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Detecting Human-to-Human Transmission of Avian Influenza A (H5N1) : Study Confirms Limited Human-To-Human Spread of Avian-Flu Virus in Indonesia in 2006

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  • Detecting Human-to-Human Transmission of Avian Influenza A (H5N1) : Study Confirms Limited Human-To-Human Spread of Avian-Flu Virus in Indonesia in 2006

    Study Confirms Limited Human-To-Human Spread of Avian-Flu Virus in Indonesia in 2006



    New software will provide first real-time analysis of such
    infectious-disease outbreaks


    SEATTLE, Aug. 28 /PRNewswire/ -- In the first systematic, statistical
    analysis of its kind, infectious-disease-modeling experts at Fred
    Hutchinson Cancer Research Center confirm that the avian influenza A (H5N1)
    virus in 2006 spread between a small number of people within a family in
    Indonesia. The findings, by biostatistician Ira M. Longini Jr., Ph.D., and
    colleagues, appear online and will be published in the Sept. 1 print
    edition of Emerging Infectious Diseases, a journal of the Centers for
    Disease Control and Prevention.

    Co-authors on the paper were biostatisticians M. Elizabeth (Betz)
    Halloran, M.D., D.Sc., and Yang Yang, Ph.D.; and epidemiologist Jonathan
    Sugimoto, M.H.S., a pre-doctoral research associate. All are within the
    Hutchinson Center's Public Health Sciences Division and Vaccine and
    Infectious Disease Institute.

    The researchers based their findings on a cluster of eight flu cases
    within an extended family in northern Sumatra
    . Using a computerized
    disease-transmission model that took into account the number of infected
    cases, the number of people potentially exposed, the viral-incubation
    period and other parameters, the researchers produced the first statistical
    confirmation of humans contracting the disease from each other rather than
    from infected birds.

    The cluster contained a chain of infection that involved a 10-year-old
    boy who probably caught the virus from his 37-year-old aunt, who had been
    exposed to dead poultry and chicken feces, the presumed source of
    infection. The boy then probably passed the virus to his father. The
    possibility that the boy infected his father was supported by genetic
    sequencing data. Other person-to-person transmissions in the cluster are
    backed up with statistical data. All but one of the flu victims died, and
    all had had sustained close contact with other ill family members prior to
    getting sick -- a factor considered crucial for transmission of this
    particular flu strain.

    In an attempt to contain the spread of the virus, the local health
    authorities eventually placed more than 50 surviving relatives and close
    contacts under voluntary quarantine and all, except for pregnant women and
    infants, received antiviral medication as a precaution.

    "The containment strategy was implemented late in the game, so it could
    have been just luck that the virus burned out
    ," Longini said. "It went two
    generations and then just stopped, but it could have gotten out of control.
    The world really may have dodged a bullet with that one, and the next time
    we might not be so lucky," he said.

    Should a strain of avian flu acquire the ability to cause sustained
    human-to-human transmission, the results could be catastrophic, Longini
    said. "If not contained, the outbreak could spread worldwide through the
    global transportation network faster than the appropriate vaccine supply
    could be made available. That's why it's so important to ascertain whether
    human-to-human transmission is happening as well as the virulence of the
    strain." The researchers estimated the secondary-attack rate of the virus
    in Indonesia -- the risk of one infected person passing it to another -- to
    be 29 percent, a level of infectiousness similar to statistical estimates
    for seasonal influenza A in the United States.

    The researchers also aimed their statistical transmission-assessment
    technology at another large avian-flu cluster in eastern Turkey that in
    2006 infected eight people, four of whom died
    . In this case, the
    researchers did not find statistical evidence of human-to-human
    transmission, most likely due to a lack of sufficient data. "There probably
    was person-to-person spread there as well but we couldn't get all the
    information we needed for the analysis
    ," Yang said.

    The methods and software used in this research led to the development
    of a software application called TranStat, which will allow first
    responders to enter, store and perform real-time analysis of data from
    infectious-disease outbreaks. This tool soon will be available online free
    of charge via MIDAS
    , the Models of Infectious Disease Agent Study, which is
    supported by the National Institute of General Medical Sciences.

    "We know the key to preventing a pandemic is early detection,
    containment and mitigation with antiviral therapy and this tool will enable
    those on the front lines
    , such as physicians, epidemiologists and other
    public-health officials, to carry that out efficiently," Halloran said.

    "The manuals on how to collect the necessary data are decades old. They are
    very outdated and incomplete. Often people on the front lines don't know
    what to do; they don't collect the correct data to assess whether
    transmission is occurring. TranStat will prompt people to gather precisely
    the data that needs to be collected to better understand and contain any
    infectious-disease spread, not just the avian flu," Sugimoto said.

    If a smoldering disease cluster does flame out of control, the software
    also could be used to estimate the important characteristics of the virus

    -- such as its transmissibility, secondary-attack rate and reproductive
    number -- which would give public-health officials a better chance at
    slowing its spread until a vaccine or other effective control measures
    could be implemented.

    Yang and colleagues recently described the basis for the statistical
    methods used in the research in The Annals of Applied Statistics.

    The study was funded and supported by the National Institute of General
    Medical Sciences MIDAS network and the National Institute of Allergy and
    Infectious Diseases.

    Longini and Halloran also are professors of biostatistics and Sugimoto
    is a pre-doctoral student in the School of Public Health and Community
    Medicine at the University of Washington.

    At Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, our interdisciplinary teams
    of world-renowned scientists and humanitarians work together to prevent,
    diagnose and treat cancer, HIV/AIDS and other diseases. Our researchers,
    including three Nobel laureates, bring a relentless pursuit and passion for
    health, knowledge and hope to their work and to the world. For more
    information, please visit fhcrc.org.


    CONTACT
    Kristen Woodward
    (206) 667-5095
    kwoodwar@fhcrc.org

    Take a look at All News Releases related news releases, photos and videos distributed by PR Newswire, with investor relations and company news.
    "Addressing chronic disease is an issue of human rights that must be our call to arms"
    Richard Horton, Editor-in-Chief The Lancet

  • #2
    Re: Study Confirms Limited Human-To-Human Spread of Avian-Flu Virus in Indonesia in 2

    Detecting Human-to-Human Transmission
    of Avian Influenza A (H5N1)

    Yang Yang,* M. Elizabeth Halloran,*? Jonathan Sugimoto,*? and Ira M. Longini, Jr.*?
    *Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, Seattle, Washington, USA; and ?University of Washington, Seattle,
    Washington, USA

    Highly pathogenic avian influenza A (HPAI) subtype H5N1 has caused family case clusters, mostly in
    Southeast Asia, that could be due to human-to-human transmission. Should this virus, or another
    zoonotic influenza virus, gain the ability of sustained human-to-human transmission, an influenza
    pandemic could result. We used statistical methods to test whether observed clusters of HPAI (H5N1)
    illnesses in families in northern Sumatra, Indonesia, and eastern Turkey were due to human-to-human
    transmission. Given that human-to-human transmission occurs, we estimate the infection secondary
    attack rates (SARs) and the local basic reproductive number, R0. We find statistical evidence of human-to-
    human transmission (p = 0.009) in Sumatra but not in Turkey (p = 0.114). For Sumatra, the estimated
    household SAR was 29% (95% confidence interval [CI] 15?51). The estimated lower limit on the local R0
    was 1.14 (95% CI 0.61?2.14). Effective HPAI (H5N1) surveillance, containment response, and field
    evaluation are essential to monitor and contain potential pandemic strains.

    link to full article: http://www.cdc.gov/eid/content/13/9/pdfs/07-0111.pdf

    Comment


    • #3
      Re: Study Confirms Limited Human-To-Human Spread of Avian-Flu Virus in Indonesia in 2



      1918 Case Fatality Rates

      Recombinomics Commentary
      December 1, 2004


      >>"Based on past experience, we don't have to panic," Longini tells WebMD. "It's clear that pandemic flu is inevitable. It is going to happen, and it could be a fairly pathogenic strain and could be a real problem. Right now, H5N1 bird influenza looks like it is fatal in 70&#37; of cases. But this 70% figure is totally absurd. It has never been true of any human flu strain. I have never seen any evidence that human influenza is anywhere near that virulent. Case fatality of even highly virulent strains are a couple of deaths per 10,000 people infected."<<

      Comment


      • #4
        Re: Study Confirms Limited Human-To-Human Spread of Avian-Flu Virus in Indonesia in 2

        This morning, I emailed a friend of mine -- someone who is a "household name" in all influenza circles, and who is one of the few people the general public recognizes as expert on the topic of avian flu and pandemic preparedness.

        Anyway, I casually mentioned the Hutch study as a way to snap America out of the doldrums when it comes to pandemic plans. He immediately called me to say to use caution when quoting from the study, as he felt strongly that the statistics and the study itself may not be dependable.

        I think Dr. Niman may be also alluding to this by reaching back to the 2004 quote from one of the authors.

        I think we all agree that H2H(2H?) occurred in Sumatra in May, 2006. I think what my friend is saying is that the authors reached very far, statistically, to obtain their conclusion. Stretched to the point of stretching their credibility.

        Comment


        • #5
          Re: Study Confirms Limited Human-To-Human Spread of Avian-Flu Virus in Indonesia in 2

          Any computer study is no better than the assumptions of those who write the programs. I can vouch for that after many years of computer programming.

          I could add to Dr. Niman's oft-repeated line (...H5N1 doesn't read press releases....) that H5N1 also isn't programmed by the same programmers as computer studies.

          .
          "The next major advancement in the health of American people will be determined by what the individual is willing to do for himself"-- John Knowles, Former President of the Rockefeller Foundation

          Comment


          • #6
            Re: Study Confirms Limited Human-To-Human Spread of Avian-Flu Virus in Indonesia in 2

            Originally posted by scottmcpherson View Post
            . . . .
            I think we all agree that H2H(2H?) occurred in Sumatra in May, 2006. I think what my friend is saying is that the authors reached very far, statistically, to obtain their conclusion. Stretched to the point of stretching their credibility.
            The researchers are extrapolating from limited data. They have a sample size of 1. That is, their statistics for H2H transmission are based on an analysis of a single 8-person cluster in Sumatra. A Secondary Attack Rate (SAR) of 29% (with a statistical range of 15-51%), based only on one cluster, is suspect until more H2H clusters are analyzed.

            Comment


            • #7
              Re: Study Confirms Limited Human-To-Human Spread of Avian-Flu Virus in Indonesia in 2

              A sample size of 1 is unacceptable by statistical norms.

              Comment


              • #8
                Re: Study Confirms Limited Human-To-Human Spread of Avian-Flu Virus in Indonesia in 2

                Indonesia dismisses human-to-human bird flu report

                JAKARTA, Sept 3 (Reuters) - Indonesia rejected on Monday a study by U.S. researchers that concluded that the H5N1 bird flu virus had spread from person to person during an outbreak last year, saying it was misleading.

                A mathematical analysis published last week in the U.S. journal of Emerging Infectious Diseases said it found statistical evidence of human-to-human transmission in a cluster of cases on Sumatra island, where eight family members died in May 2006. Indonesia's Health Minister Siti Fadillah Supari said the research findings had "misled the public".

                "It's pure logic... If there had been human-to-human transmission, it would have already swept the country and killed thousands," Supari told a news conference.

                "Our scientists have already determined that the 2006 outbreak on North Sumatra was not a case of human-to-human transmission." Researcher Ira Longini and colleagues at the Ferd Hutchinson Cancer Research Center in Seattle, who examined two clusters of bird flu cases, said they had developed a tool to run quick tests on disease outbreaks to see if dangerous epidemics or pandemics may be developing.

                "We find statistical evidence of human-to-human transmission in Sumatra, but not in Turkey," they wrote in a report published in the journal Emerging Infectious Diseases on the two clusters studied.

                Bird flu is endemic in bird populations in most parts of Indonesia, where millions of backyard chickens live in close proximity to people.

                While it is largely an animal disease, experts fear the virus could mutate and spread from human to human, turning into pandemic that could kill millions.

                Contact with sick fowl is the most common way for humans to contract the disease.

                Indonesia has had 105 confirmed human cases from bird flu, out of which 84 have been fatal, the highest for any country in the world.

                The popular resort island of Bali, the centre of Indonesia's tourism industry, recently saw its first confirmed human fatalities from the disease.

                Supari said tests done in WHO laboratories in Atlanta on virus samples from Bali showed the virus had jumped from animal to humans.

                "There is nothing to worry about, so far Atlanta has not issued any alarm," she said after the news conference.

                Bali regularly hosts large international conventions and is due to hold an important U.N. climate change conference in December with about 10,000 people expected to attend.

                Globally there have been 327 cases and 199 human deaths from bird flu, World Health organisation data shows.

                Thomson Reuters empowers professionals with cutting-edge technology solutions informed by industry-leading content and expertise.
                "Addressing chronic disease is an issue of human rights that must be our call to arms"
                Richard Horton, Editor-in-Chief The Lancet

                Comment


                • #9
                  Re: Study Confirms Limited Human-To-Human Spread of Avian-Flu Virus in Indonesia in 2

                  Volume 13, Number 9?September 2007

                  Research

                  Detecting Human-to-Human Transmission of Avian Influenza A (H5N1)

                  Yang Yang,* M. Elizabeth Halloran,*? Jonathan D. Sugimoto,*? and Ira M. Longini, Jr.*?
                  *Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, Seattle, Washington, USA; and ?University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, USA
                  Suggested citation for this article
                  Abstract
                  Highly pathogenic avian influenza A (HPAI) subtype H5N1 has caused family case clusters, mostly in Southeast Asia, that could be due to human-to-human transmission. Should this virus, or another zoonotic influenza virus, gain the ability of sustained human-to-human transmission, an influenza pandemic could result. We used statistical methods to test whether observed clusters of HPAI (H5N1) illnesses in families in northern Sumatra, Indonesia, and eastern Turkey were due to human-to-human transmission. Given that human-to-human transmission occurs, we estimate the infection secondary attack rates (SARs) and the local basic reproductive number, R<SUB>0</SUB>. We find statistical evidence of human-to-human transmission (p = 0.009) in Sumatra but not in Turkey (p = 0.114). For Sumatra, the estimated household SAR was 29% (95% confidence interval [CI] 15%?51%). The estimated lower limit on the local R<SUB>0</SUB> was 1.14 (95% CI 0.61?2.14). Effective HPAI (H5N1) surveillance, containment response, and field evaluation are essential to monitor and contain potential pandemic strains.

                  Highly pathogenic avian influenza A (HPAI) subtype H5N1 is repeatedly crossing the species barrier to humans. Since December 2003, a total of 291 cases of HPAI (H5N1) have been reported in humans, resulting in 172 deaths (i.e., 59% case-fatality ratio) in 12 countries, mostly in Southeast Asia (1). Among these cases, 31 family clusters have been documented, ranging in size from 2 to 8 family members. How many of these clusters are due to a common avian source and how many are due to human-to-human transmission are important facts to determine. Should one of these HPAI (H5N1) strains gain the capacity for sustained human-to-human transmission, the resulting outbreak, if not contained, would spread worldwide through the global transportation network more rapidly than adequate supplies of vaccine matched to the new variant could be manufactured and distributed (2,3). We analyzed data from 2 of the largest of the familial clusters to ascertain if human-to-human transmission took place, and if so, how transmissible the strain was.
                  Methods

                  May 2006 Human Avian Influenza Family Cluster, Indonesia

                  During late April and early May 2006, a cluster of 8 cases of HPAI (H5N1) was detected and investigated by the Indonesian public health surveillance system in northern Sumatra (4?6). All case-patients were members of the same extended family. Seven of them resided within 3 adjacent houses in the village of Kubu Sembilang. The remaining patient resided with his immediate family in the village of Kabanjahe (≈10 km away).
                  The index patient was a 37-year-old woman, thought to have been exposed to dead poultry and chicken fecal material before onset of illness. She also reportedly maintained a market stall that sold live chickens. Although her illness was not confirmed to have been caused by the (H5N1) avian influenza virus, her death on May 5, 2006, is suspected to be the result of HPAI (H5N1) infection because of her reported symptoms, illness progression, and prior contact with diseased or dead poultry.
                  <TABLE cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=5 width=150 align=right border=0><TBODY><TR><TD bgColor=#d8eceb>
                  Figure
                  </TD></TR><TR><TD bgColor=#d8eceb></TD></TR><TR><TD bgColor=#d8eceb>Figure. Schematic of estimation method. An infectious person (in red) infects a susceptible person (in green) in the same household with probability of household secondary attack rate (SAR<SUB>1</SUB>)...
                  </TD></TR><TR><TD> </TD></TR><TR><TD bgColor=#d8eceb>
                  Appendix Figure 1
                  </TD></TR><TR><TD bgColor=#d8eceb></TD></TR><TR><TD bgColor=#d8eceb>Appendix Figure 1. Exposure and disease events for each member of the family cluster in northern Sumatra, Indonesia...
                  </TD></TR><TR><TD> </TD></TR><TR><TD bgColor=#d8eceb>
                  Appendix Figure 2
                  </TD></TR><TR><TD bgColor=#d8eceb></TD></TR><TR><TD bgColor=#d8eceb>Appendix Figure 2. Exposure and disease events for each member of the family cluster in Eastern Turkey.
                  </TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>
                  Twenty members of her extended family are suspected to have been in contact with her, many during a family gathering on April 29, 2006 (7). At that time, she was manifesting symptoms (i.e., she had a heavy cough, was severely ill, and was prostrate). That night, 9 of these members slept in the same small room as she did (indicated by a black triangle in Appendix Figure 1). Of these 9 family members, 2 of her sons (15 and 17 years of age) and her 25-year-old brother, who lived in Kabanjhe, became ill in the next 3 weeks. The sons died. The brother was the only person from this family cluster to recover.
                  Of the remaining 11 family members, 4 became ill and died. The 29-year-old sister of the index patient, who lived in an adjacent house, became ill after she provided direct personal care to her ill sister (7). The 18-month-old daughter of this sister also became ill after she was in the presence of the index patient with her mother. The 10-year-old nephew of the index patient, who lived in the other house adjacent to hers, became ill after he attended the family gathering and frequently visited his aunt's house. The nephew's father became ill after he personally cared for his son. The possibility that HPAI (H5N1) was transmitted from the nephew to his father is also supported by genetic sequencing data (4). Though symptoms did not develop in the mother of the nephew, she was directly exposed to her husband during his illness. All case-patients, except for the index patient, were confirmed as influenza (H5N1) positive by PCR. The nephew's mother was confirmed as influenza (H5N1) negative. As an intervention, 54 surviving relatives and close contacts were identified and placed under voluntary quarantine (7). All of these persons, except for pregnant women and infants, received oseltamivir prophylactically.
                  December 2005 Human Avian Influenza Family Cluster, Eastern Turkey

                  From December 18, 2005, (8) to January 15, 2006 (9), a cluster of 8 confirmed (H5N1) influenza cases was detected in Dogubayazit District in eastern Turkey (Appendix Figure 2) (10?13). These case-patients were among 21 members of 3 households located within 1.5 km of each other (14). All confirmed case-patients were hospitalized after onset of symptoms (9). Four of the confirmed case-patients died; the other 4 recovered (9). Ten of the remaining 14 household residents were hospitalized with avian influenza-like symptoms but were never confirmed to be (H5N1) infected (9). All but one of the hospitalized residents were children (6?15 years of age) (9).
                  Before onset of symptoms, 4 children from 1 household, 3 of whom had confirmed cases (including the index patient), were reported to have had close contact with the dead bodies of sick chickens (15). The 2 confirmed case-patients in the second household reportedly slaughtered a duck together on January 1, 2006, at the beginning of a die-off in the household's flock (14). Two of the remaining confirmed case-patients lived in the third household and had no history of contact with sick or dying poultry. The remaining confirmed case occurred in a fourth residence located near the first household (10), but because we lacked information on the number of household members and the case-patient's exposure history, we excluded it from these analyses. Most, if not all, of the 21 residents attended a dinner hosted by the family of the index patient on December 24, 2006, while he was symptomatic (8).
                  Statistical Methods

                  We used a previously developed statistical transmission model (16,17) to test whether human-to-human transmission occurred, and if it did, to estimate transmission parameters. In the model, persons mix with one another in households and between households. In addition, we include a common source of infection due to zoonotic exposure. Mathematical and statistical details are given in the Technical Appendix.
                  Model of Probability of Transmission
                  We define p<SUB>1</SUB> as the probability that an infectious household member infects another household member in 1 day. If the distribution of the infectious period is known, we can obtain the household secondary attack rate (SAR<SUB>1</SUB>) from p<SUB>1</SUB>, defined as the probability that an infectious household member infects another household member over his or her infectious period. Similarly, we define the daily transmission probability (p<SUB>2</SUB>) and the community SAR (SAR<SUB>2</SUB>) for between household spread. Finally, we define the daily probability (b) that any person is infected from a zoonotic source. The contact structure used for parameter estimation is shown in the Figure. We assume that the distributions of the incubation and infectious periods are predetermined by the investigator.
                  We establish the likelihood function for each person and then for the whole population for statistical inference. The likelihood function for a person is equivalent to the probability of observing the realized data on that person throughout the outbreak. The likelihood function for a person labeled i is built with the following steps: 1) Obtain the probability that person i is infected by an infectious source labeled j on day t, given person i is not infected up to day t ? 1. If source j is a person, this probability is p<SUB>1</SUB>, for the same household, or p<SUB>2</SUB> for exposure in the community, multiplied by the probability of person j being infectious on day t. The probability of person j being infectious on day t is derived from the symptom-onset day of person j and the distribution of the infectious period. If source j is zoonotic, the infection probability is b. The probability of escaping infection is simply 1 minus the corresponding probability of infection. 2) Take the product of the probabilities obtained in step 1 over all humans and zoonotic sources j to obtain the probability of person i escaping infection by any infectious source on day t. 3) Take the product of the probabilities obtained in step 2 over all days before and including day t to obtain the probability of person i escaping infection up to day t. 4) If person i is not infected by the end of the outbreak, the likelihood function for person i is the product of the probabilities of person i escaping infection up to the last day of observation. 5) If person i is observed to have symptom onset on day <SUB></SUB>and the infection time is known to be t, the probability of the data regarding person i is the product of 3 pieces of information: a) the probability of person i escaping infection up to day t ? 1, b) the probability that person i is infected on day t, and c) the probability that the duration of the incubation period is <SUB></SUB>? t. Because we do not observe the infection time, the likelihood function for person i is obtained by summing the above product, a ? c, over all potential values of t.
                  The likelihood function for the whole population is the product of all the individual likelihood functions. In the event that human-to-human transmission occurs, SAR estimates are used to estimate the local basic reproductive number (R<SUB>0</SUB>), which is defined as the average number of secondary cases infected by a typical index case-patient in the beginning of the outbreak (Technical Appendix). There is potential for sustained transmission if R<SUB>0</SUB> is >1. If human-to-human transmission is determined to be occurring, then the above parameters are estimated from the symptom dates and contact information from the population under study. Data on exposed persons who do not become ill form an important component of the inference procedure.
                  Statistical Test
                  We set up a statistical test with the null hypothesis being that no human-to-human transmission occurs, that is, p<SUB>1</SUB> = p<SUB>2</SUB> = 0. The alternative hypothesis is either p<SUB>1</SUB> or p<SUB>2</SUB> is not equal to 0, or both are not equal to zero. The test statistic we use is proportional to the ratio of the maximum value of the likelihood function assuming the null hypothesis is true (null likelihood) and the maximum value of the likelihood function at the estimated parameter values (full likelihood).
                  Specifically, we define the likelihood ratio test statistic as ?2 log (the null likelihood function divided by the full likelihood function). If no human-to-human transmission occurs, the 2 likelihood functions would be roughly equal, and we expect to see a likelihood ratio close to 1, and, thus, a likelihood ratio statistic close to 0. A large value of the likelihood ratio statistic is evidence of deviation from the null hypothesis. The question is how to obtain a reference set of the likelihood ratio statistic values that we would see under the null hypothesis. Given no human-to-human transmission, all the observed case-patients must have been infected by the zoonotic source. Since the exposure to the zoonotic source is assumed constant for each person on each day, the null likelihood function will not change if we reassign the infection and symptom status of the observed case-patients to a different group of people in the population. By performing such reassignment many times, we obtained a collection of datasets that were each equally likely to have been observed had there been no human-to-human transmission. The values of the likelihood ratio statistic calculated from these datasets form the null distribution for statistical testing. This method is referred to as a permutation test. The p value is given by the proportion of the reference values that are equal to or larger than the observed likelihood ratio statistic value. More technical details are given in the Technical Appendix.
                  The probability of infection by the zoonotic source may not be estimable together with SAR<SUB>1</SUB> or SAR<SUB>2</SUB> from an observed cluster. In such a situation, a statistical test of the occurrence of human-to-human transmission is still meaningful because the likelihood ratio test statistic is still estimable from the permuted datasets.
                  Data Required
                  A list of the inputs that are required for estimation and statistical testing are listed in the Table. Three categories of input parameters are required for this estimation model: outbreak-wide, individual level, and analysis parameters. The duration of the outbreak, the duration of the incubation period for the pathogen, and the minimum and maximum durations of the infectious period for the pathogen are the required outbreak-wide inputs. For each person, their residential location (neighborhood and household), their demographic characteristics (sex and age), and whether they were a case-patient or not are required input parameters. Case-patients require additional input of their illness-onset dates, types of outcome, outcome dates, and whether or not they are the index patient in the outbreak. Hospitalization and treatment dates (considered prophylactic for nonpatients) are optional input parameters for each person. For each person who visits another residence during the outbreak period, his or her identifiers, the neighborhood and household visited, and the start and end dates of the visit are required inputs. Analysis-related inputs include the last date of community exposure to potential common sources of infection, the last date of observation, and inputs for R<SUB>0</SUB> estimation (mean number of residents per household and mean number of out-of-residence contacts per person per day). An expanded version of the model will require the input of other exposure information such as from schools or hospitals.
                  Results

                  For the outbreak in Indonesia, Appendix Figure 1 shows that the incubation period had a probable range of 3?7 days and the infectious period, a probable range of 5?13 days. Thus, we let the incubation period have a uniform distribution of 3?7 days (mean 5 days) and the infectious period a uniform distribution of 5?13 days (mean 9 days). For the data shown in Appendix Figure 1, only the household SAR (SAR<SUB>1</SUB>) can be estimated. We determined that human-to-human spread did occur by rejecting the null hypothesis of no human-to-human transmission (p = 0.009). The estimated household SAR is 0.29 (95% confidence interval [CI] 0.15?0.51). Thus, a single infected person in a household infected another household member with the probability of 0.29. The average household size for rural Indonesia is ≈5 people. Because we do not have an estimate of the community SAR, we have an estimate of the lower limit of the local R<SUB>0</SUB>, i.e., 1.14 with a 95% CI of 0.61?2.14. A sensitivity analysis on the distribution of the incubation and infectious period shows that the test and estimates for SAR<SUB>1</SUB> and R<SUB>0</SUB> are insensitive to uncertainty about these distributions within plausible ranges.
                  For the outbreak in Turkey, all the parameters are estimable, but we do not reject the null hypothesis of no human-to-human transmission (p = 0.114). Our estimate of the daily probability of infection from the common source is 0.011 (95% CI 0.005?0.025).
                  Discussion

                  We have presented statistical evidence that the strain of HPAI (H5N1) that caused the family cluster of human cases in northern Sumatra was spread from human to human and that the household SAR was 29%. This household SAR is similar to statistical estimates for interpandemic influenza A in the United States (12.7%?30.6%) (18,19). The mean incubation period of this strain appears to have been ≈5 days, nearly twice as long as for past pandemic strains and current interpandemic strains of influenza. The CI for the estimated lower bound for the local R<SUB>0</SUB> covers 1. Therefore, even though we determined that human-to-human transmission probably occurred, whether the virus was capable of sustained human-to-human transmission is not clear. This virus may have required very close human contact to be transmitted. Even with no intervention, the finding that R<SUB>0</SUB> = 1.14 indicates that the chance that a single introduction would result in any further spread is ≈12%. In addition, the reported prophylactic use of oseltamivir may have played some role in limiting further spread. We did not find statistical evidence of human-to-human spread for the outbreak in eastern Turkey. This does not mean that no low-level human-to-human spread occurred in this outbreak, only that we lack statistical evidence of such spread. The power would be too low to detect such spread for an outbreak with 7 total cases and small SARs (17).
                  We did not consider the role of heterogeneity?such as age, sex, treatment status, or quarantine?in transmission. The parameters could be made to be functions of time-dependent covariates, as we have done with similar models (16,19,20). We can easily extend the model used here for covariates; however, we must have sufficient data to support such models.
                  Computer simulations have shown that the targeted use of influenza antiviral agents could be effective in containing a potential pandemic strain of influenza at the source (21,22), if initiated within 3 weeks of the initial case in the community, and if the R<SUB>0</SUB> is <1.8. This strategy, known as targeted antiviral prophylaxis, involves treating identified index patients in a mixing group and offering a single course of prophylaxis to the contacts of these index patients in predefined close contact groups, i.e., households at a minimum but also possibly neighborhood clusters, preschool groups, schools, and workplaces. In addition, the voluntary household quarantine of suspected close contacts of case-patients was recommended. Targeted antiviral prophylaxis at the household and neighborhood cluster level was carried out for the outbreak in Sumatra.
                  Ascertaining whether a potential pandemic strain of influenza is capable of sustained human-to-human transmission and estimating key transmission parameters are important. To estimate more than the household SAR, more detailed community data need to be collected. This would include a complete census of potentially exposed households and persons in the area where immediate transmission could occur from both potential zoonotic and human sources. Such data would enable estimation of important parameters and a more complete estimate of the R<SUB>0</SUB> rather than just the lower limit.
                  We have developed a software application, TRANSTAT, for implementing these analyses. This application provides a stand-alone environment for the entry, storage, and analysis of data from outbreaks of acute infectious diseases. A partial list of the input information is given in the Table. The statistical methods presented here can be applied to the data along with several standard epidemiologic tools. This information system would allow for real-time analysis and evaluation of control measures for an outbreak. We would encourage outbreak investigators to use this tool, taking care to input data on the exposed nonpatients as well as case-patients. The authors will provide a link to this software upon request.
                  This work was supported by the National Institute of General Medical Sciences MIDAS grant U01-GM070749 and National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases grant R01-AI32042.
                  Dr Yang is a staff scientist in the Biostatistics and Biomathematics Program in the Division of Public Health Sciences at the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, Seattle, Washington. His primary research interest is in the statistical and mathematical analysis of infectious disease data and intervention studies.
                  References
                  1. World Health Organization. Confirmed human cases of avian influenza A (H5N1). Epidemic and pandemic alert and response. 2007 Apr 11. [cited 2007 Apr 25]. Available from http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/cases_table_2007_04_11/en/index.html
                  2. Webby RJ, Webster RG. Are we ready for pandemic influenza? Science. 2003;302:1519?22.
                  3. Stohr K. Avian influenza and pandemics?research needs and opportunities. N Engl J Med. 2005;352:405?7.
                  4. Butler D. Family tragedy spotlights flu mutations. Nature. 2006;442:114?5.
                  5. World Health Organization. Avian influenza?situation in Indonesia?update 12. Jakarta, Indonesia. Report no. 12. 2006 May 19. [cited 2006 Sep 22]. Available from http://www.who.int/csr/don/2006_05_16b/en/index.html
                  6. Soebandrio A. Indonesia: avian flu from Indonesia's experience and perspectives. Pandemic Preparedness and Infection Control. 2006 July 13?14.
                  7. World Health Organization. Avian influenza?situation in Indonesia?update 16. Jakarta, Indonesia. Report no. 16. 2006 Jun 2. [cited 2006 Sep 16]. Available from http://www.who.int/csr/don/2006_05_31/en/index.html
                  8. Recombinomics. H5N1 bird flu pandemic phase evolution. 2006 Jun 5. [cited 2007 Mar 16]. Available from http://www.recombinomics.com/news/06050601/h5n1_phase_evolution.html
                  9. Recombinomics. Timeline for Kocyigit Ozcan family clusters in Dogubeyazit. January 22, 2006. [cited 2006 Mar 16]. Available from http://www.recombinomics.com/news/01220601/h5n1_kocyigit_ozcan_timeline.html
                  10. World Health Organization. Avian influenza, situation in Turkey, update 2. Ankara, Turkey. Report no. 2. Epidemic and pandemic alert and response. 2006 Jan 9. [cited 2007 Feb 27]. Available from http://www.who.int/csr/don/2006_01_09/en/index.html
                  11. World Health Organization. Avian influenza, situation in Turkey, update 4: sequencing of human virus. Ankara, Turkey. Report no. 4. Epidemic and pandemic alert and response. 2006 Jan 12. [cited 2007 Feb 27]. Available from http://www.who.int/csr/don/2006_01_12/en/index.html
                  12. World Health Organization. Avian influenza, situation in Turkey, update 5. Ankara, Turkey. Report no. 5. Epidemic and pandemic alert and response. 2006 Jan 16. [cited 2007 Feb 27]. Available from http://www.who.int/csr/don/2006_01_16/en/index.html
                  13. Lauer C. Turkey's bird flu outbreak: one year later. Turkish Daily News. 2007 Jan 12. [cited 2007 Mar 20]. Available from http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=63680
                  14. World Health Organization. Shindo N. Avian influenza outbreak response in Turkey, 2006. Epidemic and pandemic alert and response. [cited 2007 Mar 20]. Available from http://www.col.ops-oms.org/servicios/influenza/reunion/docs/trad/10_turkey_summary.pdf
                  15. World Health Organization. Avian influenza, situation in Turkey. Ankara, Turkey. Epidemic and pandemic alert and response. Report no. 1. 2006 Jan 5. [cited 2007 Feb 27]. Available from http://www.who.int/csr/don/2006_01_05/en/index.html
                  16. Yang Y, Longini IM, Halloran ME. Design and evaluation of prophylactic interventions using infectious disease incidence data from close contact groups. Applied Statistics. 2006;55:317?30.
                  17. Yang Y, Longini IM, Halloran ME. A resampling-based test to detect person-to-person transmission of infectious disease. Annals of Applied Statistics. 2007;1:211?28. [cited 2007 Jul 19]. Available from http://projecteuclid.org/dpubs/repository/1.0/disseminate?handle=euclid.aoas/1183143736&view=
                    body&content-type=pdfview_1
                  18. Longini IM, Koopman JS, Monto AS, Fox JP. Estimating household and community transmission parameters for influenza. Am J Epidemiol. 1982;115:736?51.
                  19. Longini IM, Koopman JS, Haber MJ, Cotsonis GA. Statistical inference for infectious diseases: risk-specific household and community transmission parameters. Am J Epidemiol. 1988;128:845?59.
                  20. Rampey AH, Longini IM, Haber MJ, Monto AS. A discrete-time model for the statistical analysis of infectious disease incidence data. Biometrics. 1992;48:117?28.
                  21. Longini IM, Nizam A, Xu S, Ungchusak K, Hanshaoworakul W, Cummings DA, et al. Containing pandemic influenza at the source. Science. 2005;309:1083?7.
                  22. Ferguson NM, Cummings DAT, Cauchemez S, Fraser C, Riley S, Meeyai A, et al. Strategies for containing an emerging influenza pandemic in Southeast Asia. Nature. 2005;437:209?14.
                  Figures

                  Figure. Schematic of estimation method. An infectious person (in red) infects a susceptible person (in green) in the same household with probability of household secondary attack rate (SAR<SUB>1</SUB>)...
                  Appendix Figure 1. Exposure and disease events for each member of the family cluster in northern Sumatra, Indonesia...
                  Appendix Figure 2. Exposure and disease events for each member of the family cluster in Eastern Turkey...
                  Table

                  Table. Parameters and data used in analysis
                  Suggested Citation for this Article

                  Yang Y, Halloran ME, Sugimoto J, Longini, Jr IM. Detecting human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A (H5N1). Emerg Infect Dis [serial on the Internet]. 2007 Sep [date cited]. Available from http://www.cdc.gov/EID/content/13/9/1348.htm

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Detecting Human-to-Human Transmission of Avian Influenza A (H5N1)

                    Detecting Human-to-Human Transmission
                    of Avian Influenza A (H5N1)



                    Timothy M. Uyeki * and Joseph S. Bresee *

                    This letter is in response to a recently published article about statistical
                    modeling to assess human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A (H5N1) viruses in 2 case clusters (1).

                    Sporadic cases and clusters of human infection with highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) viruses have occurred after direct contact with diseased or dead poultry(2,3).

                    Limited, nonsustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza (H5N1) viruses is believed to have occurred in some clusters (4).

                    Every human infection with a novel influenza A virus should be investigated, and suspected clusters should be investigated immediately to assess exposures and transmission patterns.

                    Yang et al. applied a statistical model to evaluate publicly available data from 2 case clusters of human infection with avian influenza A (H5N1) viruses (1).

                    These clusters were investigated in detail during 2006 by field epidemiologic investigation teams.

                    Yang et al. suggest that statistical methods can prove or confirm human-to-human transmission, but this suggestion is misleading.

                    Modeling approaches can suggest transmission modalities to account for case patterns, but determination of human-to-human transmission requires detailed field epidemiologic investigations in which human, animal, and environmental exposures as well as clinical and laboratory data are assessed and interpreted.

                    Indication that a novel influenza A virus has acquired the ability to spread among humans could be reflected by a change in the epidemiology of clusters, such as increases in
                    1) size and frequency of clusters,
                    2) cases among nonrelated persons, and
                    3) clinically mild cases.

                    This ability could also be reflected in accompanying changes in viruses isolated from case-patients.

                    When facing emerging infectious disease threats such as those posed by highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) viruses, surveillance should rapidly detect human cases and case clusters and facilitate accurate identification of the agent.

                    Field epidemiologic investigations, initiation of evidence-based clinical management of case-patients, and epidemiologic disease-control methods (including appropriate infection control measures) should be implemented immediately.

                    Statistical modeling can provide useful and supportive insights but should not be viewed as an alternative to a detailed field epidemiologic investigation combined with laboratory data.

                    Timely and comprehensive field investigations remain most critical to guiding decisions about containment efforts for pandemic influenza and other emerging infectious diseases (5).

                    Timothy M. Uyeki* and Joseph S. Bresee*

                    *Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
                    References

                    Comment


                    • #11
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