Re: Opinion Piece, Lancet. Moral Panic and Pandemics
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ffice:smarttags" name="place"></o:smarttagtype><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml> <o:OfficeDocumentSettings> <o:RelyOnVML/> <o:AllowPNG/> </o:OfficeDocumentSettings> </xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml> <w:WordDocument> <w:View>Normal</w:View> <w:Zoom>0</w:Zoom> <w:Compatibility> <w:BreakWrappedTables/> <w:SnapToGridInCell/> <w:WrapTextWithPunct/> <w:UseAsianBreakRules/> </w:Compatibility> </w:WordDocument> </xml><![endif]--><!--[if !mso]><object classid="clsid:38481807-CA0E-42D2-BF39-B33AF135CC4D" id=ieooui></object> <style> st1\:*{behavior:url(#ieooui) } </style> <![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 10]> <style> /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman";} </style> <![endif]--> What are the messages and why has the communication of key facts been such a problem. There are three main problems, as I see it, the message, delivery and credibility.
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What is the absolute minimum information required to make an informed decision?
If we start with the term Pandemic. To me this implies the emergence, or re-emergence, of an infectious disease spreading over a wide geographical area. More interestingly it does not say anything about the reproductive number, generation time or severity, nor does it say anything about the epidemiology, latency or causative agent. It fact it says little apart form there is a disease which is currently gaining the upper hand over us.
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The problem with pandemic communication is that the WHO’s 1 to 6 scale seemed to be viewed as stages leading up to some kind of catastrophic blast off. Why was it so difficult to explain that
'Phase 6 means the disease is now into the phase where it will spread freely. We will also be letting you know how quickly it is spreading, the range of severity being reported, the range of symptoms, typical course of the illness etc. None of these are implied in going to phase 6. Pandemics, and epidemics, can be of a very mild disease or cause mass fatalities. They can have long latency periods, like HIV, so take decades to build up or infection, incubation and infection of the next host can occur in a few days as in flu.'
All of this was well know as was the fact that viral influenza can cause massive fatalities in all age groups, as it did in 1918, or be an inconvenience to the young and fit. That it could also come as a disease, like HP H5N1, killing half of those that caught it was a major shock to all and is the reason that so many countries had pandemic plans in place. Anyone who could legitimately be called a flu expert, and most of the regulars here prior to the H1N1 pandemic, were well aware that other flu serotypes were just as likely to go pandemic as H5N1. SARS and HIV had also made it clear novel disease, as well as novel strains of old disease, had to be considered. However H5N1, due to its extreme case fatality rate, was far more likely to result in a global catastrophe.
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The next communication problem was with the epidemiology. The seasonal flu has a typical symptom set, for the fit, and although it causes many fatalities annually these are heavily concentrated in the very elderly (90% of deaths in the over 65s – US data). The 1918 flu was noted for attacking the young and fit, the group generally best able to fend off infectious disease. H1N1(2009), once enough data was available to see a pattern, caused lots of mild, or asymptomatic, illness with a small amount of very severe respiratory illness. Again the age profile was nothing like seasonal flu with nearly half of the fatalities falling in the 25 to 50 age group and very few over 65s. The message here is that the total numbers of fatalities may not be very different to previous years but those dying are young adults rather than their grandparents and great-grandparents.
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The other communication problem is in being believed and not crying wolf. The message is the same as for any other natural disaster. We need to prepare for Hurricanes, Earthquakes and Pandemics. Fortunately they are not all of the worst category and just because most of us got a gentle shaking this time it does not mean we will next time. At all times we need to have a contingency plan for the full range of events and preparations for the range of likely events. H5N1 is still out there and there is no reason to believe that there has to be a prescribed gap between flu pandemics, or pandemics of any other disease. I thought the scientists did an excellent job at their briefings, clear and factual. The problem was that most people did not watch briefings what they got was news stories. The sad truth is that all the key communication points could be explained in half a page of A4 text but it is not possible to get everyone to read half a page of text.
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I am not sure the question <st1

lace>Shannon</st1

lace> raises is real, in the sense I do not thing there is a need to spin in any direction. The truth is not that complicated and the public should be capable of understanding that a disease can be fatal for some and mild for most. If the illness develops in such a way as to cause the patient breathing difficulties then a trip to casualty, without delay, is needed else the usual - rest, lots of fluids and time - remedy is fine.
As to response, prepare for and initiate a response for a severe pandemic until it becomes evident that it is not, at which point scale back. Again I do not see this as hard to sell. It may lead to production of excess vaccine but we need to have the public debate over vaccine technology and capacity. Do we pay for a transition to quicker production methods and the maintenance of a surge capacity, so we can cope with flu pandemics, or if not are we clear that the downside is massive loss of life should a virulent strain go pandemic. We, collectively, may decide the risk is acceptable and that the money could be better spent elsewhere but we should at least have the discussion based on the facts.