Indonesia May Share Gene Data on Bird Flu Cases, Official Says

[hawkeye]

Indonesia May Share Gene Data on Bird Flu Cases, Official Says

June 2 (Bloomberg) -- Genetic information that may help scientists understand the bird flu virus that caused the world's largest cluster of human cases hasn't been shared publicly by Indonesia, a government official said.

I Nyoman Kandun, director-general of disease control and environment at the Indonesian Ministry of Health, said the government would consider how the information would be used before agreeing to any request for its public release on GenBank genetic sequence database. The government may share the information if it helps researchers and isn't an opportunity for them to make money, Kandun said.

``We have not received any request to share it with GenBank,'' Kandun said yesterday in an interview from Jakarta. ``If there was a request, and it's clear that it is in the public interest to do so, why not? I would surely recommend it to the health minister.''

Scientists are analyzing genetic sequences of the H5N1 avian influenza virus to look for changes that may indicate that it is becoming more contagious among people and closer to setting off a feared pandemic. The infections last month of seven members of a family living on the Indonesian island of Sumatra are seen as particularly significant because they may provide the first evidence of a three-person chain of infection.

``We think it's important to share this information so that everyone can have a better understanding of what's going on,'' said Maria Cheng, a spokeswoman for the World Health Organization in Geneva. The WHO ``can't compel countries to do things they don't want to do.''

Genetic sequencing of samples from family members, six of whom were confirmed to have died from H5N1, were undertaken by a WHO reference laboratory in Hong Kong and shared with the Indonesian government, Malik Peiris, professor of microbiology at the University of Hong Kong, said over the phone.

Analysis of samples from the Sumatran cases show there has been no change in the H5N1 virus that would indicate it's become easily transmissible between people, Peiris said.

[HenryN]

Re: Indonesia May Share Gene Data on Bird Flu Cases, Official Says

Commentary at

http://www.recombinomics.com/News/06010602/H5N1_Indonesia_Progress.html

[Mellie]

Progress on Release of Indonesian H5N1 Sequences

Progress on Release of Indonesian H5N1 Sequences

Recombinomics Commentary
June 1, 2006

``We have not received any request to share it with GenBank,'' Kandun said yesterday in an interview from Jakarta. ``If there was a request, and it's clear that it is in the public interest to do so, why not? I would surely recommend it to the health minister.''

``We think it's important to share this information so that everyone can have a better understanding of what's going on,'' said Maria Cheng, a spokeswoman for the World Health Organization in Geneva.

The above comments from the director-general of disease control in Indonesia as well as a spokesperson for the WHO would appear to pave the way for the release of H5N1 bird flu sequences sequestered at the WHO private database. Release of these sequences is important for determining how H5N1 is evolving in Indonesia.

The recent cluster in north Sumatra was the largest and most deadly in Indonesia and had clear examples of multiple human-to-human transmissions. The description of the sequences provided information of the lack of reassortment and "significant mutations". These significant mutations appear to be limited to HA positions 226 and 228 in the receptor binding domain. However, usually resistance markers for the two classes of anti-virals are determined as well as position 627 in the PB2 gene.

The WHO report indicated the H5N1 was sensitive to neuraminidase inhibitors, but failed to mention sensitivity to ion channel blocks, the amantadanes. This omission suggested the isolates were amantadane resistant with M2 S31N. The high concentrations of H5N1 in the nose ands throat also raised the possibility of acquisition of PB2 E627K. Moreover, the similarity to bird isolates suggest the HA cleavage site was the wild type sequence, RERRRKKR.

The amantadine resistance would affect treatment choices and the acquisition of PB2 E627K may make the H5N1 more transmissible, which would account for the size of the cluster and length of the transmission chain.

In addition to questions concerning the sequences in Sumatra, there are additional concerns about the sequence from West Java, which have a novel cleavage site, RESRRKKR, which has not been reported in bird sequences anywhere. This difference between in the human and bird sequences raises questions on the origin of infections. Since most H5N1 testing is limited to suspect cases that have had recent exposure to dead and dying birds, cases due to infection by H5N1 from an alternate reservoir may be overlooked.

Publishing of the sequences allows for sophisticated analysis that can determine the source of the infections. WHO consultants believe H5N1 evolves via reassortment and random mutation. However, compelling evidence indicates change via recombination is much more common. Since acquisitions of polymorphisms are derived from other viruses via dual infection, the acquired polymorphisms can be used to identify donor sequences and viruses. Thus, polymorphisms can be used to trace origins, and this tracing is most efficient when a robust database is available.

Therefore release of the sequences allows important questions of origins of infections to be determined. These sequestered sequences as well as additional sequences from animal reservoirs will aid in the identification and elimination or control of reservoirs causing the increasing number of H5N1 infections in humans and other hosts.