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  • CIDRAP: H1N1 lessons learned

    Pandemic underscored influenza's unpredictability


    Editor's Note: This is the first of a series of articles reviewing the world's experience with pandemic H1N1 influenza and what we've learned in the past year. Look for further installments in the days to come.

    Apr 23, 2010 (CIDRAP News) ? A year's experience with the 2009 H1N1 influenza virus has underscored the endless unpredictability of flu.

    The virus and the resulting illness defied expectations on many levels. It was first detected in North America, not Southeast Asia. Unlike the pathogens that caused previous pandemics, the virus was not a new subtype, but rather an H1N1 strain, making it a cousin of a seasonal flu strain that's been around for decades.

    Unlike seasonal flu, though, the illness hit children and nonelderly adults much more than people over 65. It was relatively mild for most people, unlike the 1918 flu or the devastating disease associated with H5N1 avian flu, which had heavily shaped pandemic preparations. But it killed far more children and young people than seasonal flu typically does, with the vast majority of deaths involving people younger than 60.

    The pandemic also brought the first hint that obesity is a risk factor for severe flu. And it reinforced an old and somewhat underappreciated lesson: that pregnant women who contract flu also can get seriously ill and even die.

    In one of the biggest surprises, the pandemic virus made seasonal viruses do a vanishing act this past winter, at least in the United States. Although type B and H3N2 viruses circulated to some degree in certain parts of the world, such as Asia, they failed to show up or appeared in only tiny numbers in the US.

    This week, a year after the pandemic virus first burst into the headlines, several experts contacted by CIDRAP News reflected on the past year and the lessons it has taught about the virus and the illness. Future stories will look at treatment issues, the H1N1 vaccine, the vaccination program, and other public health responses.

    New, but not new
    A big surprise to many?and a source of terminological confusion?was that the H1N1 virus is not a new subtype. As an H1N1 virus, it is the same subtype as the virus that caused the 1918 pandemic and whose descendants have circulated in humans ever since, except for one 20-year interruption.

    As virologist Vincent Racaniello, PhD, of Columbia University describes it, the H1N1 virus of 1918 went into both people and pigs at the time and evolved on mostly separate tracks in the two different hosts. In humans the subtype circulated until 1957, when it was replaced by the H2N2 virus, which triggered the pandemic of 1957-58. H1N1 then vanished from humans until 1977, when it mysteriously reappeared, probably as the result of a lab accident. It then continued to evolve as one of three seasonal flu strains, with H3N2 and type B.

    Meanwhile, the H1N1 in pigs continued to circulate, but evolved much more slowly than its human counterpart, according to Racaniello, who authors "Virology Blog." Because pigs, as food animals, don't live very long, their viruses don't face very much selection pressure, he explained. "So that virus that went into them in 1918 didn't change very much. It did reaasort with a variety of human and avian viruses, but the key proteins, the HA and NA, are direct descendants and haven't changed very much. To me that's the most amazing thing, that pigs have almost been like a freezer for this virus."

    While the H1N1 in pigs changed little, human strains of H1N1 changed a lot, under pressure from the immune system of their long-lived hosts, Racaniello said. By 2009, the human and pig versions were so different that when the swine version jumped into humans, many people had little protection against it.

    The fact that seasonal H1N1 and the pandemic H1N1 are the same subtype obscures how different they are, Racaniello said. "Subtypes are kind of artificial definitions," he commented. "The H1N1 pandemic virus is as different from the previous seasonal H1N1 as it is from an H3N2. So the fact that we're calling it H1N1 doesn't really mean anything. We should get used to the idea that a pandemic could be caused by the same subtype [as a seasonal virus]."

    Dr. Daniel B. Jernigan of the Influenza Division at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) expressed a similar view. "[The pandemic H1N1] is not a new subtype. But the distance from the nearest neighbor causing routine human disease is pretty far, so in that sense it's not unexpected that you'd have significant numbers of people who have not had exposure to anything like this," he said.

    As it turned out, of course, those who had some protection against the pandemic virus were older people, who benefited from their encounters with H1N1 viruses before 1957. Those who had some exposure in the 1930s, 1940s, and to some degree the 1950s probably have some immunity, said Jernigan.

    Geographic expectations
    Another surprise to many, given that the last two pandemics and H5N1 avian flu had their roots in Southeast Asia, was that the pandemic virus was discovered in North America. The first known cases of the 2009 H1N1 occurred in Mexico, with cases popping up in the United States shortly afterward.

    But Racaniello said it's not known where the virus really emerged. "We had the first reports in North America, in Mexico and the US. That doesn't mean it went from pigs to people there; it doesn't mean it originated in those areas." But even if it did, he added, "I don?t think it's surprising, because we have lots of pigs in North America, and [pigs are] where this virus came from."

    The virus's real birthplace may never be pinpointed, because its ancestors are missing from the surveillance records for at least 10 years, he said. "The parents haven't been detected for a long time. I don?t know if we're going to figure that out. The moment may have passed."

    Wave pattern
    In the United States, the 2009 virus first spread widely in late April and May, slowed but **** around through midsummer, heated up again in late summer as children returned to school, and peaked in late October and early November. Then it waned fairly quickly, and a feared third wave never materialized in the winter.

    In this pattern of waves the pandemic differed sharply from seasonal flu but bore some resemblance to past pandemics, especially that of 1957. "If you look at pandemic epi curves, what we saw in 1957 was very similar to what we saw this year, in the shape of the curve and the time it appeared," said Jernigan. He said no significant winter wave was noticed in 1957-58, but mortality data later suggested that one did occur.

    The absence of a winter wave of cases this time around may be explained by a shrinking number of susceptible people. With the combination of immunity in older people, the virus's presence through the summer, and a major wave of cases in the fall, "What we may have done was burn through a significant amount of the population, so there weren't enough susceptibles left to have a third wave," said Jernigan.

    In addition, by winter a growing number of people had gained immunity through vaccination, further limiting the number of easy targets for the virus, noted William Schaffner, MD, chair of the Department of Preventive Medicine at the Vanderbilt University School of Medicine and a board member of the Infectious Diseases Society of America. The CDC's current estimate of the number of people vaccinated is between 72 million and 81 million.

    Impact on the population
    The true impact of the pandemic on the population won't be known for some time to come, given that pandemic viruses tend to dominate flu seasons for several years and that it takes 2 to 3 years to develop accurate flu mortality data for a given season. The number of cases can only be estimated, because costly confirmatory testing was sharply reduced within weeks of the outbreak's start.

    But it's safe to say that the public generally regards the pandemic as mild, or at least milder than news reports led people to expect. The perception is based on the fact that for most people the illness resembled seasonal flu and also that the number of cases dropped steeply after the fall peak. In addition, the CDC's latest estimate of deaths in the pandemic is 12,270, well below the oft-cited CDC estimate of 36,000 in a typical flu season?though the two estimates are based on different methods.

    But the perception of the pandemic as mild overlooks the reality that cases and deaths have targeted mainly children and young adults, in sharp contrast to seasonal flu. About 90% of the deaths in a typical flu season are in elderly people, whereas most of the pandemic deaths have been in younger adults and children.

    "Normally severe flu strikes children under 4 and people over 65 and spares healthy people from 5 to 65. What we see is it did not spare older children and younger adults," said Andrew Pavia, MD, chief of pediatric infectious diseases at the University of Utah Health Sciences Center and chair of the pandemic flu task force for the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA).

    The CDC estimates that 35 million cases have occurred in adults aged 18 to 64, 19 million in children through age 17, and just 6 million in those older than 64. The proportions are similar for hospital cases, estimated at a total 270,000. And out of an estimated 12,270 deaths, there were 9,420 in the younger adult group, 1,580 in the elderly, and 1,270 in children.

    The H1N1 burden on younger people was also underscored by a recent report in BMC Infectious Diseases with data from the early months of the pandemic in 11 countries: It showed that more than 75% of cases occurred in people age 30 and under, with the highest incidence in those 10 to 19. Only 3% of cases were in people 65 and older.

    "What we had in terms of overall severity doesn't fit easily into a headline," said Pavia. "We had a disease that caused largely moderate illness in most people," but there was a risk of severe disease for young children, pregnant women, people with underlying diseases. About 278 children died of confirmed H1N1, far more than the previous record of about 88 in a flu season, he added.

    In view of the disease burden on younger people, a team of researchers led by Cecile Viboud of the National Institutes of Health recently tried to refine our understanding of the pandemic's impact by estimating the total years of life lost. They estimated the number of deaths to be between 7,500 and 44,100, with the lower number based on deaths officially attributed to pneumonia and influenza and the higher number representing all-cause deaths, including those from diseases associated with flu but not necessarily reported as such.

    Their main finding was that, in life-years lost, the pandemic was at least as severe as a nasty regular flu season and possibly worse than the pandemic of 1968-69.

    Health system stressed
    As for the pandemic's impact on the healthcare system, the general verdict is that there were signs of stress, but the system was not overwhelmed.

    "Our clinical capacities were stretched but not broken by this pandemic," said Schaffner. He credits the built-in protection enjoyed by older people for sparing the system. Without that, he said, "We would've been in much hotter soup just taking care of patients. Because in this country we've pared down our excess medical capacity, just because it's so expensive."

    Pavia said hospitals were not too hard hit overall, but some emergency departments, particularly pediatric emergency units, were "extremely stressed." Some had to set up satellite units in their parking lots during the peak period. Pediatric emergency departments have probably done more disaster training than other departments because of the heavy load of respiratory illnesses they face each winter, he commented.

    Intensive care units (ICUs) also were put to the test, Pavia said. One colleague reported that his hospital's ICU at one point ran short on dialysis machines, not on ventilators, which are often cited as likely to be scarce in a pandemic. "In planning we didn't think about dialysis machines," he said.

    But from the reports he has heard, ICUs had more problems with staffing than with equipment, Pavia said. Workers became exhausted from caring for young adults who required long periods of intensive care. "It may be that the greatest vulnerability in our intensive care capacity is personnel, the ability to sustain effort over a long period of time," he commented.

    The clinical picture
    The clinical illness caused by the novel H1N1 virus was generally similar to seasonal flu, experts say. But the intense scrutiny of the pandemic brought some new aspects to light and underlined previous lessons.

    "Clinically I'd have to say the illness is fairly similar to what had been reported before," said Kathleen M. Neuzil, MD, MPH, an associate professor of medicine in the division of allergy and infectious diseases at the University of Washington in Seattle and chair of the influenza working group for the CDC's Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP).

    "I think we have to be careful in interpreting some of [the findings], because this would have to be the most studied virus, if not in history, then for a very long time," she said. "There was a lot more testing and a lot more capturing of different types of disease."

    For example, there have been reports that quite a few H1N1 patients had no fever, seeming to suggest that this could be peculiar to the pandemic virus. But in the past, said Neuzil, the CDC definition of influenza-like illness included fever, so afebrile flu cases would not have been counted. "The pandemic made us look a little harder at the illness; it made us look more broadly," she said.

    In fact, Jernigan said the pandemic and seasonal viruses probably differ little in this respect. "There were some reports that up to a third or even half of individuals didn't have fever, which is not so different from seasonal flu, but we don't have a lot of good data."

    Another tentative finding is that gastrointestinal (GI) symptoms are more common in H1N1 cases than with seasonal flu, which, if true, would have implications for transmission.

    "The GI symptoms do appear to be somewhat more prominent than with seasonal," said Pavia. "We've seen that in H5N1 in Southeast Asia. It's interesting in terms of clinical presentation, but it also raises the possibility that some patients will be able to transmit infection by shedding virus in their stool."

    Jernigan said the CDC has observed a higher-than-expected rate of GI problems in H1N1 patients, but he's not sure if it's real. "I don't know that we have enough data to say that this virus truly causes more GI illness," he said. "It's not unheard of for you to get more GI problems when you get flu."

    A feature that has turned out to be less common than expected in H1N1 cases is bacterial coinfections, Jernigan reported. "We saw them, but they were not as prominent as we expected, probably due to a lot of antibiotic use and vaccination against strep pneumo," he said.

    Streptococcus pneumoniae and Staphylococcus aureus are the typical causes of pneumonia secondary to flu, he noted. "We've been vaccinating against strep pneumo for the past 10 years or so, and we may be seeing a benefit during the pandemic of that vaccination program."

    Community acquired methicillin-resistant S aureus (MRSA) has emerged in recent years and makes a "bad combination" with flu, Jernigan added. "We saw that, but we didn't see it in the amount we thought we would?maybe because people are using more of the right antibiotics."

    In terms of transmissibility, the experts agreed that the H1N1 virus seems to differ little from seasonal flu. However, Schaffner said it appears that children can shed the virus considerably longer than is the case with seasonal flu?for a week or a week and a half after recovery. In seasonal flu cases, it gets much harder to recover virus by 3 or 4 days after the onset of symptoms, he said.

    Obesity emerges as risk factor
    One thing that clinicians noticed about adult flu patients with serious H1N1 infections is that many were obese. "People were struck by the number of morbidly obese patients in their units," said Pavia.

    It's an association that has not been prospectively studied, he said, but added, "I think it's real. I think it's probably a moderate-strength risk factor, and we were not in a position to notice it before."

    "That is something we did find that is unique," Jernigan affirmed. "It came up early because of the kinds of individuals that were getting sick. They were otherwise health individuals, 30s to middle-aged, that were in ICUs and needed long-term respiratory support. It does look like obesity, especially morbid obesity, is a perhaps a significant risk factor."

    A recent study by a CDC team using data from the early months of the pandemic showed that patients who were morbidly obese were nearly five times as likely to be hospitalized as were normal-weight patients. Their risk of death was also higher, but the difference was less dramatic.

    The reason for the finding is unclear, but it may be simply that obesity is more common now than it once was, Jernigan commented. He also cited a recent study in which obese mice seemed to have poorer immunologic memory compared with lean mice.

    Schaffner commented that the identification of obesity as a risk factor for complications "comes as no surprise to clinicians. They know that taking care of large people with lung infections is much more difficult than people who are lean," because of physical factors.

    Danger for pregnant women
    Another risk factor, albeit not a new one, that the pandemic highlighted was pregnancy. "One lesson was that flu is a dangerous disease for pregnant women. We knew it but it wasn't that prominent in our consciousness," said Pavia.

    Reports from the first months of the pandemic suggested that pregnant women accounted for about 5% of H1N1 deaths, though they make up only about 1% of the US population. This finding echoed, though on a much smaller scale, what happened in the 1918 pandemic, which took a heavy toll on pregnant women.

    Jernigan said there were indications early in the pandemic that obstetricians and gynecologists "weren't really thinking about flu as something that might harm their patients." The pandemic experience has raised their awareness of the risk, in his view. And messages about the risk to pregnant women pushed H1N1 vaccination rates for pregnant women well above the typical levels for seasonal flu shots, he added.

    Other risk factors for serious H1N1 cases include asthma and, particularly in children, neurologic disorders, both of which are also seen in seasonal flu, Jernigan reported.

    The pandemic brought a number of reports from various countries that racial and ethnic minorities seemed more susceptible to severe H1N1 illness. Jernigan said that pattern holds for both pandemic and seasonal flu: Majority and minority groups have about the same risk of contracting flu, but minorities are more likely to get seriously sick. The reasons are various and include access to care and vaccination, care-seeking behavior, and reluctance to be vaccinated.

    Among patients who got severely sick, some showed signs of suffering a "cytokine storm," an overly intense immune response that floods the bloodstream with pro-inflammatory chemicals and causes the lungs to fill up with fluid, according to Pavia. The phenomenon is believed to have been a common feature in fatal cases in the 1918 pandemic.

    "There were certainly patients who appeared to have the kind of catastrophic shock-like illness that's been blamed on cytokine storm," he said. "We don't as of today have a lot of evidence that those severe multi-organ system dysfunction patients had cytokine storm; it just resembles that and fits with the hypothesis."

    Other lessons learned
    One of the important lessons of the pandemic was the value of early antiviral treatment for patients with severe illness or at risk for severe illness, according to Pavia. He said it was hard to get this point across to clinicians. (A later story will look at the use of antivirals in the pandemic.)

    Another lesson of the past year, in Pavia's mind, is the need for networks of clinical investigators prepared to swing into action when an outbreak starts.

    "We did a pretty good job of getting clinical information quickly?the CDC, NIH, and other investigators stepped up to the plate, but we don't have an organized system to do that," he said. Clinical investigations "were cobbled together on the fly." They worked reasonably well, but systems set up in advance would be more effective, he added.

    A more general lesson, according to Neuzil, is the need to avoid "tunnel vision" in pandemic preparedness, as exemplified by focusing heavily on the H5N1 threat. "One lesson for preparedness is for us to think very broadly and just look at multiple different scenarios," she said.

    That was done to some extent, particularly regarding increased surveillance and the stockpiling and distribution of antivirals, Neuzil added.

    Outlook for next season
    One abiding mystery of the pandemic, experts agree, is why the 2009 H1N1 virus pushed the seasonal flu strains almost completely off the stage this past winter. That makes the question of what will happen next winter all the more interesting.

    The disappearance of the seasonal strains "remains a fascinating mystery," said Pavia. "Everything we'd say would be pure speculation. We expected that H3N2 and B would've resurfaced this year, and it's hard to explain their absence based on cross-immunity related to [2009] H1N1." Some level of cross-immunity between the novel virus and the seasonal H1N1 probably accounts for the latter's exit, he added.

    The experts expect the pandemic virus will be around again come winter, but they offer a range of views on which other flu viruses will be competing with it. The approaching flu season in the Southern Hemisphere will offer the first clues.

    Racaniello expects that the pandemic strain will follow the pattern of past pandemics and dominate flu seasons for at least 10 years. "It'll probably be just H1N1 and B viruses; the H3N2 and the previous seasonal H1N1 will be gone," he said.

    Pavia agreed that the pandemic H1N1, with or without drift mutations, will circulate next winter. "And I'd guess B will be back. But what will happen to H3N2 or H1N1 Brisbane [seasonal H1N1], I have no idea."

    Schaffner said he, too, expects the 2009 H1N1 virus to be back. But because of the likely level of population immunity, he said, "My expectation is it'll be a minority player in 2010-11. I'm sticking my neck out here."

    And Jernigan commented, "If we had to guess, I think we'd say seasonal H1N1 is not likely to hang around." He expects the pandemic strain to be the dominant player and to become the new seasonal H1N1. As for H3N2, which displaced H2N2 back in 1968, "I don't know exactly what will happen this fall, but I would guess that the H3N2 would actually persist. This is a guess."


    Last edited by tetano; April 27, 2010, 09:11 AM.

  • #2
    Re: H1N1 LESSONS LEARNED Pandemic underscored influenza's unpredictability

    one year ago I would have predicted that it would be less predictable than it turned out it was.
    I'm interested in expert panflu damage estimates
    my current links: http://bit.ly/hFI7H ILI-charts: http://bit.ly/CcRgT

    Comment


    • #3
      Re: H1N1 LESSONS LEARNED Pandemic underscored influenza's unpredictability

      Vaccine production foiled, confirmed experts' predictions


      Maryn McKenna * Contributing Writer

      Second in a series marking the 1-year anniversary of novel H1N1 pandemic influenza. The first, on the virus itself, appeared Apr 23.

      Apr 26, 2010 (CIDRAP News) ? Among the many surprises of the 2009 H1N1 flu pandemic?its emergence at the end of a flu season, its unexpected toll of mild illness, its almost-complete replacement of circulating seasonal strains?was its reversal of years of received wisdom on how vaccines would be needed to respond.

      Researchers had predicted, for instance, that to be protected against a novel strain, most members of the population would require two doses of vaccine containing the new pandemic strain. And because that many doses of vaccine would stress the existing vaccine-manufacturing system, other researchers had predicted that the addition of dose-sparing adjuvants to the new vaccine would be crucial to stretch out scarce supplies of newly made antigen.

      Neither turned out to be true.

      To the great relief of health authorities, most members of the population turned out to need only one dose of the novel vaccine, though whether the youngest children needed two became a matter for international disagreement. And because that move freed up so many doses of antigen, the United States' long reluctance to test and license adjuvants used in flu vaccines in Europe did not become the bad bet that many flu experts had feared.

      By September 2009, Australian researchers were reporting in the New England Journal of Medicine that?contrary to predictions?one dose of a 15-microgram vaccine made from the novel strain produced an acceptable immune response in 97% of adults who received it.

      By November, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) was reporting that the single-dose regimen was equally protective for pregnant women, who were emerging as one of the groups at highest risk of serious complications from the novel virus.

      But US health authorities continued to caution that children younger than 10, another group at higher risk for pandemic complications, should continue to receive two doses of the new vaccine, because only 55% of children in those age-groups had produced a protective immune response after one dose.

      That recommendation brought the United States into conflict with the World Health Organization (WHO), which only 3 days earlier had recommended giving young children a single dose as a way of extending the vaccine to as many children as possible. When asked about the discrepancy, Dr. Thomas Frieden, director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), said: "If the data show a difference, we will reconsider our recommendations. . . . We're sticking with what the [Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices] has recommended."

      A second report by the same Australian group, published in late December, found an adequate immune response in infants and young children after one dose, but that finding did not change US policy.

      Other long-held predictions, however, turned out to be all too accurate. The fragile egg-based manufacturing system for flu vaccine, which had gone without significant innovation for 50 years, proved inadequate to manufacturing the new vaccine. The newly isolated pandemic strain did not grow well in chicken eggs?something that also had happened in the past for seasonal vaccine strains?and the resulting slowdown in manufacturing and delivery strained public confidence and allowed anti-vaccine sentiment to build.

      At the same time, long-recognized bottlenecks in flu-vaccine production, including lack of capacity in the post-manufacturing "fill and finish" step that puts vaccine into vials, slowed the industry's process for getting the new antigen out to the marketplace.

      In mid-summer 2009, federal officials had predicted they would be able to release 120 million doses of novel vaccine by October, with millions more doses to follow each week. By mid-August, that prediction was scaled back to 45 million doses by mid-October. And on Oct. 21, Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Kathleen Sebelius was grilled by Congress regarding the slow start to vaccine delivery: Only 12.8 million doses had become available.

      In testimony, Sebelius blamed both the new virus's slow growth in eggs, and also production problems on some new manufacturing lines. "We anticipate that number [of doses] growing exponentially as we move into the season," she said. By early November we're confident that vaccine will be far more widely available. There'll be enough vaccine so every American who wants to can be vaccinated."

      But by the end of 2009, Americans who had urgently pursued the vaccine when it was supposed to be delivered had turned away from seeking it. By this February, the CDC said in April, 229 million doses of antigen had been ordered, about 162 million had been "fill-finished," about 126 million had been put into distribution, and somewhere between 81 and 91 million doses had been administered.

      That accounting made it clear that some millions of doses?the CDC could not, by April 1, say how many?were likely to be discarded because they are subject to strict expiration dates once packaged. (The Washington Post estimated the amount of vaccine discarded could reach more than 71 million doses.)

      In a speech last week, Sebelius called the overpromising of vaccine one of the pandemic's "teachable moments" for her department. "We wanted to make sure the American people knew what we knew when we knew it, but we raised expectations too high," she said. Sebelius did not, however, specify how HHS would alter its approach in the future.

      But additional millions of doses that remain in bulk form may last long enough to be combined into next fall's seasonal vaccine, giving manufacturers a head start on that always-unpredictable process?provided the circulating virus does not mutate over the summer to make the retained antigen unusable.

      "It is theoretically possible that some of that antigen could be the H1N1 component of a trivalent vaccine," Dr. Anne Schuchat, director of the CDC's National Center for Immunizations and Respiratory Diseases, said in a briefing April 1. "Plans around that particular decision are under discussion between the Department of Health and Human Services and the individual manufacturers."

      Comment


      • #4
        Re: CIDRAP: H1N1 lessons learned

        Vaccination campaign weathered rough road, paid dividends



        Apr 30, 2010 (CIDRAP News) ? As the biggest public health initiative in the history of the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the H1N1 pandemic vaccination campaign encountered stiff headwinds with scarce supplies and complex messaging but ended up reaching about a quarter of the US population and, some say, smoothing the path for future immunization efforts.

        About a month after the pandemic flu virus emerged, federal officials ordered vaccines from five different companies at a price tag of $650 million, with $287million more for adjuvants that could be needed if the virus turned out to be severe or if vaccine potency was lower than expected.

        While manufacturers struggled with a low-yielding seed strain, public health experts were anxious about the next daunting step: getting the vaccine into people's arms. Their task was to launch the first mass vaccination campaign since the much-maligned swine flu vaccine of 1976, against steady undercurrents of antivaccine sentiment and general mistrust of government.

        Charting a campaign course
        Taking a page from the playbook of the CDC's Vaccines for Children (VFC) program, which distributes vaccines for administration to uninsured and Medicaid-eligible children, the agency contracted with its VFC partner, McKesson Corp., as the central vaccine distributor for the pandemic vaccine. The CDC stipulated that the vaccine would be allocated to states on a pro-rata basis and that states would designate providers, including local health departments, medical clinics, and other partners. The agency projected that the vaccine would be sent to 90,000 different sites, which the CDC last August said made the pandemic vaccine campaign the biggest public health venture in its history.

        In July, Kathleen Sebelius, secretary of the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), said she expected a fall launch for the campaign and asked states to prepare their plans and identify vaccination sites. Though the Obama administration had earmarked $260 million to help states support the vaccine campaign, the federal government's request came at a time when the nation's economic downturn had taken a toll on state budgets, which alongside years of shrinking federal funds had eroded the public health workforce.

        The impact of the effort on local publish health agencies was glimpsed at a congressional hearing on the pandemic vaccine last November, when Dr Rob Fulton, director of the St. Paul?Ramsey County Public Health Department in Minnesota, told legislators that 135 of his department's 320 employees were involved in the H1N1 response at least part-time, which took time from their regular work.

        Aside from planning a massive vaccination campaign, health officials had a complex task in pitching it to the public. What they had was a seasonal flu vaccine campaign that needed to be launched about a month earlier than usual, followed closely by the pandemic vaccine initiative. They weren't sure if people would need a second dose of the pandemic version. As public health recommendations evolved and research findings on the pandemic vaccine emerged, the message became even more complex: the risk groups recommended for the two vaccines were slightly different, and children younger than 10 would need a second dose of the pandemic vaccine.

        Anticipating the public's concern about the new vaccine's safety, CDC officials added several extra monitoring systems to its vaccine safety network and conducted focus groups to help craft its vaccine pitch, especially to parents. Officials with HHS and CDC also held tabletop exercises with journalists and bloggers to help sketch out scenarios and resulting communications challenges, such as explaining baseline rates of health events such as neurologic conditions and miscarriages, that might thwart the vaccine campaign.

        At the end of a tabletop exercise last September, Bill Hall, news director for HHS, summed up the challenge in talking to the public about the need for the vaccine. "The public wants a simple message, but nothing about flu is simple," he said.

        Production delays, fall wave cause turbulence
        By the middle of August, it became clear that the amount of pandemic vaccine available for an October launch would be much lower than expected: 45 million doses by the middle of the month instead of the 120 million doses projected earlier. Federal officials said the low-yielding vaccine virus strain and glitches with new production lines were hampering manufacturers.

        With pandemic flu infections spreading across the country in September, fueled by students returning to school, and the realization that the vaccine would launch later than expected, federal officials braced themselves and warned the public to expect some bumps on the road, with demand exceeding supply. At a press conference on Sep 25, CDC Director Dr Tom Frieden said, "In the coming weeks there is going to be some roughness. We don't know what uptake will be, and we also don't know which states will have problems?but we're working hard to identify them and help them overcome difficulties."

        However, the good news was that researchers found that one dose was protective for most people, instead of the two doses public health officials had expected.

        When states got their first vaccine shipments in early October, it was the inhaled version made by MedImmune, which encountered few production problems. The mist version of the vaccine is approved only for people ages 2 through 49, and is contraindicated for many in the CDC's priority groups, such as pregnant women and people with underlying medical conditions

        In the face of vaccine shortages, state and local health officials had to reschedule flu vaccination clinics, and states and hospitals grappled with how to ensure that the meager supplies they got during the first months of the campaign would reach those at highest risk of flu complications. In early November with the pandemic infections widespread in all but two states, Frieden told Congress that the vaccine shortage would probably outlast the flu wave.

        However, balancing out anxieties about production delays was good news about the new vaccine's safety: The first report in mid November suggested the safety profile was similar to that of the seasonal flu vaccine.

        Campaign hits stride
        Pandemic vaccine shipments finally hit their stride in December, reaching the 100 million-dose milestone by the middle of the month. States expanded their vaccination efforts outside the priority groups, and the breathing room allowed federal officials to make their first assessments of the campaign. Sebelius, at a Dec 17 press briefing, told reporters that partnerships between federal officials and their state and local counterparts would yield long-term benefits. "One of the key lessons we learned is you can't mount a public health response only from the beltway," she said.

        Anne Schuchat, MD, director of the CDC's National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, urged state and local health officials to do everything they could to put vaccine in the path of people, and they responded, setting up immunization clinics in nontraditional venues such as shopping malls, airports, subway stations, and sporting events. Also, Schuchat has said that 40 states used school-based vaccinations to some degree, and the CDC recently reported that three of the four states that had the highest vaccine uptake were among those with school-based vaccine clinics.

        In early April, the CDC estimated that the pandemic vaccine campaign had reached 24% to 27% of Americans, or between 72 million and 81 million people, by the end of February. And as a bonus, flu risk messages and the early availability of the seasonal flu vaccine seem to have paid off in record uptake, with nearly all of the 114 million doses used.

        Solid reviews for centralized distribution
        Public health officials who were close to or involved in the vaccination campaign said it worked well and provided useful lessons for the years ahead.

        Dr Paul Etkind, senior analyst for immunization with the National Association of City and County Health Officials (NACCHO), told CIDRAP News that despite early vaccine availability problems, the central distribution system worked well. The centralized system is providing good data, compared to the normal seasonal flu distribution system, on how many and where people were vaccinated. "We're finding out what the gaps were and what populations and areas were underserved," he said.

        Considering the complexity of vaccination messages, health officials?between the pandemic and seasonal vaccines?were able to put an extraordinary amount of vaccine into people's arms, Etkind said. Though everyone wishes the pandemic vaccine uptake was higher, "final numbers might show that we may have knocked down fatalities," he added.

        One particular bright spot of the campaign was the response of pregnant women, who are at risk for severe illness with H1N1, Dr. Daniel B. Jernigan, a CDC flu expert, told CIDRAP News.

        "That's an area where we know we've not had a great vaccination record" in the past, he said. "I think one success of the 2009 H1N1 experience is that a whole lot more pregnant women got vaccinated than before." He thinks obstetricians and gynecologists are now more aware of the risk that flu poses for pregnant women.

        Enhanced safety monitoring boosted the strength of the campaign despite disinformation about the vaccine that made the immunization task more difficult, Etkind said. "There was a lot of talk about another 1976 with new vaccine and the risk of Guillain-Barre syndrome (GBS). And yet with enhanced surveillance that included more resources and faster response, we didn't see any of those things [that antivaccine activists] claimed ahead of time," he said. "It was a safe vaccine and seemingly effective."

        Kris Ehresmann, RN, MPH, immunization director at the Minnesota Department of Health in St. Paul, told CIDRAP News that the centralized system that took shape looked very different from the mass dispensing model that many public health officials had envisioned when plotting out their pandemic plans in the years before. Though she said the centralized system made sense, many had envisioned mass dispensing through public health clinics, which would have meant fewer sites. "This was a paradigm shift for many people. That challenge was reordering the world in the midst of a crisis," she said. "But we got the vaccine to so many different sites."

        When federal officials outlined the plans for pro-rata distribution, with each state deciding how best to distribute the vaccine to providers, some feared that the process might become chaotic, she said. She added that Minnesota was able to target its vaccine to the CDC's highest priority groups, and as a result the uptake numbers so far look good.

        Partnership investments shone
        Etkind said the importance of vaccine partnerships was a valuable lesson, and working with new providers, different state agencies, pharmacies, and social service agencies will pay dividends during future immunization efforts. "That was a new high, another thing to be very happy about and proud of."

        He singled out partnerships with schools as particularly important, especially given recent expansions in seasonal flu vaccine recommendations to include everyone except babies younger than 6 months and children's role in the spread of the virus. "School locations can be a very effective way to meet that new demand," Etkind said.

        Ehresmann said the new relationships with providers have gotten her department thinking about how best to set up a seasonal flu vaccination system that is relatively painless to administer. "We've got lots of ideas," she said.

        Communications challenges remain
        Communications regarding the vaccine were a big challenge, and Etkind said the CDC deserves praise for the tremendous amount of work it did in testing messages with focus groups. "Some of the messages made it through, and the right people came to be vaccinated," he said. "But it's an unfinished story, and there is always room for improvement." He added that there are still parts of the population that aren't as receptive to the vaccine message, such as minority groups.

        Health officials have a big task in front of them in reestablishing a sense of trust in government, he said. "This came to the forefront with flu vaccination. Hopefully, we can acknowledge this and learn to deal with it in a constructive fashion."

        Ehresmann said seasoned public health officials probably weren't surprised when the vaccine was delayed, because they expect problems to crop up during a crisis, but the shortage presented some unique communications challenges. Sometimes the message at the federal level was that states had vaccine available at a time when supplies were very scarce. "You don't want to contradict your partners, but there wasn't plenty of vaccine, yet we had to portray somehow that we hadn't messed up," she said.

        The lesson from the vaccine shortage, Ehresmann said, is "Underpromise and overdeliver."

        Another lesson that surfaced during the campaign is that vaccination messages to adults need some rethinking, Etkind said. Opinion polls from Harvard showed that adults were likely to have their children vaccinated, but didn't believe they were at risk for the disease. "Flu doesn't recognize differences in age or professional differences. And part of what protects them [children] is that parents are also protected," he added.

        Ehresmann predicted that the next communication challenge will be how to portray the pandemic flu risk and the need for vaccination during the transition time as the pandemic strain evolves into more of a seasonal flu pattern.

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