tetano
Editor, Senior Moderator
Declan Butler
26 June 2012
If you thought that the controversy was over, think again. Last week?s publication of the second of two papers describing how to make mammalian-transmissible forms of the H5N1 avian influenza virus merely closes one chapter of a smouldering debate about the risks of the research. That debate seems certain to reignite in the coming months once researchers lift a voluntary moratorium on the work.
The research published last week, led by Ron Fouchier at the Erasmus Medical Centre in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, showed that introducing as few as five genetic mutations made the H5N1 virus capable of airborne spread between ferrets1, 2. It followed similar work published in May3 by Yoshihiro Kawaoka?s groups at the University of Wisconsin?Madison and the University of Tokyo.
In December 2011, the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) had recommended that only redacted portions of the papers should be published, mainly on the grounds that divulging the detailed methods could increase the risk of bioterrorism. But, after much wrangling, the NSABB in March finally agreed to the publication of updated versions of the full papers4.
...
http://www.nature.com/news/freeze-on-mutant-flu-research-set-to-thaw-1.10888
26 June 2012
If you thought that the controversy was over, think again. Last week?s publication of the second of two papers describing how to make mammalian-transmissible forms of the H5N1 avian influenza virus merely closes one chapter of a smouldering debate about the risks of the research. That debate seems certain to reignite in the coming months once researchers lift a voluntary moratorium on the work.
The research published last week, led by Ron Fouchier at the Erasmus Medical Centre in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, showed that introducing as few as five genetic mutations made the H5N1 virus capable of airborne spread between ferrets1, 2. It followed similar work published in May3 by Yoshihiro Kawaoka?s groups at the University of Wisconsin?Madison and the University of Tokyo.
In December 2011, the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) had recommended that only redacted portions of the papers should be published, mainly on the grounds that divulging the detailed methods could increase the risk of bioterrorism. But, after much wrangling, the NSABB in March finally agreed to the publication of updated versions of the full papers4.
...
http://www.nature.com/news/freeze-on-mutant-flu-research-set-to-thaw-1.10888