WHO criticized Chinese ministry for not sharing new bird flu strain samples

[Gert van der Hoek]

WHO criticized Chinese ministry for not sharing new bird flu strain samples

The Associated Press

Published: November 1, 2006


BEIJING The World Health Organization on Wednesday criticized China's Agriculture Ministry for not sharing samples of a newly discovered strain of bird flu that has become the primary version of the disease in southern China and parts of Asia.

Scientists said this week that the strain ? called H5N1 Fujian-like ? was found in almost all poultry infections and some human cases in China in the past year and was now prevalent in Hong Kong, Laos, Malaysia, and Thailand.

While it's normal for new strains of viruses to emerge, it is imperative for health officials to know if one has become dominant, said Julie Hall, an infectious disease expert at the WHO's Beijing office.

"There's a stark contrast between what we're hearing from researchers and what the Ministry of Agriculture says," Hall said in an interview with The Associated Press. "Unless the ministry tell us what's going on and shares viruses on a regular basis, we will be doing diagnostics on strains that are old."

She said the ministry has not shared bird flu virus samples ? a key step in developing diagnostic tools and vaccines ? since 2004.

The ministry's reluctance has been an ongoing source of aggravation at the WHO and international health experts have repeatedly complained about Chinese foot-dragging in cooperating in investigating emerging diseases like bird flu and severe acute respiratory syndrome.

"This is a new disease. Nobody knows how to tackle it, nobody in the world has all the answers," Hall said. "But if they share ... then we will all gain from that."

Telephones at the Agriculture Ministry were not answered on Wednesday and it did not immediately respond to faxed questions.

Hall said the ministry has reported only three outbreaks of bird flu in provinces where one out of 30 geese and ducks in live markets tested positive for H5N1 in the yearlong surveillance program, which began in June 2005, indicating that the disease was still prevalent. Additionally, 95 percent of the poultry tested after October 2005 were positive for the Fujian-like strain, according to the results of the study reported in Tuesday's issue of Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

"The ministry needs to tell us just how many substrains are circulating in China and whether some strains are dominant or becoming more dominant," Hall said.

The H5N1 flu has devastated poultry in China and several other southeast Asian countries and also has claimed more than 150 human lives. Most of the people affected lived close to flocks of chickens or other poultry.

SARS, which was first identified in 2003, rapidly spread from southern China to some 30 countries, killing 774 people and infecting more than 8,000.

http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/11/01/asia/AS_GEN_China_Bird_Flu.php

 

[Vibrant62]

Re: WHO criticized Chinese ministry for not sharing new bird flu strain samples

From this report it would suggest that those cases that have been 'suspect' on clinical presentation but negative on PCR testing might have been this strain, or a derivation of it. This may explain many recent cases that have failed to test positive but have minifested clinically as BF. My question is how prevalent this Fujian like strain is at present, and if there is any indication it has reached Indonesia. Does anyone have additional data on this?

 

[MHSC]

Re: WHO criticized Chinese ministry for not sharing new bird flu strain samples

Scrutiny call after new bird flu strain find

<!-- The detection of a new strain of the H5N1 avian flu shows that both control measures for poultry vaccinations and surveillance work are inadequate, scientists say.

//--> Caroline Kim and Reuters

Wednesday, November 01, 2006

The detection of a new strain of the H5N1 avian flu shows that both control measures for poultry vaccinations and surveillance work are inadequate, scientists say.

Since its first detection in March last year in the mainland's Fujian province, the "Fujian-like" strain has been found in six other provinces - Guangdong, Hunan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Guangxi and Jiangxi.


"Existing measures need to be reviewed and surveillance has to be increased in both Hong Kong, China and Eurasian countries," said Dr Gavin Smith, a post-doctorate researcher at Hong Kong University's microbiology department. "Strains in poultry vaccinations also need to be reassessed."
Although it is highly unlikely that the new strain has evolved from previous vaccines, Smith told The Standard Tuesday vaccinations often suppress certain types of viruses, leaving room for others to multiply.


"There's a lot of variables and, previously, we haven't seen such a widespread impact of one strain," he said.


When 53,220 fecal samples were collected from poultry markets between July last year and June, 1,294 were found to have been infected with the H5N1 virus.


After a genetic sequencing of viruses between April and June this year, 103 out of 108 that had tested positive, revealed the "Fujian-like" strain.

Scientists say the "Fujian-like" virus is distinctly different from previous strains, both biologically and genetically, and may have the ability to spread.


Project co-ordinator and professor of microbiology Guan Yi believes the variant strain may have become dominant since it was not as easily affected by the vaccine used to control previous strains.


"This virus is likely to have already instigated a third wave of H5N1 infections in the region, as it's already widespread in southern China and has also been detected in neighboring countries," Guan Yi said, emphasizing that the research does not necessarily suggest that the new strain is more highly pathogenic or virulent.


According to Smith, the prevalence of the "Fujian-like" strain is not a cause for alarm since research has yet to indicate the likelihood of a human pandemic.


"Whether this new strain is likely or less likely to spark a pandemic than any other strain is completely unknown," Smith said.


"Although there are no signs of outbreaks, the research indicates that current vaccinations for poultry are ineffective and inadequate," he said, noting that the single vaccine currently used in the mainland is also not enough to tackle the issue.


"The methods of poultry vaccination must be addressed," he added.
Both Guan Yi and Smith suggest that a more systematic surveillance method be put in place to "determine the dynamics of the spread of the virus."


Furthermore, a report published last week in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences in the United States said the predominance of this virus over a large geographical region within a short period directly challenges current disease control measures.


The H5N1 virus is one of nine different subtypes of the avian influenza virus that attack the immune system in birds.




http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?pp_cat=11&art_id=30750&sid=10641151&con_type=1

 

[MHSC]

Re: WHO criticized Chinese ministry for not sharing new bird flu strain samples

New strain of bird flu spreads to humans


By Roger Highfield, Science Editor
Last Updated: 3:23am GMT 01/11/2006


<!--NO VIEW-->
A previously unknown and dangerous strain of the H5N1 bird flu has emerged from southern China and has spread from birds to people in South-east Asia, marking a third wave of avian flu and rekindling fears of a global pandemic.


Although the H5N1 avian influenza mostly affects birds and infects people only sporadically, the new strain will once again raise fears that it may mutate or combine with a human virus to form a mutant or hybrid capable of passing from person to person, triggering a pandemic where millions of lives may be lost.


"The implications of this study are that current control measures, as generally practised to control avian influenza, are ineffective," said Prof Yi Guan of the University of Hong Kong, leader of a large team that describes the virus today in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

Prof Guan, director of the State Key Laboratory of Emerging Infectious Diseases, who collaborated with Prof Robert Webster of St Jude's Children's Research Hospital in Memphis, a leading centre in the West, concludes that "the pandemic threat persists".


"We have no information to suggest that this is more highly pathogenic or that this virus is a more likely candidate for a pandemic virus than any other H5N1 or other subtype virus," he told The Daily Telegraph. However, the team points out that a highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza virus in Eurasian and African poultry populations is considered the most likely candidate for a new pandemic influenza and the rise of avian-to-human interspecies transmission seen in the last 12 months "seems to favour such a hypothesis".


For today's study, the team searched for different viral strains by monitoring the H5N1 avian influenza virus in market chickens, ducks, and geese. The researchers found that a strain emerged last year and became the dominant strain in southern China by early this year, displacing previous ones. The strain appeared to avoid China's compulsory chicken vaccination programme, and may even be aided by the vaccine, which may be ineffective against the new strain.


The new strain was also responsible for recent human H5N1 infections in China, which have occurred in rural and urban areas, some of which could not be linked to nearby outbreaks in farms or local markets. The researchers warn that such urban human infections could lead to a serious outbreak, challenging current pandemic preparedness plans.


These new viruses have already transmitted to Hong Kong, Laos, Malaysia and Thailand, resulting in a new transmission and outbreak wave in South-east Asia, say the team. "The predominance of this virus over a large geographical region within a short period directly challenges current disease control measures," the team concludes.


This strain may have begun the third wave of transmission of H5N1 avian flu that could potentially spread throughout Eurasia. Without more and broader flu surveillance in both poultry and humans, say the researchers, identifying an outbreak of human H5N1 influenza will be difficult.



http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/10/31/nflu31.xml

 

[HenryN]

Re: WHO criticized Chinese ministry for not sharing new bird flu strain samples

From this report it would suggest that those cases that have been 'suspect' on clinical presentation but negative on PCR testing might have been this strain, or a derivation of it. This may explain many recent cases that have failed to test positive but have minifested clinically as BF. My question is how prevalent this Fujian like strain is at present, and if there is any indication it has reached Indonesia. Does anyone have additional data on this?

The Fujian strain, like the Indonesian strain have regions of identity with the Qinghai strain, indicating all are linked together via recombination in wild birds, which are poorly monitored worldwide, including Indonesia.

The Fujian stain has only been reported in China and southeast Asia. The vast majority of bird isolates in Indonesia have the common HPAI cleavage site of QRERRRKKR. The vast majority of human isolates in Indonesia has QRESRRKKR. One bird isolate had the Qinghai HA cleavage site, but the most common Fujian site LRERRRK_R has not been reported in Indonesia.

 

[Vibrant62]

Re: WHO criticized Chinese ministry for not sharing new bird flu strain samples

Thank you Dr. Niman.

 

[aardvark]

Re: WHO criticized Chinese ministry for not sharing new bird flu strain samples

Dr. Niman, you've mentioned that China has released hundreds of sequences to GenBank in recent months. Are sequences for isolates belonging to the Fujian sublineage well-represented among those?

 

[HenryN]

Re: WHO criticized Chinese ministry for not sharing new bird flu strain samples

Dr. Niman, you've mentioned that China has released hundreds of sequences to GenBank in recent months. Are sequences for isolates belonging to the Fujian sublineage well-represented among those?

I will be doing a commentary. The recent sequences released by China are from isolates collected between 1997 and 2004. Many of these isolates were precursors to the Fujian-like strain, but did not have the characteristic cleavage site, which included a dropped K. The isolate with a dropped K that was the likely precursor to this cleavage site was in one of the first H5N1 sequences, which was from a duck being smuggle from Fujian province to Taiwan. That sequences was made public in early 2004 and was a prototype for the Z genotype.

The first H5N1 sequence in the Fujian-like category was from early 2005 and, as indicated from its name, was also in Fujian province. Many of the recent isolates have the dropped K as well as a Q-->L change right in front of the cleavage site.

China released human sequences from fatal H5N1 infections in late 2005 / early 2006. These sequences were the Fujian strain, and the Chinese Ministry of Health put out a detailed report, indicating that addition 2006 cases were also the Fujian strain (based on sequence homology as well as the novel cleavage site).

China has not released 2005 or 2006 isolates from birds, which is why WHO is complaining (the recent sequences by Hong Kong / St Jude were largely from southern China, while the sequences from Beijing Genome Institute are largely from northern China. The recent travel logs I have put up are color coded green if they are from the recently released sequences from Beijing.

 

[aardvark]

Re: WHO criticized Chinese ministry for not sharing new bird flu strain samples

Fascinating, as always -- thank you

 

[GaudiaRay]

Re: WHO criticized Chinese ministry for not sharing new bird flu strain samples

Is it strange that WHO is criticising China for failing to release sequences when IN FACT Hong Kong, Weybridge and St Jude have failed to release full sequences of virus samples they hold?

We know that the leaders of those labs are in close communication with WHO.

And what does the failure to release full sequences, as well as current sequences out of China, mean to the world health researchers who are not working at HK, Weybridge, & St. Jude, or who are not in the secret WHO "club" which was exposed by the Italian researcher recently?

Again, what are the consequences for failure to release full sequences?
I do believe that failure to release the FULL sequences does have serious and major consequences, one of which is continuing ignorance of the full facts.

And what does that mean...ignorance of the full facts? Does that mean that researchers outside of the "club" are locked out of data which may have value?

Is the fact that the vaxes now being used on poultry are NOT CURRENT one of those consequences?

Is it appropriate for WHO to challenge China when it has failed to call for full release of complete sequences over which it has control or significant influences?

Where are we here?

 

[Johnny Yuma]

Re: WHO criticized Chinese ministry for not sharing new bird flu strain samples

We're **** outta luck...........to paraphrase Clint Eastwood in the Dead Pool.

SWELL>

 

[HenryN]

Re: WHO criticized Chinese ministry for not sharing new bird flu strain samples

Is it strange that WHO is criticising China for failing to release sequences when IN FACT Hong Kong, Weybridge and St Jude have failed to release full sequences of virus samples they hold?

We know that the leaders of those labs are in close communication with WHO.

And what does the failure to release full sequences, as well as current sequences out of China, mean to the world health researchers who are not working at HK, Weybridge, & St. Jude, or who are not in the secret WHO "club" which was exposed by the Italian researcher recently?

Again, what are the consequences for failure to release full sequences?
I do believe that failure to release the FULL sequences does have serious and major consequences, one of which is continuing ignorance of the full facts.

And what does that mean...ignorance of the full facts? Does that mean that researchers outside of the "club" are locked out of data which may have value?

Is the fact that the vaxes now being used on poultry are NOT CURRENT one of those consequences?

Is it appropriate for WHO to challenge China when it has failed to call for full release of complete sequences over which it has control or significant influences?

Where are we here?

Even club members are locked out. Most peer reviewed journals require that papers include enough detail so anyone skilled in the art can reproduce the experiments. In the case of papers that include analysis requiring sequences, the authors are supposed to place the sequences in a public database (like Genbank) and include accession numbers in the paper. In the PNAS paper on the Fujian strain, 404 H5N1 isolates were discussed. Phylogenetic trees of 404 HA sequences and 156 PB2 sequences were in the paper, and those 556 sequences were deposited and accession numbers were included in the paper. However, the paper also indicated that only a few (I think 6) of the isolates were Amantadine resistant. Because the statement was based on the M2 sequence, the 404 MP sequences should have been deposited so scientists reading the paper could independently verify how many isolates were or were not Amantadine resistant. The paper did not include accession numbers for MP sequences (or any numbers for PB1, PA, NA, NP, or NS). In reality, there should have been 3232 sequences deposited (8 for each of the 404 isolates). These may be "in progress", but the statement on Amantadine resistance indicates that at least partial sequences have been generated for all 404 MP gene segments.