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ECDC: Outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N8) in Europe
- Thread starter tetano
- Start date
Gert van der Hoek
In Memoriam - Editor, Senior Moderator
Re: ECDC: Outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N8) in Europe
Main conclusions and recommendations
On 6 November 2014, the German authorities reported an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus
A(H5N8) at a holding with 31 000 fattening turkeys in the north-east of Germany.
On 16 November 2014, Dutch authorities reported an outbreak of HPAI virus due to A(H5N8) in a holding with 150 000
laying hens kept indoor located in Hekendorp (municipality Oudewater), north east of Rotterdam.
On 16 November 2014, UK authorities reported another outbreak of HPAI virus due to A(H5N8) in an indoor holding with
6 000 breeding ducks in North Yorkshire, England.
Culling of the affected poultry is ongoing or completed, protection and surveillance zones have been established and
investigations initiated to analyse how the birds became infected.
This virus has been detected among wild birds in Asia where it has caused several outbreaks on commercial poultry farms
in South Korea, Japan and China. However, this is the first time it has been detected in Europe. It remains unclear how this
virus was introduced simultaneously into closed indoor holdings in European regions far from one another and different
poultry production sectors. The ability of this highly pathogenic avian influenza virus to sub-clinically infect wild birds
increases the risk of geographical spread and subsequent outbreaks, as observed in South Korea. Ongoing monitoring and
testing of wild birds and domestic poultry in the EU therefore plays an important role in the possible detection of further
virus occurrences.
To date, no human infections with this virus have ever been reported world-wide and the risk of zoonotic transmission to
the general public in the EU/EEA countries is considered to be extremely low. However, given the evolutionary history of
the virus with the HA gene evolved from the widely circulating H5N1 viruses, people in direct contact with/handling
diseased birds or poultry and their carcasses (e.g. farmers, veterinarians and labourers involved in the culling and
rendering) might be at risk of infection. Given this potential zoonotic risk, contingency plans for the control of avian
influenza in poultry and birds should be developed in collaboration with public health and occupational health authorities to
ensure that persons at risk are sufficiently protected from infection.
Appropriate personal protective equipment, including
respiratory protection, should be made available and used.
People exposed at the affected holdings should be monitored for ten days in order to document possible related symptoms.
Local health authorities may consider actively monitoring these groups and administering antiviral prophylaxis as
recommended for persons with exposure to A(H5N1) dependent on the local risk assessment (i.e. intensity of exposure).
Persons exposed as a result of their occupation should be offered vaccination against seasonal influenza, if they are not
already vaccinated.
ECDC - RAPID RISK ASSESSMENT
Main conclusions and recommendations
On 6 November 2014, the German authorities reported an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus
A(H5N8) at a holding with 31 000 fattening turkeys in the north-east of Germany.
On 16 November 2014, Dutch authorities reported an outbreak of HPAI virus due to A(H5N8) in a holding with 150 000
laying hens kept indoor located in Hekendorp (municipality Oudewater), north east of Rotterdam.
On 16 November 2014, UK authorities reported another outbreak of HPAI virus due to A(H5N8) in an indoor holding with
6 000 breeding ducks in North Yorkshire, England.
Culling of the affected poultry is ongoing or completed, protection and surveillance zones have been established and
investigations initiated to analyse how the birds became infected.
This virus has been detected among wild birds in Asia where it has caused several outbreaks on commercial poultry farms
in South Korea, Japan and China. However, this is the first time it has been detected in Europe. It remains unclear how this
virus was introduced simultaneously into closed indoor holdings in European regions far from one another and different
poultry production sectors. The ability of this highly pathogenic avian influenza virus to sub-clinically infect wild birds
increases the risk of geographical spread and subsequent outbreaks, as observed in South Korea. Ongoing monitoring and
testing of wild birds and domestic poultry in the EU therefore plays an important role in the possible detection of further
virus occurrences.
To date, no human infections with this virus have ever been reported world-wide and the risk of zoonotic transmission to
the general public in the EU/EEA countries is considered to be extremely low. However, given the evolutionary history of
the virus with the HA gene evolved from the widely circulating H5N1 viruses, people in direct contact with/handling
diseased birds or poultry and their carcasses (e.g. farmers, veterinarians and labourers involved in the culling and
rendering) might be at risk of infection. Given this potential zoonotic risk, contingency plans for the control of avian
influenza in poultry and birds should be developed in collaboration with public health and occupational health authorities to
ensure that persons at risk are sufficiently protected from infection.
Appropriate personal protective equipment, including
respiratory protection, should be made available and used.
People exposed at the affected holdings should be monitored for ten days in order to document possible related symptoms.
Local health authorities may consider actively monitoring these groups and administering antiviral prophylaxis as
recommended for persons with exposure to A(H5N1) dependent on the local risk assessment (i.e. intensity of exposure).
Persons exposed as a result of their occupation should be offered vaccination against seasonal influenza, if they are not
already vaccinated.
ECDC - RAPID RISK ASSESSMENT