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Michael Osterholm on the H3N2v Threat

sharon sanders

Editor-in-Chief & President
Osterholm On The H3N2v Threat


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Credit Wikipedia


# 6518


Michael Osterholm, director of CIDRAP (Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy) at the University of Minnesota, served for 24 years (1975-1999) in various roles at the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) - the last 15 as state epidemiologist and chief of the Acute Disease Epidemiology Section.

All of which makes him a very credible voice in the public health arena.
Earlier this week Osterholm voiced concerns over the plans of many state and county fairs to continue with their pig exhibits in the face of mounting human infections from the H3N2v virus (see Osterholm: Time To Close The Pig Barns).

Today Dr. Osterholm has penned a commentary, which appears in the Star Tribune, where he makes his case for caution when it comes to dealing with this emerging virus.

Rather than excerpt his article, I?ll simply invite you to follow the link below and read it in its entirety.


This year, it seems, it's 'risk on' with swine flu


  • Article by: MICHAEL OSTERHOLM
  • Updated: August 25, 2012 - 6:23 PM
But we shouldn't chance it. While it's not easy to know whether we're seeing a burgeoning pandemic, we should do what we can to prevent one from developing
(Continue . . .)


The concern over this virus is less about the threat it poses today, and more on what it could become tomorrow, or next month. Viruses are constantly changing, always looking for an evolutionary advantage.

The H3N2v virus is not well adapted to humans yet, but with every new jump to a human host, it gets another opportunity to try to figure us out.

Whether this virus has `legs?, and eventually learns to transmit efficiently among humans, is impossible to know. The point is, it could.

And in doing so it could cause a potentially serious public health crisis.
The problem with taking precautionary steps, of course, is they are invariably inconvenient and unpopular. And if they are successful ? and an outbreak is averted ? few people will ever believe they actually served to prevent a disaster.

The old adage is both ironic and true.


When public health works . . . nothing happens.

If this variant flu virus ever gets a foothold in the human population, we?ll never know if restricting pig exhibits would have prevented it. After all, the 2009 H1N1 virus managed to spark a pandemic without the aid of show pigs at Midwest county fairs.

But if I were a public health official, that?s a fine point I?d hate to have to sell to the pubic in the middle of an outbreak.




(Fair disclosure: I?m acquainted with Mike Osterholm, consider him a friend, and was invited to be presenter at a CIDRAP pandemic conference in 2009).
Posted by Michael Coston
 
Re: Michael Osterholm on the H3N2v Threat

But it is this assumption that I am trying hard to accept: ''H3N2v is not well adapted to human''.

It was a 'human' virus, it is also not represent an antigenic shift event, because humans has a previous immunity achieved through natural infection or vaccination with sesonal H3N2 strain circulating in mid '90 of the XX century.

While it is impossible to predict the events courses, it may be possible that this herd immunity will play a role in the evolution of the epidemics, especially when schools will reopen in the US and the virus will find a naive population to spread.

In this circumstance it will be clear how well the virus will transmit to older parents and siblings and then in the general population.

The danger may be represented by further reassortment events, with entirely animal origin viruses, such as the H5, H7 or H9.

Antibodies can recognize HA and NA surface proteins, at least partially and in variable measure according the age, first influenza exposure and geographical area of residence. The presence of M gene may also be recognized at least for some conserved portions (M2e).

This rensemble much more a multiple intra-subtypic mutation event, such as described by dr E. Kilbourne and could mimic the 1977 H1N1 'children pandemic'.

I would like to add only a thing: I dissent from other points of views in a gently manner as I consider all people cited by the above post they deserve the maximum respect for their respective professionality and reputation.
 
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