Re: Critical Thinking Skills Assist Sound Decision Making
Hi Tropical. Thanks for reading, and for a thoughtful post which has its "finger on the pulse' of the issue. I am glad you enjoy the analysis thread. In an effort to assure that I am responding to what you intend, I am going to paraphrase you're text in a couple of places. If I have missed the point, please steer me back on course.
The problem will be how to extrapolate an ultimate result with so much unknown variables.
Because the scientist did not released an final answer, the lay reader will assumed the answer by plain deductions (no matter if it is scientificaly exact).
I agree with you 100%. When 'the experts' are either; unclear, or provide conflicting data, or reach conflicting conclusions, the non-experts are confused. Not by any fault on their part, but by the definition of the word 'confused'. That is precisely why I started this thread, to try to provide
'thinking tools' and some examples, that average people can apply, when they need to make decisions based on 'messy' data. I think that many people read FluTrackers (FT) for the same reasons, they want answers (and in an absence of "scientific final answer" will make "plain deductions") to;
1) Is there going to be a pandemic?
2) When will it happen?
3) How bad will it be?
4) How long will it last?
5) What can I do about it?
6) When should I start?
7) How much time and effort should I expend?
8) How do I rationalize prepping to my; mate, family, friends...?
9) Should I 'keep it private', or become active in my community?
Because so many people probably have the same thoughts, I will say (you), but understand that I mean (everybody) that agrees with the concept in this list. I am not an expert on; bird flu, infectious diseases in general, or pandemic preparedness. I am a self-taught 'critical thinker', who has found a method to make sense of confusing data,that works for me, and would like to share that method.
Right away, we can break this list in half.
One of the 'thinking tools' is to guess at answers, and see where that takes us. It sounds silly, but let's just try it. Starting with number 5) . If we were to guess at an answer such as NOTHING, what effect would that have on the other questions? They all become irrelevant huh? So we are really happy that we
can do something about it. What can we do? There are two
kinds of things; some are general and some are specific.
General:
A)
Adopt an attitude that a pandemic disease is 'the enemy', and we are going to learn as much as we can about 'the enemy' so that we can keep it from killing us. (put Sun Tzu's "Art of War" on your 'during pandemic' reading list).
B) Recognize that any talk of stopping the pandemic from happening is making a rather large assumption, that
we can. We probably won't be able to. That thought alone is difficult for some people in today's technology-advanced society to grasp, but we need to get it out on the table. Some things are just plain BIGGER than us. It doesn't mean that people shouldn't be trying to make vaccines, and new anti-viral drugs, etc. It just means that they should also
have a plan 'B', which includes prepping.
C) Organisms of all types operate on
'stimulus - response' and those with higher-order thinking capability also operate on
'risk-reward'. Questions 1-4 (and their answers) comprise the 'stimulus', and our task is to identify and implement a
measured and appropriate 'response'. Questions 6-9 are more in the 'risk - reward' category.
D) Avoid 'paralysis by analysis' thinking that hinges on " if I don't know the exact answer then I can't do anything at all". A good antidote is to break the 'elephant' into smaller pieces, and then
respond to each one separately.
E) Recognize that 'starting' to take action is only the first threshold to overcome. Each incremental step in preparing is itself another, smaller threshold. Create a list that pairs 'threat level' with 'response action'. If the current 'threat level' is already at or above the 'response action' tasks that you have accomplished, then this list is also an
action plan.
Specific:
A) You don't even have to list what is really important in an emergency, because Flutrackers already has a wealth of information on; water, food, vitamins, herbs, masks etc. Make the list anyway. There is
something rather personal about thinking about what you (and your loved ones) need to stay alive for various periods of time. What do you need for the next 15 minutes, the next 8 hours, the next day, the next 12 weeks. Reading about it is too detached, too remote, too easy to put it off or dismiss it completely. Write it down. Make it detailed. If you get writer's block, see B)....
B) Make two lists. As you go through each day, write down everything you touch, eat, drink, breathe, or depend on for your daily existence (once is enough for each item). If it's not needed for survival, and in a pandemic you could just 'cross it off', then it goes in the 'B' list. If you need it now, or don't need it now , but would in a pandemic, it goes on list A).
This exercise alone may just revolutionize your life. It's a
'what's really important' thing. Doing this takes 'preparing' out of the abstract and theoretical world and gives it some teeth.
Now let's get back to 'how much' and 'when', and create our 'ladder of thresholds' for measured and appropriate responses to various stimuli. A
second 'thinking tool' is to use the best answer we have today, and then ask what we should do based on that. It's like U.S. President Eisenhower said, "
Plans are invariably worthless, yet planning is indispensable". If we get a better answer tomorrow, then we can change the plan to reflect that, but we shouldn't not act in the meanwhile. Or as General George S. Patton said "
A good plan today is better than a perfect plan tomorrow." So let's see what those same questions look like with today's (imperfect) answers.
1) Is there going to be a pandemic?
Yes. This is something that all of the experts agree on, so this is a simple answer. It may not be H5N1, It may not even be some other Avian Influenza. It may not be this year, or next, but it will happen. There are so many emerging diseases, and re-emerging (drug resistant) diseases, that everyone should be assigning some portion of their time and energy to creating a buffer in case of disruptions in the super-efficient-yet-fragile infrastructure that supports the 'developed' world. Most things that you do to prep for a pandemic are great insulation from worry for natural disasters too.
2) When will it happen?
Sooner than we want. Sooner than almost anyone can be ready for, even if they already started. Talk to anyone who IS preparing, and they will tell you that 'there's always more that can be done', and 'it all takes longer than you want it to'. Also, if you are waiting for the WHO to declare Phase 4 of pandemic alert, anything you want will not be available, because everyone will want it then.
3) How bad will it be?
History tells us that eventually, there will be a devastating pandemic. Most scientists agree that H5N1 has the earmarkings of being that 'hugely severe' disease.
4) How long will it last?
When we are in it, it will seem like an eternity. Estimates of 'disease wave' duration say 2-3 waves of several weeks each, but that isn't what people should prepare for. They should recognize that any severe pandemic will (not might, or may) disrupt the world's; economic, transportation, healthcare and public safety infrastructures. The way to think about this is that every generation prior to our grandparent's, that could afford to, were more self-sufficient than we are today. Our generation is the anomaly, and we are complacent in our ignorance. I am speaking of the 'first world' nations here.
5) What can I do about it?
Preparing ( aka prepping); that deliberate and continuous process of creating and maintaining a store of knowledge, tools and rations that serve to insulate people from harm, when the fabric of society is weakened or diminished, either locally and temporarily, or more globally and permanently.
6) When should I start?
You already have. Everyone does some things, and has some knowledge, and has some reserve of skill and energy and resources to apply to overcome spells of misfortune. So all we are talking about is what constitutes the next steps in the ladder. Don't delay the next steps.
7) How much time and effort should I expend?
How much are you worth? It is like buying a motorcycle helmet. If you have a $5 head, then you can buy a $5 helmet. If you value your life more than that, where is your line? What percent of net income would create a significant increase in your self-sufficiency? Try spending that amount and then see how you feel. Are you more relaxed? Better peace of mind, and lower stress? Besides, a lot of prepping isn't about spending money. It's in planning, and organizing. What you spend on food in the long run may be about the same, or perhaps less, if you eat more meals at home instead of eating 'out'.
8) How do I rationalize prepping to my; mate, family, friends, ...?
Get them to read here at Flutrackers. "Rational minds, equally informed, seldom disagree", so the challenge is to expose them to the information. Consistent, low-key, non-inflammatory supply of data in ways that are relevant to their lives, over time, will sink in. If someone is irretrievably irrational about it, then they simply have to accept you as you are (with your concerns) equally to your acceptance of them (with their denial). Identify portions of the prepping effort and expense the same way that you rationalize insurance. You don't buy it because you expect to need it, you buy it hoping that you never will, but it still makes sense to do.
9) Should I 'keep it private', or become active in my community?
This a personal decision. My perspective on this is that even personal preparation has a beneficial impact on the community. Just as 'herd immunity' results when a significant percentage of a population is vaccinated, the people who don't prep are more likely to survive because those who do prep take pressure off the system, when the system is most highly stressed.
So, in my opinion, we shouldn't need [
certain "ultimate study results", with no matter if the result will be scientifically exact ] to make decisions to prepare. Perhaps, continued vigilance of the developing situation allows us to fine-tune our response. However, even "lay readers" like ourselves can figure out that this situation is threatening. Smart readers will take effective actions to insulate themselves from the impending harm. Just for fun, let's look at the details to see if they can help us fine-tune, or not.
Your excerpts from my post:
1. "Very rarely do the wild birds get sick or die, but often the virus is quickly lethal to the poultry."
2. "In light of the thousands of tests that aren't finding H5N1 in live wild birds, why do they keep doing them?"
3. "Is it a feel-good exercise that provides the 'masses' with comfort that they aren't under attack from aerial bombardment with infected feces? Would that cause panic?"
Statement # 1.) The 'context' of this statement is talking about the effect of H5N1 on wild birds vs the effect of H5N1 in poultry flocks. The first part is true of Avian Influenza (AI) in general, less so for H5N1, since it has caused numerous die-offs in wild birds. The second part is also true of AIs in general, in that wild birds are better adapted to influenzas. Infectious diseases that wild birds show no symptoms of are known to kill poultry. H5N1 has been tremendously lethal to poultry. Recent reports detailed chickens dying within 3 hours of first showing any symptoms.
Your Comments:
1. a) If very rarely do the wild birds get sick or die, that means the illness is not a very lethal one for them in their natural environment
b) That a), does not exclude that the birds are the species which spread the virus to the poultry, but they are enough robust to prevail it, or
c) They are not so much robust, but the spreadings between wild birds are of much smaller entity than for the poultry for reasons of mass poultry caging
1. a) Increasing our knowledge of what effects the disease has in other species is good. However, the definition of an emerging infectious disease suggests that we shouldn't put too much faith in forward-looking statements, based on past performance. Normal behavior for Avian Influenza is to infect wild bird intestines, in a mild, non-life-threatening way. A couple of serotypes; H5s and H7s have shown a tendency to change to a lethal form (from LPAI to HPAI). H5N1 has broken so many of the 'rules' (or things we thought we knew about AIs), that it's in a class by itself.
Even though "rarely do the wild birds get sick or die", H5N1 has been an exception, and caused huge wild bird die-offs, not only by infecting the gastrointestinal tract, but also infecting the respiratory tract, and has shown capability to infect many other organs in wild birds, whether in their natural environment or not, (like a zoo, or songbird cage). The word 'wild' refers to "not selectively-bred by man" rather than to where it lives. see
http://www.flutrackers.com/forum/showthread.php?t=30016
Free-living birds in the orders Anseriformes (ducks? geese? swans) and Charadriiformes (gulls? terns? shore birds) have traditionally been considered the natural reservoirs for avian influenza viruses (AIVs).[1?2] However? before 2005? no evidence showed that highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses were maintained in wild bird populations.
b) That a),
does not exclude that the birds are the species which spread the virus to the poultry, but they are enough robust to prevail it,
1. b) I agree. Just because AIs in general have rarely been lethal to wild birds, and H5N1 has been, doesn't mean it is always "very lethal" in them. It doesn't have to be just one or the other. It can be both. It can switch on/off. It can depend on; the bird species, the strain of H5N1, the environmental 'stressors' (such as weather and food availability), the viral load they are exposed to...etc. The likelihood of transmission is dependent on several factors such as; the viral reproductive rate (Ro), which organ(s) are infected, how the virus is excreted, the temperature, bird density... etc. It quickly becomes apparent that trying to predict any single event about the spread of this disease is nearly impossible since two situations that seem to be similar, may have vastly different results. It can appear to be dormant, and then rage again. Areas in which it is endemic are an even tougher problem, since there can be host species other than birds.
c) They are not so much robust, but the spreadings between wild birds are of much smaller entity than for the poultry for reasons of mass poultry caging
1. c) You're right, the disparities that we observe in mortality of wild birds vs poultry may not be caused by the wild bird's being (more robust) than poultry, but by the poultry's dense farming practices. In general, wild birds have more resistance to AI diseases than poultry. It has to do with the genetic effects of selective breeding of the poultry( and may have to do with today's chicken having descended from 'jungle fowl', not water birds). That doesn't mean that if someone were to cage a bunch of wild birds and infect them, that H5N1 would kill any fewer of them. H5N1 is writing its own 'playbook' as it goes, we get to watch it happen. Maybe 10 to 20 years from now someone can say with certainty that H5N1 does this (or it doesn't do that), but it is way too new, and changing too fast to say with certainty now. It's not the scientist's fault that they can't say with certainty. Scientists learn from nature, not the other way around.
Statement # 2.) About the 1,000s of tests that are done, and do not find the disease....
2. a) You bring up a possible relationship between; lethality, the showing of symptoms, the sensitivity of the testing, and transmissibility (infectiousness and spread) in the wild birds. It would be convenient if some relationship existed, and if we could figure it out, but there is no rule that says a relationship must exist. I only hope that they are keeping the 1,000s of samples in 'deep freeze' so that if better tests become available, they can fill in the database later.
2. b) I think you are referring to the statistical significance of their 'sample sizes' relative to the entire population of birds. I have read about the methods for trapping the birds, and how they try to be random about it, and get a true cross-section of the flocks. Besides, many tests are done on hunter-killed birds, which should be fairly random. I don't think that would be the reason for not finding the virus.
2. c) I think you're right on it! One of the
'thinking tools" that I use is to 'put myself in the situation'. If I were tasked with being vigilant, I would have difficulty saying that the tests should be stopped, only because we hadn't found it yet. I would try to use the best tools available, and hope that they became effective if-and-when the virus mutated to be an even greater threat.
3. Yes, of course. It can be reasonable that they insist to exercise the tests, because, in lack of scientific ultimate proves, that provides the 'masses' with comfort that they aren't under attack from aerial bombardment with infected feces.
Statement # 3.) We agree, but as comforting and assuring as the testing may be, I only hope that it is not false comfort. A little bit more 'panic' would get more people to prepare, and ultimately save human lives. The risk is that too much panic can cause harm too. I think I would not want the job of deciding when to raise the alert level (WHO). I do think that more could be done in a progressive, and gradual, but increasing intensity. Due to human nature, there is likely to be an overlap between the 'threshold' (.....o0|0o....) of incentive for some people to take effective action, and the 'trigger-level' (......o0 |snap! ) for other people to start to panic. IMHO the greatest number of people will survive due to their own preparedness, only if awareness and incentives are gradually and progressively increased such that ~5% of people are starting to panic
just before TSHTF. Too much beforehand, and the 'collateral damage' is increased. The larger danger is in having
not enough people preparing, for a couple of reasons; 1) things always take longer than anticipated, prepping especially 2) impossible to be 'fully prepared', there's always more to do 3) People are more resilient than the authorities give them credit for (most folks can deal with, and want, the truth).
Sorry it took me so long to respond......
///Read///
and even cooler that you did. Thanks. 
One did, so it apparently wasn't the use of the 'advanced' editor vs the 'std.' editor. To back-fix the situation, since I couldn't edit them anymore, please accept my providing 'replacement' links now. 
