• FluTrackers.com Inc. does not provide medical advice. Information on this web site is collected from various internet resources, and the FluTrackers board of directors makes no warranty to the safety, efficacy, correctness or completeness of the information posted on this site by any author or poster. The information collated here is for instructional and/or discussion purposes only and is NOT intended to diagnose or treat any disease, illness, or other medical condition. Every individual reader or poster should seek advice from their personal physician/healthcare practitioner before considering or using any interventions that are discussed on this website. By continuing to access this website you agree to consult your personal physican before using any interventions posted on this website, and you agree to hold harmless FluTrackers.com Inc., the board of directors, the members, and all authors and posters for any effects from use of any medication, supplement, vitamin or other substance, device, intervention, etc. mentioned in posts on this website, or other internet venues referenced in posts on this website.
  • We are not asking for any donations. Do not donate to any entity who says they are raising funds for us.

JAMA. Emergency Preparedness and Public Health: The Lessons of Hurricane Sandy

Giuseppe

Emeritus
[Source: The Journal of the American Medical Association, full free text: (LINK). Extract, edited.]
Viewpoint| ONLINE FIRST

Emergency Preparedness and Public Health: The Lessons of Hurricane Sandy

FREE - ONLINE FIRST


Tia Powell, MD; Dan Hanfling, MD; Lawrence O. Gostin, JD

Author Affiliations: Montefiore Einstein Center for Bioethics, Albert Einstein College of Medicine, Bronx, New York (Dr Powell); Inova Health System, Falls Church, Virginia (Dr Hanfling); and Department of Emergency Medicine, George Washington University (Dr Hanfling) and O?Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law, Georgetown University (Mr Gostin), Washington, DC.

JAMA. 2012;():1-2. doi:10.1001/jama.2012.108940.

Published online November 16, 2012



Before dawn on Tuesday morning, October 30, in the midst of flooding and damaging winds from Hurricane Sandy, New York University's (NYU?s) most fragile patients, premature infants, were carried down 9 flights of stairs in the dark and transported to hospitals on dry ground.<SUP>1 </SUP>Although the infants arrived safely, the mid-storm evacuation of these critically ill patients was concerning. A safer daylight transfer before flooding overwhelmed southern Manhattan would have been preferable. The Veterans Affairs (VA) New York Harbor hospital evacuated patients before the storm.<SUP>2 </SUP>Bellevue, New York's flagship public hospital, evacuated patients in the immediate aftermath of the storm when the backup power supply failed.<SUP>3 </SUP><SUP>- 4 </SUP>These neighboring hospitals each made different decisions about when to evacuate. Across the New York City metro region, many hospitals, nursing homes, and assisted living facilities were evacuated, most of them after the storm hit, making this the central public health challenge of this calamitous event. It is a familiar story?a superstorm comes ashore, infrastructure is overwhelmed, and health care facilities evacuate patients, with major delays in returning to normal functioning. Afterwards, policy makers evaluate lessons learned for the next disaster, but similar missteps are often repeated. Why did some health care facilities with the same risk level evacuate while others did not? Although the 2 storms were different in many ways, it is instructive to compare Hurricane Katrina with the still-unfolding events of Sandy.

(?)
-
------
 

Attachments

Back
Top Bottom