Giuseppe
Emeritus
[Source: Bulletin of the World Health Organization, full PDF document: http://dx.doi.org/10.2471/BLT.13.125989 - Abstract, edited.]
Early response to the emergence of influenza A(H7N9) virus in humans
Sirenda Vong,a Michael O?Leary a & Zijian Feng b
Abstract
Problem
In 2003, China?s handling of the early stages of the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was heavily criticized and generally considered to be suboptimal.
Approach
Following the SARS outbreak, China made huge investments to improve surveillance, emergency preparedness and response capacity and strengthen public health institutions. In 2013, the return on these investments was evaluated by investigating China?s early response to the emergence of avian influenza A(H7N9) virus in humans.
Local setting
Clusters of human infection with a novel infuenza virus were detected in China ? by national surveillance of pneumonia of unknown etiology ? on 26 February 2013.
Relevant changes
On 31 March 2013, China notifed the World Health Organization (WHO) of the first recorded human infections with A(H7N9) virus. Poultry markets ? which were rapidly identified as a major source of transmission of A(H7N9) to humans ? were closed down in the affected areas. Surveillance in humans and poultry was heightened and technical guidelines were quickly updated and disseminated.
The health authorities collaborated with WHO in risk assessments and risk communication. New cases were reported promptly and publicly.
Lessons learnt
The relevant infrastructures, surveillance systems and response capacity need to be strengthened in preparation for future emergencies caused by emerging or existing disease threats. Results of risk assessments and other data should be released promptly and publicly and such release should not jeopardize future publication of the data in scientifc journals. Coordination between public health and veterinary services would be stronger during an emergency if these services had already undertaken joint preparedness planning.
_____
a World Health Organization Ofce in China, 401 Dongwai Diplomatic Office Building, 23 Dongzhimenwai Dajie, Chaoyang District, Beijing 100600, China. b Chinese Centre or Disease Control and Prevention, Beijing, China.
Correspondence to Sirenda Vong (e-mail: vongs@wpro.who.int).
(Submitted: 11 June 2013 ? Revised version received: 22 November 2013 ? Accepted: 25 November 2013 ? Published online: 16 December 2013 )
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.2471/BLT.13.125989
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Early response to the emergence of influenza A(H7N9) virus in humans
Sirenda Vong,a Michael O?Leary a & Zijian Feng b
Abstract
Problem
In 2003, China?s handling of the early stages of the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was heavily criticized and generally considered to be suboptimal.
Approach
Following the SARS outbreak, China made huge investments to improve surveillance, emergency preparedness and response capacity and strengthen public health institutions. In 2013, the return on these investments was evaluated by investigating China?s early response to the emergence of avian influenza A(H7N9) virus in humans.
Local setting
Clusters of human infection with a novel infuenza virus were detected in China ? by national surveillance of pneumonia of unknown etiology ? on 26 February 2013.
Relevant changes
On 31 March 2013, China notifed the World Health Organization (WHO) of the first recorded human infections with A(H7N9) virus. Poultry markets ? which were rapidly identified as a major source of transmission of A(H7N9) to humans ? were closed down in the affected areas. Surveillance in humans and poultry was heightened and technical guidelines were quickly updated and disseminated.
The health authorities collaborated with WHO in risk assessments and risk communication. New cases were reported promptly and publicly.
Lessons learnt
The relevant infrastructures, surveillance systems and response capacity need to be strengthened in preparation for future emergencies caused by emerging or existing disease threats. Results of risk assessments and other data should be released promptly and publicly and such release should not jeopardize future publication of the data in scientifc journals. Coordination between public health and veterinary services would be stronger during an emergency if these services had already undertaken joint preparedness planning.
_____
a World Health Organization Ofce in China, 401 Dongwai Diplomatic Office Building, 23 Dongzhimenwai Dajie, Chaoyang District, Beijing 100600, China. b Chinese Centre or Disease Control and Prevention, Beijing, China.
Correspondence to Sirenda Vong (e-mail: vongs@wpro.who.int).
(Submitted: 11 June 2013 ? Revised version received: 22 November 2013 ? Accepted: 25 November 2013 ? Published online: 16 December 2013 )
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.2471/BLT.13.125989
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