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Bird Flu Virus Crosses Species Barrier to Kill Dogs, Study Says
Dogs sometimes eat "meadow muffins" when their diet has insufficient grains. I had a German Shepherd that would do just that. A farm vet advised me to decrease the meat and increase the dry food in its diet....problem solved.
.
"The next major advancement in the health of American people will be determined by what the individual is willing to do for himself"-- John Knowles, Former President of the Rockefeller Foundation
Re: Bird Flu Virus Crosses Species Barrier to Kill Dogs, Study Says
Viral sampling from infected equids is nasal swab, not fecal matter. Literature demonstrates that EI is highly contagious; vet could carry it easily on clothing.
I was just curious if there was a plausible route directly from Duck---> Dog, other than eating infected meat.
It would be logical conclusion with racing canines, fed a select diet of certain protein sources, and domestic dogs that scavenge dead bird/fowl carcasses or are fed dead fowl from infected farms.
Re: Bird Flu Virus Crosses Species Barrier to Kill Dogs, Study Says
Dogs catch flu directly from birds, study finds <!-- END HEADLINE -->
<!-- BEGIN STORY BODY -->Wed Apr 2, 5:16 PM ET
Dogs can catch influenza directly from birds, Korean researchers said on Wednesday, saying their finding shows pets could play a role in future pandemics.
Several pet dogs became ill and died from what turned out to be purely avian strains of seasonal flu virus, the researchers reported in the journal Emerging Infectious Diseases.
"Our data provide evidence that dogs may play a role in interspecies transmission and spread of influenza virus," Daesub Song of Green Cross Veterinary Products Company Ltd in Yong-in, South Korea and colleagues reported.
The dogs had H3N2 influenza -- a strain similar to one of the flu strains now circulating among humans. But genetic analysis showed the dogs were infected with viruses directly from birds, Song's team said.
Doctors know animals pass flu viruses to one another. Many experts believe most, if not all, influenza viruses originate among birds.
The H5N1 avian influenza virus, which is sweeping through flocks in Asia, Africa and parts of Europe, has occasionally passed to humans, infecting 376 people and killing 238 of them. It has also occasionally infected dogs, cats, clouded leopards, civets and dozens of bird species, from swans to coots.
The fear is that it will somehow change or combine into a form that is easily passed from one human to another, sparking a pandemic that would have the potential to kill hundreds of millions of people globally.
H3N2 is found in birds and is also a very common human flu strain. But the varieties that infect birds and people look different on the genetic level.
Song's team investigated outbreaks among dogs.
"From May through September 2007, cases of severe respiratory disease occurred in animals at three veterinary clinics located 10 to 30 km (6 to 18 miles) apart in Kyunggi Province and one kennel located in Jeolla Province (southern South Korea)," they wrote.
A miniature schnauzer recovered, but a cocker spaniel, two Korean Jindo dogs and a Yorkshire terrier died.
Another 13 dogs in a shelter were affected, and there is evidence some dogs infected others.
DNA analysis showed the viruses from the dogs closely resembled those from Chinese chickens or ducks in Hong Kong, Japan and China.
"Transmission of avian influenza A virus to a new mammalian species is of great concern because it potentially allows the virus to adapt to a new mammalian host, cross new species barriers and acquire pandemic potential," they wrote.
They believe the dogs were infected via food.
"We posit that this transmission results from feeding dogs untreated minced meats of ducks or chickens," they wrote.
"In South Korea, untreated duck and chicken meats, including internal organs and heads, have been widely used to feed dogs for fattening in local canine farms or kennels."
It is possible some of the dogs were infected via respiratory secretions in live bird markets, and passed the virus to others, they added.
"Live-bird markets are thought to constitute a missing link in the epidemiology of avian influenza viruses because they bring together numerous hosts, such as chickens, ducks, turkeys, geese and doves, in a high-density setting, which represents an ideal environment for virus interspecies transmission," they wrote. (Reporting by Maggie Fox, editing by Will Dunham and Todd Eastham)
Re: Bird Flu Virus Crosses Species Barrier to Kill Dogs, Study Says
Here are the top 100 for the partial NA sequence, which have a major North American component (ALB is Alberta Canada and birds have wings) and more evidence for recombination
gb|EU301275.1| Influenza A virus (A/aquatic bird/Korea/JN-2/2... 798 0.0 gb|AY862644.1| Influenza A virus (A/dove/Korea/S11/03(H3N2)) ... 771 0.0 gb|AY862642.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Korea/S9/03(H3N2)) n... 771 0.0 gb|AY862641.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Korea/S8/03(H3N2)) n... 771 0.0 gb|AY862640.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Korea/S7/03(H3N2)) n... 771 0.0 gb|AY862643.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Korea/S10/03(H3N2)) ... 765 0.0 gb|EU301274.1| Influenza A virus (A/aquatic bird/Korea/CN-2/2... 760 0.0 gb|EU301276.1| Influenza A virus (A/aquatic bird/Korea/KN-2/2... 753 0.0 gb|AF156395.1|AF156395 Influenza A virus (A/Duck/Hong Kong/Y4... 749 0.0 gb|EU301284.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Korea/LPM01/2004(H3N... 747 0.0 gb|AY422022.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hokkaido/95/01(H2N2)... 747 0.0 gb|EU301288.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Korea/LPM18/2004(H3N... 744 0.0 gb|EU301287.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Korea/LPM17/2004(... 744 0.0 gb|EU301286.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Korea/LPM09/2004(H3N... 744 0.0 dbj|AB302790.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hong Kong/301/1978(... 744 0.0 dbj|AB277755.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hokkaido/5/1977(H3N... 744 0.0 dbj|AB276116.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hokkaido/95/01(H2N2... 744 0.0 gb|EU301285.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Korea/LPM03/2004(... 738 0.0 dbj|AB286877.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hokkaido/120/2001(H... 738 0.0 gb|CY005620.1| Influenza A virus (A/dk/Hong Kong/293/1978(H7N... 738 0.0 gb|EU301301.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Korea/LPM88/2006(... 735 0.0 gb|EU301300.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Korea/LPM86/2006(H3N... 735 0.0 gb|EU301297.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Korea/LPM61/2005(... 735 0.0 gb|EU301296.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Korea/LPM56/2005(H3N... 735 0.0 gb|EU301290.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Korea/LPM23/2005(H3N... 735 0.0 gb|EU301289.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Korea/LPM22/2005(H3N... 735 0.0 gb|AY862639.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Korea/S6/03(H3N2)... 735 0.0 gb|EU301303.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Korea/LPM92/2006(H3N... 729 0.0 gb|EU301302.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Korea/LPM91/2006(H3N... 729 0.0 gb|EU301294.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Korea/LPM43/2005(... 729 0.0 gb|EU301293.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Korea/LPM39/2005(H3N... 729 0.0 gb|EU301298.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Korea/LPM66/2006(H3N... 726 0.0 gb|EU301295.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Korea/LPM44/2005(... 726 0.0 gb|CY014618.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hong Kong/784/1979(H... 720 0.0 gb|CY016158.1| Influenza A virus (A/gadwall/Ohio/37/1999(H6N2... 717 0.0 gb|CY020999.1| Influenza A virus (A/environment/Ohio/1001/200... 711 0.0 gb|AY300945.1| Influenza A virus (A/turkey/CA/D0208652-C/02(H... 711 0.0 gb|CY028237.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Maryland/182/2006... 708 0.0 gb|CY021167.1| Influenza A virus (A/green-winged teal/Ohio/17... 708 0.0 gb|CY011050.1| Influenza A virus (A/blue-winged teal/Ohio/908... 708 0.0 gb|EU301299.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Korea/LPM67/2006(... 704 0.0 gb|CY019215.1| Influenza A virus (A/environment/Ohio/994/2005... 704 0.0 dbj|AB296073.1| Influenza A virus (A/turkey/Massachusetts/374... 702 0.0 emb|AJ574906.1| Influenza A virus (A/turkey/Massachussetts/37... 702 0.0 gb|AF508581.1| Influenza A virus (A/Pheasant/Ireland/PV18/97(... 702 0.0 gb|CY005908.1| Influenza A virus (A/turkey/Minnesota/833/1980... 702 0.0 gb|CY024812.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard.Maryland/708/2005... 699 0.0 gb|CY022743.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Maryland/712/2005... 699 0.0 gb|CY021463.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Maryland/710/2005... 699 0.0 gb|CY021455.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Maryland/615/2005... 699 0.0 gb|CY021279.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Maryland/631/2005... 699 0.0 gb|CY021271.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Maryland/691/2005... 699 0.0 gb|CY021263.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Maryland/681/2005... 699 0.0 emb|AJ574908.1| Influenza A virus (A/turkey/Minnesota/3689-15... 699 0.0 gb|CY014923.1| Influenza A virus (A/blue-winged teal/New York... 699 0.0 gb|CY014903.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard duck/New York/170... 699 0.0 gb|CY014851.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard duck/New York/189... 699 0.0 gb|AY849791.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/TX/298313/04(H5N2... 699 0.0 gb|DQ309439.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/BritishColumbia/CN26... 699 0.0 gb|AY703834.1| Influenza A virus (A/guillemot/Sweden/3/00(H6N... 697 0.0 gb|EU182311.1| Influenza A virus (A/turkey/MN/3397-3/1992(H5N... 693 0.0 dbj|AB295604.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Pennsylvania/10218/... 693 0.0 gb|CY014757.1| Influenza A virus (A/turkey/Minnesota/836/1980... 693 0.0 gb|CY005875.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/MN/5733-1/1980(H9N2... 693 0.0 gb|CY004578.1| Influenza A virus (A/pintail duck/ALB/86/1976(... 693 0.0 gb|CY004319.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard duck/ALB/57/1976(... 693 0.0 gb|CY011058.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Ohio/275/1987(H4N... 690 0.0 emb|AJ574903.1| Influenza A virus (A/Pekin duck/France/92/00(... 690 0.0 emb|AJ574902.1| Influenza A virus (A/Pekin duck/France/43/00(... 690 0.0 gb|CY014641.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/New Zealand/41/1984(... 690 0.0 gb|CY004678.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard duck/ALB/144/1987... 690 0.0 gb|CY004621.1| Influenza A virus (A/pintail duck/ALB/627/1979... 690 0.0 gb|CY004525.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard duck/ALB/294/1987... 690 0.0 gb|CY004517.1| Influenza A virus (A/coot/ALB/134/1987(H6N2)) ... 690 0.0 gb|CY020847.1| Influenza A virus (A/pintail/Ohio/73/1989(H6N2... 684 0.0 gb|CY017413.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Ohio/424/1988(H3N... 684 0.0 gb|CY011250.1| Influenza A virus (A/wigeon/Ohio/379/1988(H5N2... 684 0.0 gb|CY004969.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard duck/ALB/645/1980... 684 0.0 gb|CY004832.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard duck/ALB/630/1984... 684 0.0 gb|CY004806.1| Influenza A virus (A/pintail duck/ALB/599/1979... 684 0.0 gb|CY004799.1| Influenza A virus (A/blue-winged teal/ALB/580/... 684 0.0 gb|AF156401.1|AF156401 Influenza A virus (A/Turkey/California... 682 0.0 gb|CY022263.1| Influenza A virus (A/poultry/Italy/365/1997(H5... 681 0.0 dbj|AB292407.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Alberta/223/1979... 681 0.0 gb|CY014560.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard duck/Alberta/205/... 681 0.0 emb|AJ697880.1| Influenza A virus (A/Pekin Duck/France/D-1080... 681 0.0 emb|AJ697879.1| Influenza A virus (A/Pekin Duck/France/D-1043... 681 0.0 gb|AY330340.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hokkaido/13/00(H9N2)... 681 0.0 gb|CY005897.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/MN/1516/1981(H5N2)) ... 681 0.0 gb|CY005532.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Nanchang/1749/1992(H... 681 0.0 gb|CY005306.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/ALB/124/1991(H11N... 681 0.0 gb|CY005142.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard duck/ALB/321/1988... 681 0.0 gb|CY004792.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard duck/ALB/106/1979... 681 0.0 gb|CY004785.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard duck/ALB/354/1978... 681 0.0 gb|CY004102.1| Influenza A virus (A/pintail duck/ALB/1360/197... 681 0.0 gb|CY004045.1| Influenza A virus (A/pintail duck/ALB/367/1978... 681 0.0 gb|CY004027.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard duck/ALB/290/1978... 681 0.0 gb|CY004020.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard duck/ALB/280/1978... 681 0.0 gb|CY004001.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard duck/ALB/250/1978... 681 0.0 gb|CY003896.1| Influenza A virus (A/herring gull/DE/475/1986(... 681 0.0
Re: Bird Flu Virus Crosses Species Barrier to Kill Dogs, Study Says
In horses, two major sub-types of influenza A virus are known to circulate. The first (H7N7) was isolated in Czechoslovakia in 1956, the second (H3N8) in Miami in 1963. The H7N7 sub-type is believed to be extinct or present only at very low levels.
The H3N8 sub-type is almost certainly a mutation of a bird flu virus, and changes in the virus have seen the development of two lineages - American and European. The H3N8 sub-type was behind a severe 1989 outbreak in China, which affected 80% of horses exposed to it and killed 20%. It went on to cause outbreaks in Trinidad (1979), Argentina (1985), South Africa (1986), and Jamaica (1989). H3N8 was behind the recent Australian outbreak.
The ability of the influenza virus to occasionally cross the species barrier raises an obvious question: If equine influenza has managed to mutate to infect dogs, could people also catch flu from their horses?
Dalva Mancini and a team of researchers in Brazil have looked for evidence pointing to the transmission of influenza between horses and people. Their work revealed high levels of antibodies in horses to two human influenza A strains - H1N1 and H3N2. The researchers had taken fluids and mouth and nasal swabs from 46 horses at studs and racing stables in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, in Brazil.
About 78% of the horses carried antibodies to two strains of equine flu. Remarkably, they tested positive in even higher numbers to human influenza A virus - 80.43% for H1N1 and 93.47% for H3N2. Similar numbers had antibodies to type B influenza.
The results meant that the immune systems of the horses recognised and generated antibodies against the human flu viruses, but did not become sick. "A high incidence of human influenza virus infection was observed among the horses evaluated," the researchers said. "These results demonstrated that horses are reservoirs of the circulating influenza viruses of both the equine-specific and the non-specific strains."
"These interspecies transmissions reinforce the potential mechanisms for introduction of genes of the avian influenza viruses in reservoirs that can reach man. "The response to the type B strain in the horse sera is particularly noteworthy, since this strain is considered to be restricted to humans," they said in their findings. The researchers continued: "It may be concluded ... the high incidence of influenza viruses among animals and humans surely represents a problem to both public health and animal protection all over the world.
"The occurrence of interspecies transmission is of concern since this allows the maintenance of the influenza virus in different reservoirs."
The evidence, they said, led to the conclusion that interspecies transmission probably occurs between humans and horses.
G.A. Landolt, in a presentation to the American Association of Equine Practitioners in 2006, reviewed the transmission of influenza A viruses between species and its implications for horses. He described equine flu as a disease that generated serious health and economic problems, adding that vaccination was the cornerstone of influenza prevention. Vaccine failure, he said, could primarily be blamed on the sustained genetic evolution of the virus, called antigenic drift, as well as the occasional introduction of gene segments or entire viruses from other species, called antigenic shift. These factors, he said, accounted for the diversity of influenza viruses.
"Although the barrier to transmission of avian viruses to horses is relatively strong, it is anything but complete," he said.
A severe epidemic in horses in northeast China in 1989, he said, served as an example of such spread. Genetic evidence pointed to this virus having spread directly to horses from the bird reservoir. He says evidence shows that influenza viruses of different genotypes and subtypes can occasionally transmit between two species of mammals, pointing to a 2004 outbreak in Floria among 22 race greyhounds which showed the strain had evolved from equine influenza virus. It spread to six states. Further research has since shown this virus had been circulating in several states as early as 1999.
"The transmission of influenza from horses to dogs is especially interesting in light of the fact that dogs were not commonly regarded as hosts for influenza A viruses. "The viral and host factors that determine the species range of influenza viruses and the mechanisms by which host barriers are overcome are not completely understood. Regardless of the mechanisms involved, the equine-lineage H3N8 viruses have since become established in the dog population in the United States," he said.
Although horse strains have shown relatively little genetic diversion, the new canine variety has shown high rates of evolution.
"Although it is unclear if the canine H3N8 viruses are still capable of infecting horses, they potentially represent a serious emerging disease threat to the American horse population. "Although horses have often been regarded as isolated hosts for influenza, events of recent years clearly indicate that the species barrier for viruses jumping either to or from horses is not absolute. "The realisation of this fact has importance for control, because commercially available vaccines may not provide protection against infection with viruses stemming from other species."
(this is why I posted the equid influenza article earlier that suggests a direct correlation between vaccine evasion and recent phylogenic divergence)
Source: Influenza in horses and humans: the perils of viral marketing
April 1, 2008
Re: Bird Flu Virus Crosses Species Barrier to Kill Dogs, Study Says
Even though it's unlikely the virus would survive the trip many cat and dog foods and treats are manufactured in Asia, and elsewhere, for worldwide distribution.
After the recent toxins in pet food many people have started to feed raw or home cooked poultry on a regular basis. It's not uncommon for some raw feeders to give their pets whole carcasses, perhaps some of them from possibly questionable sources. It would also seem possible that canines used for dog fighting might also be fed live cats or birds to provoke their instincts for the kill.
Even though it's unlikely the virus would survive the trip many cat and dog foods and treats are manufactured in Asia, and elsewhere, for worldwide distribution.
After the recent toxins in pet food many people have started to feed raw or home cooked poultry on a regular basis. It's not uncommon for some raw feeders to give their pets whole carcasses, perhaps some of them from possibly questionable sources. It would also seem possible that canines used for dog fighting might also be fed live cats or birds to provoke their instincts for the kill.
Western
Since the virus easily passes dog to dog, it is pretty easy to invision a transmission chain beginning with a wild bird or chicken. H3N2 is not highly pathogenic in birds. If the virus was in dog food, dog deaths would likely signal the problem since many of the H3N2 infected dogs died.
(1.6): J Gen Virol. 2008 Apr;89(Pt 4):949-57. Ecology of H3 avian influenza viruses in Korea and assessment of their pathogenic potentials.
Song MS, Oh TK, Moon HJ, Yoo DW, Lee EH, Lee JS, Kim CJ, Yoo GJ, Kim H, Choi YK.
College of Medicine and Medical Research Institute, Chungbuk National University, 12 Gaeshin-Dong Heungduk-Ku, Cheongju 361-763, Republic of Korea.
To determine the genetic origins of novel H3 avian influenza viruses of chickens and ducks in Korea, genetic characterization of H3 avian influenza viruses isolated from live poultry markets and migratory aquatic birds in South Korea during 2004-2006 was conducted. Phylogenetic analysis revealed that at least four novel genotypes of H3N2 and two genotypes of H3N6 avian influenza viruses were co-circulating in backyard poultry of Korea. The viruses were reassortants between H9N2 viruses of Korean chickens and unknown influenza viruses of migratory birds. Genetic comparison of H3 viruses from live bird markets with those from wild bird isolates revealed that certain gene segments of wild bird isolates are related closely to those of Korean group H9N2 viruses isolated from live poultry markets in 2003. Furthermore, animal-challenge studies demonstrated that the pathogenicity of certain avian H3 influenza viruses was altered due to reassortment, leading to H3 avian influenza viruses in Korea that can potentially expand their host range to include mammals. These studies emphasize the continuing need to monitor backyard poultry at live poultry markets to better understand interspecies transmission and the emergence of novel influenza viruses that have the potential to infect humans.
PMID: 18343836 [PubMed - in process]
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------
Virus Subtype Genotype
LPM isolates
Dk/Korea/LPM01/04 H3N2 A
Ck/Korea/LPM03/04 H3N2 C
Dk/Korea/LPM09/04 H3N2 A
Ck/Korea/LPM17/04 H3N2 A
Dk/Korea/LPM18/04 H3N2 A
Dk/Korea/LPM22/05 H3N2 A
Dk/Korea/LPM23/05 H3N2 A
Dk/Korea/LPM36/05 H3N6 ?
Dk/Korea/LPM38/05 H3N6 ?
Dk/Korea/LPM39/05 H3N2 B
Ck/Korea/LPM43/05 H3N2 A
Ck/Korea/LPM44/05 H3N2 A
Dk/Korea/LPM56/05 H3N2 A
Ck/Korea/LPM61/05 H3N2 A
Dk/Korea/LPM66/06 H3N2 A
Ck/Korea/LPM67/06 H3N2 A
Dk/Korea/LPM86/06 H3N2 A
Ck/Korea/LPM88/06 H3N2 C
Dk/Korea/LPM91/06 H3N2 D
Dk/Korea/LPM92/06 H3N2 D
(1.6): J Gen Virol. 2008 Apr;89(Pt 4):949-57. Ecology of H3 avian influenza viruses in Korea and assessment of their pathogenic potentials.
Song MS, Oh TK, Moon HJ, Yoo DW, Lee EH, Lee JS, Kim CJ, Yoo GJ, Kim H, Choi YK.
College of Medicine and Medical Research Institute, Chungbuk National University, 12 Gaeshin-Dong Heungduk-Ku, Cheongju 361-763, Republic of Korea.
To determine the genetic origins of novel H3 avian influenza viruses of chickens and ducks in Korea, genetic characterization of H3 avian influenza viruses isolated from live poultry markets and migratory aquatic birds in South Korea during 2004-2006 was conducted. Phylogenetic analysis revealed that at least four novel genotypes of H3N2 and two genotypes of H3N6 avian influenza viruses were co-circulating in backyard poultry of Korea. The viruses were reassortants between H9N2 viruses of Korean chickens and unknown influenza viruses of migratory birds. Genetic comparison of H3 viruses from live bird markets with those from wild bird isolates revealed that certain gene segments of wild bird isolates are related closely to those of Korean group H9N2 viruses isolated from live poultry markets in 2003. Furthermore, animal-challenge studies demonstrated that the pathogenicity of certain avian H3 influenza viruses was altered due to reassortment, leading to H3 avian influenza viruses in Korea that can potentially expand their host range to include mammals. These studies emphasize the continuing need to monitor backyard poultry at live poultry markets to better understand interspecies transmission and the emergence of novel influenza viruses that have the potential to infect humans.
PMID: 18343836 [PubMed - in process]
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------
Sampling and virus isolation.
Faecal samples of ducks and chickens
were collected twice monthly from LPM in the Chungbuk and
Chungnam provinces of South Korea from December 2004 to April
2006. Birds sold in the markets are mainly brought in from local
backyard poultry farms, usually within a 20 km radius of the cities.
We also collected faecal samples of migratory birds for the survey of
AI viruses in the Chungbuk and Chungnam provinces of South Korea
from 2004 to 2007 and investigated whether the AI outbreaks in
domestic poultry bore any relationship to those in migratory birds in
Comment