BMC Medicine: Containing the accidental laboratory escape of potential pandemic influenza viruses

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Containing the accidental laboratory escape of potential pandemic influenza viruses

Stefano Merler, Marco Ajelli, Laura Fumanelli and Alessandro Vespignani


BMC Medicine 2013, 11:252 doi:10.1186/1741-7015-11-252
Published: 28 November 2013
Abstract (provisional)
Background

The recent work on the modified H5N1 has stirred an intense debate on the risk associated with the accidental release from biosafety laboratory of potential pandemic pathogens. Here, we assess the risk that the accidental escape of a novel transmissible influenza strain would not be contained in the local community.
Methods

We develop here a detailed agent-based model that specifically considers laboratory workers and their contacts in microsimulations of the epidemic onset. We consider the following non-pharmaceutical interventions: isolation of the laboratory, laboratory workers? household quarantine, contact tracing of cases and subsequent household quarantine of identified secondary cases, and school and workplace closure both preventive and reactive.
Results

Model simulations suggest that there is a non-negligible probability (5% to 15%), strongly dependent on reproduction number and probability of developing clinical symptoms, that the escape event is not detected at all. We find that the containment depends on the timely implementation of non-pharmaceutical interventions and contact tracing and it may be effective (>90% probability per event) only for pathogens with moderate transmissibility (reproductive number no larger than R0?=?1.5). Containment depends on population density and structure as well, with a probability of giving rise to a global event that is three to five times lower in rural areas.
Conclusions

Results suggest that controllability of escape events is not guaranteed and, given the rapid increase of biosafety laboratories worldwide, this poses a serious threat to human health. Our findings may be relevant to policy makers when designing adequate preparedness plans and may have important implications for determining the location of new biosafety laboratories worldwide.

full article

http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1741-7015-11-252.pdf

 

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Re: BMC Medicine: Containing the accidental laboratory escape of potential pandemic influenza viruses


Alessandro Vespignani and Stefano Merler on the odds of containing a lab influenza breakout

Posted by Biome on 2nd January 2014 - 1 Comment



Research into the dynamics of human infection with influenza viruses has been spurred on in recent years by outbreaks of avian influenza (also known as bird flu) that have led to human fatalities. However studies into these avian viruses, such as H5N1, have led to some controversy. In 2012, two studies were published on genetic mutations that enable easy transmission of H5N1 between ferrets ? a mammalian model commonly used to study influenza infection due to similarities to human disease pathology. A debate was sparked over the safety of conducting such research, with concern over the potential escape of a mutant virus triggering a human pandemic. In order to carry out research into infectious agents like influenza, Biological Safety Level (BSL) laboratories have been constructed to contain them. However the possibility of a breach in containment is always present. Alessandro Vespignani from Northeastern University, USA, Stefano Merler from the Bruno Kessler Foundation, Italy, and colleagues take a computational approach to address how likely it is that the escape of a transmissible virus would not be contained within the local community, as published in a recent study in BMC Medicine. Vespignani and Merler explain more about how they constructed their model, what it revealed and what impact this may have on research into influenza viruses.

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