decided not to or could not provide that kind of monitor.

I just wanted to understand a little bit more about specifically how that played a role in which passengers were able to, or which more passengers were able to, you know, finish their quarantine at home, you know, following the guidelines set by the federal government.

00:12:01 Dr. Jackson

So, to answer your question briefly: Yes, you are correct in your understanding there ,and just to add on that some of the passengers elected to complete their stay at the National Quarantine Unit on their own.

00:12:14 Mr. Haynes

Thank you, Dr. Jackson, and thank you all for joining us. A transcript of this briefing will be available on the media website, or media newsroom, atwww.cdc.gov/media. Thank you; this will conclude our briefing.

00:12:30 Operator

Thank you for your participation. Participants, you may disconnect at this time.

https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2026/transcript-update-on-cdcs-hantavirus-response-6-24-26.html

[Pathfinder]

"Today, the final contact of a person exposed to Hantavirus on the cruise ship MV Hondius completed their quarantine period, tested negative and returned home.

No further cases have been reported since the 25th of May.

We are therefore very pleased to say that WHO considers the outbreak over.

The total number of cases from the outbreak remains 13, including three deaths.

More than 650 contacts were identified and followed up by health authorities in 33 countries and territories.
Although the outbreak is over, WHO will continue working with governments and partners to advance our understanding of this outbreak and of hantavirus more generally.

We are also coordinating a study involving 21 countries to understand how the disease develops, which will support the development of diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines for future outbreaks.

Once again, I would like to thank all countries that supported the response, in line with the International Health Regulations:vArgentina, Cabo Verde, Chile, the Netherlands, South Africa, the United Kingdom and especially Spain, which showed incredible solidarity in supporting the safe disembarkation and repatriation of passengers and crew in Tenerife"-
@DrTedros



8:14 AM · Jul 2, 2026

[Pathfinder]

Hantavirus outbreak linked to cruise ship travel, Multi-locations

2 July 2026

Situation at a glance

This is the fifth Disease Outbreak News posting on the Andes hantavirus (ANDV) outbreak linked to the cruise ship M/V Hondius. The outbreak identification followed the notification to the World Health Organization (WHO) on 2 May 2026 of severe acute respiratory illness cases onboard. Since the previous Disease Outbreak News was published on 28 May 2026, one of the probable cases from Tristan da Cunha, an Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereafter referred to as the United Kingdom), was laboratory confirmed. As of 2 July, a total of 13 cases, including three deaths, have been notified (case fatality ratio 23%). Twelve cases have been laboratory-confirmed for ANDV infection, and one is a probable case. All confirmed cases are among individuals who travelled onboard the M/V Hondius. Among the ten cases admitted to hospitals, eight have recovered and have been discharged, while two are still undergoing medical treatment. All identified contacts have completed the 42 day follow-up period by local health authorities in line with WHO guidance. The completion of the contact follow up without detection of additional secondary cases demonstrates effective interruption of transmission and confirms outbreak containment. This outbreak no longer poses a public health risk and no further related transmission is expected.

Description of the situation


On 2 May 2026, in accordance with the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR), WHO received a notification from the National IHR Focal Point (NFP) of the United Kingdom of a cluster of severe acute respiratory illness aboard the Netherlands-flagged cruise ship M/V Hondius, with further details rapidly notified authorities in the Netherlands and South Africa.

As of 2 July, a total of 13 cases (12 confirmed and one probable case), including three deaths (two confirmed and one probable), have been reported globally linked to the cruise ship. The case fatality ratio for this outbreak to date is 23%. Since the last Disease Outbreak News was published on 28 May 2026, ANDV infection was laboratory confirmed in a probable case in Tristan da Cunha who developed signs and symptoms after disembarkation from the cruise ship. The early detection and isolation of the case prevented further transmission of the virus, but the limited diagnostic capacities on the island delayed the confirmation of the case until a sample was shipped and tested in the United Kingdom. The patient has recovered and has been discharged.

Among the confirmed cases admitted to hospital, eight have recovered and been discharged, while two, one in South Africa and one in France, continue to be hospitalized. All 13 cases are among people who travelled on board the M/V Hondius.

Figure 1. Epidemiological curve of Andes hantavirus cases (n = 13) reported to WHO as of 2 July 2026.



Nine of the reported cases were males, and four were females. The median age was 65-years-old (IQR 56-70), similar to the median age of the passengers onboard the ship (Figure 2). The ages of the three deceased cases were 69, 70 and 79-years-old.


Figure 2. Age and sex distribution of Andes hantavirus cases (n = 13) reported to WHO as of 2 July 2026.



Currently available information suggests that infection of initial cases was likely acquired on land prior to embarkation, although the exact source and route of exposure remain undetermined, with subsequent human-to-human transmission occurring aboard the vessel. Investigations remain underway to establish the circumstances and source of the outbreak, including genomic sequencing of ANDV samples from surveillance cases in Chile and Argentina, and will be published as soon as these are available.

This outbreak was managed through a coordinated international response, which included comprehensive epidemiological investigations, case isolation and clinical management, medical evacuations, laboratory testing, repatriation of passengers and crew from the ship and international contact tracing, as well as quarantine and monitoring measures.


Contact identification and follow-up of contacts of hantavirus cases linked to the cruise ship has been conducted in 33 countries and overseas territories. This included passengers and crew onboard the ship, contacts of the case on Tristan da Cunha, contacts from two different international flights, healthcare workers and airport crew who assisted cases before the detection of the outbreak. As of 2 July 2026, 317 high-risk contacts have completed quarantine and monitoring by local health authorities in the countries and territories where they were repatriated, evacuated or identified. Some 336 low-risk contacts completed self-monitoring in line with the updated guidance on management of contacts of Andes virus (ANDV) cases from the MV Hondius cruise ship published on 17 May 2026.

Epidemiology


Hantavirus disease is a zoonotic viral disease caused by hantaviruses of the genus Orthohantavirus, family Hantaviridae, order Elliovirales, class Bunyaviricetes. More than 20 viral species have been identified within this genus.


Human hantavirus infection is primarily acquired through contact with the urine, faeces, or saliva of certain species of (specific) infected rodents, or by touching contaminated surfaces. Exposure typically occurs during activities such as cleaning buildings with rodent infestations, though it may also occur during routine activities in heavily infested areas. Human cases are most commonly reported in rural settings, such as forests, fields, and farms, where rodents are present and opportunities for exposure are greater.


Limited human-to-human transmission has currently only been reported for hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (HPS) associated with ANDV virus infection. ANDV is endemic in South America, with confirmed circulation and human infections reported primarily in Argentina and Chile, and additional cases and related strains identified in Uruguay, southern Brazil, and Paraguay.


Andes virus transmission between humans


Based on the available information and the existing observations of the current outbreak, limited human-to-human transmission of ANDV is known to occur. However, no large-scale human-to-human outbreaks have been observed historically.^[1] ANDV circulates in specific species of rodents in the Americas, and there have been many sporadic cases reported in Argentina and Chile that have not led to onward transmission.^[2] Clusters of human cases have been reported in multiple past outbreaks and have been typically associated with close and prolonged interactions, often in shared indoor environments such as households. The largest reported outbreak of ANDV was reported in Argentina in 2018-2019,² where high viral titres in combination with attendance at large social gatherings or extensive contacts among people were associated with higher transmission. While the available evidence suggests that there are multiple modes of transmission that occur with ANDV, the probability of onward transmission between humans remains low.


Initial epidemiological investigation and the genomics analysis^[3] of the identified cases show that in this outbreak of ANDV infection, human-to-human transmission has occurred on the ship. While detailed information on the interaction between cases or with a contaminated environment aboard the ship is currently not available, these exact modes of transmission might be elucidated by upcoming results from an in-depth epidemiological investigation, as well as publication of the environmental sampling performed after the disembarkation.

Response activities operated under the assumption that ANDV transmission:

• may have included contact with an infected individual or contaminated surfaces;
• and/or through-the-air transmission (via direct deposition of infectious respiratory particles onto exposed facial mucosal surfaces—mouth, nose, or eyes);
• and/or airborne transmission (via inhalation of infectious respiratory particles).

Given the attack rate among the ship passengers, as well as the absence of secondary cases among contacts off the ship, the virus did not exhibit transmission dynamics consistent with highly transmissible airborne pathogens (such as measles).

Public health response


Authorities from States Parties managing cases and/or contacts, WHO, and partners such as the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control have coordinated response measures, including:

• Ongoing engagement between WHO and the NFPs of countries managing cases and/or contacts ensured timely information sharing and coordination of response actions.
• International contact tracing and follow-up of contacts was conducted by local health authorities in line with national arrangements.
• WHO requested regular information sharing and periodic updates from States Parties through IHR channels regarding the follow-up of contacts and their health status.
• Ongoing epidemiological investigations to define epidemiological links between cases and exposure factors on the ship, as well as to try to understand the potential source of exposure.
• A prospective natural history study designed to improve understanding of Andes virus (ANDV) transmission dynamics, incubation periods, immune responses, viral kinetics, and the determinants of severe disease through harmonised longitudinal follow-up of exposed individuals. The study uses a standardised prospective protocol implemented across 21 participating countries.^[4]
• WHO developed and published specific technical guidance documents to support response to the event, including:
  • Technical guidance on the management of hantavirus onboard ships was shared with States Parties through IHR channels
  • Technical note for the disembarkation and onward management of passengers and crew in the context of an ANDV-associated cluster;
  • Management of contacts of Andes Virus (ANDV) cases from the MV Hondius cruise ship
  • Laboratory testing of Andes virus (Orthohantavirus andesense) infection: Interim guidance

• The NFPs of countries managing cases and/or contacts have been exchanging passenger- and crew-related information.

• WHO provided risk communication coordination and support, ensured timely evidence-based information sharing, activated the coordination mechanisms across the three organizational levels, and supported national authorities in implementing public health measures, including in accordance with IHR provisions.
• WHO convened regular Member State briefings, expert discussions covering key technical, laboratory, clinical care and infection prevention and control (IPC) topics, and global webinars via the EPI-WIN knowledge platform to facilitate experience sharing and coordinate support.
• WHO supported the development of research protocols with national and international partners and planned a hantavirus consultation on medical countermeasures.
• WHO coordinated the distribution of the laboratory testing and reference materials made available by Chile and Argentina, as well as diagnostic protocols and information on available test kits and their performance.

WHO risk assessment


The ANDV outbreak associated with the MV Hondius cruise ship no longer poses a public health risk and no further related transmission is expected. ANDV remains endemic in South America, and it is associated with hantavirus pulmonary syndrome with substantial case fatality, its transmissibility remains limited, typically requiring close and prolonged exposure, and tends to result in temporally and spatially restricted clusters.


While the confined maritime environment of this event likely facilitated transmission during the voyage, epidemiological and genomic evidence supports a point source outbreak, originating either from contact with an infected animal or infected person, followed by limited chains of human-to-human secondary transmission, without evidence of sustained transmission.


The completion of the 42-day follow-up period for all identified contacts without further detection of additional secondary cases demonstrates effective interruption of transmission and confirms outbreak containment. Additionally, IPC measures continue to be applied for the management of the two cases still hospitalized.

WHO advice


WHO advises all countries to sustain strong engagement and collaboration to document and learn from this outbreak response, including both successes and operational challenges, and to apply the lessons identified to strengthen preparedness, surveillance including international tracing and follow up of contacts, clinical care, IPC, risk communication, and response capacities for future public health emergencies.

WHO further encourages the continuation of epidemiological, clinical, laboratory, and ecological studies to better understand the outbreak, its transmission dynamics, risk factors, and determinants of disease severity.

In areas where hantavirus is endemic, WHO recommends strengthening measures to prevent and control transmission through enhanced surveillance, public awareness, environmental management, reduction of exposure to rodent reservoirs and contaminated environments, and early detection, implementation of IPC measures and management of cases.

WHO also encourages continued investment in research and development to advance the availability of effective diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines, and to improve preparedness and response capabilities for future hantavirus outbreaks.

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https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON611