Laidback Al
Well-known member
Business Continuity: The risk of a pandemic in the UK
The author
Peter Power?
Visor Consultants Ltd?
expertise area:
Crisis Management - Business Continuity and Disaster Litigation
13 February 2007
news item
Many organisations have recently been focusing on the issues associated with the possibility of a serious outbreak of influenza if the strain of the influenza virus currently infecting birds in various areas of the globe (H5N1 or the so-called ?avian flu?) eventually mutates into a strain that is easily communicable from human to human (which current ?avian flu? strains are not).
While public health experts cannot now predict whether a serious outbreak of influenza involving an easily communicable strain of ?avian flu? will develop in the near future, the potential for such an outbreak ? and the likelihood that it would extend globally raises significant issues in terms of Business Continuity and various sector resilience practices, some of which are quite distinct from the issues posed by disruptions associated with natural disasters or deliberate malicious activity. These distinctions include:
It is critical to note that, at this time, an epidemic or pandemic of ?avian flu? remains a real possibility, not (yet?) a fact ? an ?avian flu? virus easily communicable between humans has not yet evolved. However, many in the UK Government now consider a Pandemic to be a higher threat to this country than terrorism. A sobering thought.
On the other hand, in the Far East where most deaths have so far been recorded the ratio of domestic poultry ?in the community? to people is c10:1 and a very high number of the population are also heavy smokers. Thus the infection is by comparison, more likely and respiratory complications more inevitable, leading to higher mortality rates?
However, the probability remains that if the H5N1 virus does not trigger pandemic flu, there might be another virus that will? For that reason, preparatory measures are both appropriate and prudent.
The UK Health Protection Authority (HPA) advice includes a lot of useful / clinical thoughts such as travel and contact history of travel in the 7 days prior to onset of symptoms, to an area affected by avian influenza A (H5N1) AND close contact (within 1 meter) with live or dead domestic fowl, wild birds or swine in any setting, including bird markets.
There is some guidance from public health officials that indicates it is desirable for all organisations to perhaps consider the implications for their operations of an epidemic or pandemic that might develop in several ?waves? over several months. The patterns of prior serious influenza outbreaks suggest that, if an ?avian flu? outbreak does occur, each wave might persist over a period of six to eight weeks.
Historic patterns also suggest that, over the course of such an outbreak, staff absences due to illness might be in a range of 20% to 50% (although absenteeism due to illness on any given day would be less ? perhaps in a 15% to 25% range).
If staff absences due to the need to care for ill family members and from fear of contagion are taken into consideration, however, the absenteeism rate might increase significantly ? with some estimates anticipating a 60%+ level.
Public health officials also cannot reliably estimate the amount of warning that organisations might have that an easily communicable strain of ?avian flu? had developed before a serious outbreak directly affects the organisations? operations.
While some scenarios suppose that an outbreak would occur first ?overseas? (quoting from a US report) in a manner that provides organisations with several weeks? warning before it spreads to U.S. operations, it is quite possible that the actual warning period for an outbreak could be very brief indeed. Consider:
Standard BC Issues - Identification of Mission Critical Operations ? BC plans identify critical operations that need to be constantly maintained or recovered within a few hours after an event, and identify other operations ? activities such as payroll and administrative functions ? that can be slated for longer recovery periods or even suspended completely during an emergency. An ?avian flu? outbreak, however, could constitute an event that could last weeks or even months. As a result, disruptions in this second category of operations may severely compromise an organisation?s ability to function if continuing wide-spread absenteeism is experienced among support staff for weeks on end. Accordingly, many organisations are reviewing their current business continuity plans to determine how they can better take into account the potential difficulties posed by an ?avian flu? outbreak.
Identification of Suspended Operations ? A corollary to the above is the recognition among some organisations that they need to review their existing BC and Crisis management plans to identify activities or functions that should be suspended throughout the duration of even an extended outbreak. For example, some organisations plan to cancel any non-essential face-to-face meetings (internal or external).
Splitting and Segregating Staff and Office Quarantines ? Some organisations are attempting to address the risk of a potential disruption to critical operations that might arise if even a single individual in a particular office, such as a firm?s trading floor, becomes ill with a highly contagious flu, raising the possibility that other employees in that office need to be quarantined. In order to minimise this possibility, some organisations are considering plans to split their critical staff into two or more teams operating out of different locations. (Some firms implemented such plans at the time of the recent SARS outbreak.) For this to work, however, these teams need to remain segregated from each other throughout the height of an outbreak ? planners recognise that it does no good to separate teams if they use common restrooms, eat in the same cafeteria or are periodically called to the same staff meetings. Even the sharing of printed (as opposed to electronic) documents between the groups should be minimised. This approach, therefore, involves potentially significant inefficiencies and costs.
Long-Distance Travel Limitations ? Many organisations recognise that long-distance travel (particularly international travel) may be difficult if not impossible during a severe outbreak; an employee?s travel to areas where an outbreak has already occurred raises difficult issues regarding restrictions on the employee?s return to work (discussed below). As a result, even if an organisation decides to refrain from cancelling its own meetings under these circumstances, it may be forced to use teleconferences and video conferences to conduct business that ordinarily would involve travel. In addition, organisations recognise that it may be difficult or impossible to send key staff to remote sites during a severe outbreak.
Security Issues ? Because of the potential for police and other security services to be severely compromised because of a combination of absenteeism and heavy demands for area-wide security efforts, some organisations are planning to enhance in-house or contractor security services during an ?avian flu? outbreak. However, this might be hopefully rather than accurate thinking?
Information-Gathering Issues ? In preparation for an ?avian flu? outbreak, some organisations have determined that their senior management would need to have in place an automated system to keep track of how the event is affecting employees. For example, such a system could be used to provide management with up-to-date information on how many employees are absent (for whatever reason) or working from a location (home or an alternate facility) that is not customary for the employee. Any such automated systems generally would have to rely heavily on self-reporting by employees due to the possibility that staff members who normally perform routine payroll and administrative functions may themselves be unavailable to support such a system.
Phased Implementation Plans ? Some organisations that have decided to develop specialised BC plans for an ?avian flu? outbreak are structuring these plans to phase in escalating responses as developments warrant. For example, an organisation might develop its own phase-in plan along the following lines.
Education Programs ? Some organisations are preparing their own education programs to clarify their policies during an ?avian flu? outbreak and to use publicly available information to educate their employees on the need to take relatively simple precautions to limit exposure to a flu outbreak. These educational programs include such items as:
Coordination with Service Providers and Suppliers ? Organisations will also need to understand how their critical service providers and suppliers plan to respond to an outbreak. Discussions between organisations and their service providers should address how they will communicate during such an event and work around any disruptions that might take place. Organisations may wish to consider increasing the levels of critical supplies on hand if they learn that the ?avian flu? strain has mutated and is easily communicable between humans.
Testing and Monitoring Programs ? Some firms are contemplating establishing programs to routinely test employees for signs of infection during an outbreak (e.g., by monitoring temperatures using tools ranging from simple thermometers to expensive scanning devices to screen staff at facility entrances). Some firms are also developing procedures to require supervisors to report any instances in which a member of their staff is evidencing signs of an infection (such as coughing and sneezing). These testing and monitoring procedures, of course, may raise significant privacy and employee rights concerns; in addition, such procedures may be less useful during an ?avian flu? outbreak in which employees could be highly contagious for several days before evidencing any symptoms.
In summary, I suggest you do the following under the banner of planning for the impact of a pandemic on your employees and customers:
http://www.workplacelaw.net/display.php?resource_id=8258
The author
Peter Power?
Visor Consultants Ltd?
expertise area:
Crisis Management - Business Continuity and Disaster Litigation
13 February 2007
news item
Many organisations have recently been focusing on the issues associated with the possibility of a serious outbreak of influenza if the strain of the influenza virus currently infecting birds in various areas of the globe (H5N1 or the so-called ?avian flu?) eventually mutates into a strain that is easily communicable from human to human (which current ?avian flu? strains are not).
While public health experts cannot now predict whether a serious outbreak of influenza involving an easily communicable strain of ?avian flu? will develop in the near future, the potential for such an outbreak ? and the likelihood that it would extend globally raises significant issues in terms of Business Continuity and various sector resilience practices, some of which are quite distinct from the issues posed by disruptions associated with natural disasters or deliberate malicious activity. These distinctions include:
- The potential for worldwide impact of such an outbreak
- The escalating absenteeism rates it would cause.
- The impact on the global economy it would have and its extended duration, among other issues.
- Exercise Week 1 ? WHO declare phase 4. First confirmed cases in Thailand.
- Exercise Week 2 ? First cases in UK about 3-6 weeks after Thailand. Massive demands by now on Internet Banking. Many flights cancelled and schools closed etc.
- Exercise Week 3 ? WHO phase 6 reached 10 weeks after simulated start. Flu now widespread in UK. Panic buying etc. ATMs run out. Hospitals overwhelmed. Massive financial crime waves. Home working proves not to work. Large scale gatherings stopped. Bad weather makes things worse. 36% absenteeism.
- Exercise Week 4 ? Flu peaks in UK 50% absenteeism. Now 18 weeks into simulated time.
- Exercise Week 5 ? Peak continues. Does not worsen. 19 weeks into simulated time.
- Exercise Week 6 ? Week 22 reached. Things just start to improve. Recovery starts.
It is critical to note that, at this time, an epidemic or pandemic of ?avian flu? remains a real possibility, not (yet?) a fact ? an ?avian flu? virus easily communicable between humans has not yet evolved. However, many in the UK Government now consider a Pandemic to be a higher threat to this country than terrorism. A sobering thought.
On the other hand, in the Far East where most deaths have so far been recorded the ratio of domestic poultry ?in the community? to people is c10:1 and a very high number of the population are also heavy smokers. Thus the infection is by comparison, more likely and respiratory complications more inevitable, leading to higher mortality rates?
However, the probability remains that if the H5N1 virus does not trigger pandemic flu, there might be another virus that will? For that reason, preparatory measures are both appropriate and prudent.
The UK Health Protection Authority (HPA) advice includes a lot of useful / clinical thoughts such as travel and contact history of travel in the 7 days prior to onset of symptoms, to an area affected by avian influenza A (H5N1) AND close contact (within 1 meter) with live or dead domestic fowl, wild birds or swine in any setting, including bird markets.
There is some guidance from public health officials that indicates it is desirable for all organisations to perhaps consider the implications for their operations of an epidemic or pandemic that might develop in several ?waves? over several months. The patterns of prior serious influenza outbreaks suggest that, if an ?avian flu? outbreak does occur, each wave might persist over a period of six to eight weeks.
Historic patterns also suggest that, over the course of such an outbreak, staff absences due to illness might be in a range of 20% to 50% (although absenteeism due to illness on any given day would be less ? perhaps in a 15% to 25% range).
If staff absences due to the need to care for ill family members and from fear of contagion are taken into consideration, however, the absenteeism rate might increase significantly ? with some estimates anticipating a 60%+ level.
Public health officials also cannot reliably estimate the amount of warning that organisations might have that an easily communicable strain of ?avian flu? had developed before a serious outbreak directly affects the organisations? operations.
While some scenarios suppose that an outbreak would occur first ?overseas? (quoting from a US report) in a manner that provides organisations with several weeks? warning before it spreads to U.S. operations, it is quite possible that the actual warning period for an outbreak could be very brief indeed. Consider:
- A serious ?avian flu? outbreak could erupt in waves over weeks or even months, with some waves appearing to be mild only to be followed by others that are much more severe. Even after a particular wave appears to subside, follow-up waves could develop after safeguards are relaxed. As a result, Business Continuity (BC) plans that address discrete events that might affect organisations for limited time periods may prove inadequate for the longer-term impact of an ?avian flu? outbreak.
- During an ?avian flu? outbreak, organisations may have to deal with unprecedented absenteeism for weeks at a time, from illness, family demands or fear of contagion. Personnel absences may become so widespread that existing succession plans may prove inadequate to have sufficient personnel available to maintain even critical operations.
- An ?avian flu? outbreak is likely to simultaneously affect multiple regions of the country and the globe. As a result, the backup facilities that have been established by many organisations ? even remote sites hundreds of miles distant from primary facilities ? may be just as affected by the outbreak as the primary locations they are intended to back up.
- Disruptions could spread to other key infrastructures, such as power, transportation, telecommunications, water systems, police, fire, NHS including emergency medical services. Moreover, basic retail services might also be disrupted. In effect, parts of the UK Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) could be jeopardised.
- These types of problems might make it very difficult for employees to function effectively at work. Further, since corporate business continuity strategies often rely heavily on the availability of public sector emergency service providers, disruptions in these services from high absenteeism could present significant challenges to corporate plans.
Standard BC Issues - Identification of Mission Critical Operations ? BC plans identify critical operations that need to be constantly maintained or recovered within a few hours after an event, and identify other operations ? activities such as payroll and administrative functions ? that can be slated for longer recovery periods or even suspended completely during an emergency. An ?avian flu? outbreak, however, could constitute an event that could last weeks or even months. As a result, disruptions in this second category of operations may severely compromise an organisation?s ability to function if continuing wide-spread absenteeism is experienced among support staff for weeks on end. Accordingly, many organisations are reviewing their current business continuity plans to determine how they can better take into account the potential difficulties posed by an ?avian flu? outbreak.
Identification of Suspended Operations ? A corollary to the above is the recognition among some organisations that they need to review their existing BC and Crisis management plans to identify activities or functions that should be suspended throughout the duration of even an extended outbreak. For example, some organisations plan to cancel any non-essential face-to-face meetings (internal or external).
Splitting and Segregating Staff and Office Quarantines ? Some organisations are attempting to address the risk of a potential disruption to critical operations that might arise if even a single individual in a particular office, such as a firm?s trading floor, becomes ill with a highly contagious flu, raising the possibility that other employees in that office need to be quarantined. In order to minimise this possibility, some organisations are considering plans to split their critical staff into two or more teams operating out of different locations. (Some firms implemented such plans at the time of the recent SARS outbreak.) For this to work, however, these teams need to remain segregated from each other throughout the height of an outbreak ? planners recognise that it does no good to separate teams if they use common restrooms, eat in the same cafeteria or are periodically called to the same staff meetings. Even the sharing of printed (as opposed to electronic) documents between the groups should be minimised. This approach, therefore, involves potentially significant inefficiencies and costs.
Long-Distance Travel Limitations ? Many organisations recognise that long-distance travel (particularly international travel) may be difficult if not impossible during a severe outbreak; an employee?s travel to areas where an outbreak has already occurred raises difficult issues regarding restrictions on the employee?s return to work (discussed below). As a result, even if an organisation decides to refrain from cancelling its own meetings under these circumstances, it may be forced to use teleconferences and video conferences to conduct business that ordinarily would involve travel. In addition, organisations recognise that it may be difficult or impossible to send key staff to remote sites during a severe outbreak.
Security Issues ? Because of the potential for police and other security services to be severely compromised because of a combination of absenteeism and heavy demands for area-wide security efforts, some organisations are planning to enhance in-house or contractor security services during an ?avian flu? outbreak. However, this might be hopefully rather than accurate thinking?
Information-Gathering Issues ? In preparation for an ?avian flu? outbreak, some organisations have determined that their senior management would need to have in place an automated system to keep track of how the event is affecting employees. For example, such a system could be used to provide management with up-to-date information on how many employees are absent (for whatever reason) or working from a location (home or an alternate facility) that is not customary for the employee. Any such automated systems generally would have to rely heavily on self-reporting by employees due to the possibility that staff members who normally perform routine payroll and administrative functions may themselves be unavailable to support such a system.
Phased Implementation Plans ? Some organisations that have decided to develop specialised BC plans for an ?avian flu? outbreak are structuring these plans to phase in escalating responses as developments warrant. For example, an organisation might develop its own phase-in plan along the following lines.
- Phase One at a particular organisation might be the current situation, with no outbreak. At that point, an organisation?s efforts might be limited to planning and stockpiling some basic supplies.
- Phase Two might be when an epidemic is declared in a foreign location (see also the WHO 6 stage alert state). Planning might be accelerated, briefings held for key staff, and travel to the affected jurisdiction might be curtailed.
- Phase Three might be declared internally when isolated outbreaks are confirmed. Further measures, such as preparing for distributions of antiviral medication and temporarily splitting staff into teams operating from segregated locations, might be triggered.
- Phase Four might be declared internally when there is evidence that an outbreak is affecting the locations of the organisation?s critical facilities, in which case the full array of the organisation?s response measures might be employed.
- Phase Five might cover a period after the worst of an outbreak appears to have passed but worries of a follow-up wave of infection remain high. At that point, protective measures might be slowly relaxed and normal operations restored incrementally until a return to Phase One can be declared.
Education Programs ? Some organisations are preparing their own education programs to clarify their policies during an ?avian flu? outbreak and to use publicly available information to educate their employees on the need to take relatively simple precautions to limit exposure to a flu outbreak. These educational programs include such items as:
- Common sense reminders on the importance of hand washing and cough/sneeze hygiene; the importance of healthy habits (e.g., getting plenty of rest and maintaining a healthy diet and exercise routine) to strengthen immune systems; the need to keep space between you and your co-workers (at least three feet according to HHS) and to avoid unnecessary gatherings to limit the risk of contagion.
- Reminders for employees at high risk (e.g., those with compromised immune systems) of the need to take special care. Firms are considering policies stressing the willingness of the organisation to take reasonable measures to accommodate such persons during an ?avian flu? outbreak.
- Advice on how to recognise the difference in symptoms between flu and a cold and, when known, between the relevant ?avian flu? strain and annual flu (this is critical to avoid overreacting to symptoms of annual flu).
- Strong reminders on the importance of not reporting to work if you have reason to believe that you may be contagious.
- Guidance on policies for using earned sick leave, advance sick leave, administrative leave or leave without pay during a pandemic.
- Instructions on how to respond if a co-worker becomes seriously ill at the office.
Coordination with Service Providers and Suppliers ? Organisations will also need to understand how their critical service providers and suppliers plan to respond to an outbreak. Discussions between organisations and their service providers should address how they will communicate during such an event and work around any disruptions that might take place. Organisations may wish to consider increasing the levels of critical supplies on hand if they learn that the ?avian flu? strain has mutated and is easily communicable between humans.
Testing and Monitoring Programs ? Some firms are contemplating establishing programs to routinely test employees for signs of infection during an outbreak (e.g., by monitoring temperatures using tools ranging from simple thermometers to expensive scanning devices to screen staff at facility entrances). Some firms are also developing procedures to require supervisors to report any instances in which a member of their staff is evidencing signs of an infection (such as coughing and sneezing). These testing and monitoring procedures, of course, may raise significant privacy and employee rights concerns; in addition, such procedures may be less useful during an ?avian flu? outbreak in which employees could be highly contagious for several days before evidencing any symptoms.
In summary, I suggest you do the following under the banner of planning for the impact of a pandemic on your employees and customers:
- Forecast and allow for employee absences during a pandemic due to factors such as personal illness, family member illness, community containment measures and quarantines, school and/or business closures, and public transportation closures.
- Implement guidelines to modify the frequency and type of face-to-face contact (e.g., hand shaking, seating in meetings, office layout, shared workstations) among employees and between employees and customers ? and encourage and track annual influenza vaccination for employees.
- Evaluate employee access to and availability of healthcare services during a pandemic, and improve services as needed.
- Evaluate employee access to and availability of mental health and social services during a pandemic, including corporate, community, and faith-based resources, and improve services as needed and identify employees and key customers with special needs, and incorporate the requirements of such persons into your preparedness plan.
- Share best practices with other businesses in your communities, chambers of commerce, and associations to improve community response efforts.
http://www.workplacelaw.net/display.php?resource_id=8258