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AIG

kent nickell

Well-known member
This article from a few days ago states that we already own 80% of AIG and that so far they have worked through about 25% of their problems which are intertwined with 2,000 other firms and involve hundreds of billions of dollars... They mentioned that it may yet take a few years to work through these problems and that the potential for diaster remains... (Today they are seeking another 60 billion)

This helps explain why some people are stating that we are just getting into this financial mess with much more deleveraging to come...


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http://mobile.washingtonpost.com/detail.jsp?key=353059&rc=to&p=1&all=1

A Meek Ending For Mighty Unit That Gutted AIG
By Brady Dennis
Updated: Saturday, February 21, 2009

WILTON, Conn. -- In this small town an hour north of Manhattan, in a bland office park alongside suburban strip malls and gas stations, the unit that wrecked American International Group is dying a slow death.

The employees of AIG Financial Products are mostly in their 30s and 40s. They roam the firm's open trading floor in khakis, button-down shirts and sweaters -- a far cry from the pinstriped pandemonium of Wall Street. Everything appears perfectly normal, from the ringing phones to the meetings unfolding in glass-walled conference rooms to the company newsletters arranged neatly on a lobby table.

But the mission of this once-mighty enterprise has shifted in recent months. Once a virtual money factory, Financial Products is no longer growing and profiting, but shrinking and fading. Its workers, once power brokers of billion-dollar deals, are methodically extracting the firm from a tangled web of transactions that bound it to nearly every major financial institution in the world.

In recent years, Financial Products wrote a series of private contracts that faltered and came back to haunt its parent company in a very public way, leaving the insurance giant on the brink of collapse. Fearing that the failure of AIG could send shock waves throughout the financial system, the federal government stepped in last September with the single largest bailout of a company in U.S. history, a total rescue package of up to $152 billion.

Taxpayers now own nearly 80 percent of AIG. Federal officials are closely monitoring the company's operations and even signing off on key corporate decisions.

In November, AIG hired veteran Morgan Stanley executive Gerry Pasciucco to dismantle Financial Products, to terminate its outstanding trades, eliminate as much risk as possible and shut down its offices around the globe.


"My task is very narrow and very limited," Pasciucco said.

He is a grim reaper of sorts. His task is to take a firm that was once a darling of the financial world and make it go away.

* * *

As word came of the federal bailout in September, a cloud of disbelief and disgrace settled over Financial Products. The firm founded on avoiding risk was suddenly synonymous with recklessness and ruin.

"It was a horrifying experience, watching it happen," said Jim Haas, the firm's co-leader of North American marketing and an employee since 1996. "There was a real badge of honor that one carried when they were able to tell people they worked for AIG, and in particular for AIG Financial Products. That vanished in a flash."

For years, the firm carved out a reputation as an innovative force envied and emulated on Wall Street. It made billions of dollars in the complex world of financial derivatives. But in 1998, executives approved a break from the firm's cautious past. Financial Products began writing credit-default swaps, which essentially insured a company's debt in case of default.

Executives at Financial Products viewed the swaps as "free money" because computer models showed almost no chance of ever having to pay out. But the swaps contracts included provisions requiring the company to put up cash as collateral if AIG's Triple A credit rating ever fell. When those downgrades came, signaling that AIG was no longer as reliable as it once had been, companies like Goldman Sachs that had done business with Financial Products demanded it put up billions of dollars.

By the end of 2007, AIG had suffered write-downs of nearly $8 billion on Financial Products' credit-default swap portfolio. The first two quarters of 2008 brought another $9.5 billion in paper losses.


"AIG bet the ranch on a business that wasn't part of our core business," current AIG chairman Edward Liddy said. "And when things seized up, we paid a hell of a price."

Only when Pasciucco arrived at the Wilton headquarters in November did he discover the full scope of winding down Financial Products. The firm had $2.7 trillion worth of swap contracts and positions; nearly 50,000 outstanding trades; 2,000 firms involved on the other side of those trades; and 450 employees in six offices around the world.

"Most of the business was written here appropriately," he said.

But the failure to prepare for the collateral calls had proved a fatal miscalculation. The firm had written contracts that lasted 50, even 70 years, but had not adequately guarded against the volatility that could bankrupt it along the way.

"If you don't account for that liquidity need, you can blow up the business," Pasciucco said. "That is really the fundamental problem."

As the collateral calls kept coming, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York announced in November it would create a separate company, dubbed Maiden Lane III, to help alleviate AIG's cash crunch caused by the credit-default swaps written by Financial Products. By buying up the underlying mortgage-related securities, the government freed Financial Products to terminate billions of dollars in credit-default swap contracts that had plagued AIG's balance sheet. So far, the government has poured more than $60 billion into the effort.

Pasciucco meets weekly with Federal Reserve employees, "making sure they're fully briefed on what we're doing and what our plans are," he said. In addition, four workstations on the firm's trading floor are reserved for Federal Reserve staff members who regularly visit Wilton. The Fed team sits in on steering committee meetings and must grant a waiver whenever the firm wants to make debt payments.

A bespectacled Harvard Business School alum who runs and plays squash, Pasciucco was a logical choice to oversee the unwinding of Financial Products. He had spent his career working in capital markets. A colleague at Morgan Stanley who was advising the government on the AIG bailout asked Pasciucco whether he'd be willing to help out, and he agreed.

Pasciucco devised a plan early on to divide the firm's portfolio into 22 groups, or "books," of business -- from foreign exchange to interest rates to commodities -- with the intention of closing them out one at a time. The goal was partly to help AIG pay back the government loan, but mostly to stem any further losses.

"You want to look across every one of your books and say, 'Where could I be surprised?'" said Pasciucco, 48. "Where I can be surprised, I want to get rid of that. We're trying to get rid of complexity and risk."

He approached about a dozen counterparties, all major banks in the United States and abroad, about buying Financial Products' holdings. He promised these firms favorable access to the company's holdings in return for their help in addressing Financial Product's need for cash.

"We've described each of the books to them," he said. "They've identified which books they may have an interest in. We've tried to make this a mutually beneficial relationship."

As a result, the firm has cut the number of outstanding trades by 25 percent, with the primary focus on reducing risk.

Last week, it announced the sale of two groups of financing contracts from its energy and infrastructure sectors, worth $60.5 million. That comes on the heels of an agreement last month to sell its commodity index business. There are more sales in the pipeline, Pasciucco said, but the complexity of many deals and unfavorable market conditions require patience and caution. Staffing numbers have fallen to 370 from 450, and the firm plans to close its Tokyo and Hong Kong operations this year.

Ultimately, Pasciucco hopes to have the riskiest fires at Financial Products mostly extinguished by the end of 2009.

"There are definitely some views that there's no way you can reduce a book of this size in less than four or five years," he said. "My view is we're going to break the back of the risk in 12 months."

* * *

The potential for disaster remains.


"There are going to be surprises," Pasciucco said. "There always are."

Few surprises could be worse than further downgrades in AIG's credit rating. Another slip could trigger a new round of collateral calls from Financial Products' counterparties and sink the parent company deeper into debt.

There's also the specter of investigations on both sides of the Atlantic. Last week, Britain's Serious Fraud Office announced that it had opened a preliminary investigation into the Financial Products' London operations, "to determine if there has been criminal conduct," according to the agency's director. Meanwhile, the FBI has been scrutinizing whether executives at AIG knowingly concealed mammoth losses that helped lead to the company's downfall. AIG has vowed cooperation in both investigations.

Then there is the thorny issue of the employees who remain at Financial Products. They are literally working themselves out of a job. As each set of business falls away, so do the people working on it.

"In a situation like this, it's hard to keep everybody on task, motivated, focused. People know they are going to be out of jobs," Pasciucco said. "So they are constantly doing that calculus in their heads, as to what's left in terms of what I get paid here? What can I get paid in a new career? When should I start my new career?"

For the better part of two decades, Financial Products had been a place where workers raked in princely sums, even by Wall Street standards.

Since the collapse, many Financial Products employees have lost nearly two-thirds of their compensation under the firm's deferred payment plan, in which bonuses are doled out over several years based on the firm's profitability.

"It's like the stock going to zero," Pasciucco said. "It's been wiped out."

Still, employees who stick around are eligible for hundreds of millions of dollars in retention payments -- half next month and the rest in March 2010 -- a practice that has roiled some members of Congress and further stoked public anger. Executives say the payments are justified because few people possess the expertise to handle the mind-bending transactions at Financial Products.

Haas, the Financial Products veteran, said no one at the firm is looking for sympathy. "The whole world hurts right now," he said. But he said the vast majority of current employees had no role in the problems that wrecked the firm, and many feel a measure of shame and guilt for how its troubles spread to AIG and helped poison the economy.

"People have great pride in this organization. Everyone is horrified at what happened," he said, adding they are determined to close down the firm with dignity and professionalism. "There's a duty. We owe it to AIG. And now we owe it to the government and the taxpayer."

These days, Haas avoids telling people where he works. But he and the others who remain still show up each week at the office park off Danbury Road. They keep framed pictures of smiling children on their desks. Letizia's Pizza in Norwalk still delivers each night to those who stay late, chipping away at the pieces of Financial Products until it is finally gone.

"The great irony in it," Haas says, "is the better job we do, the sooner we'll be out of a job."
 
Re: AIG

This makes me wonder what is going on with the other large insurance companies who offer a basket of "financial" services. Many are heavily invested in commercial real estate. If commercial real estate becomes "non performing" then.......
 
Re: AIG

From articles that I have seen the Baltic Dry Index, a measure of international shipping is on the down turn also. I imagine ships that are moored in protective ports probably do not require the same amount of insurance as those out on the oceans filled with cargo. Like wise if there is not as much international freight shipped there is not as much freight for trucks and trains to haul to in land markets. Trucks and trains parked in yards probably don't need as much insurance as those in use.

Next week our family is going to try an experiment, going from two vehicles to one to save additional money. If we can go to one car totally we are hoping to save on that cars: fuel, maintenance and insurance. Our place out in the country is not within what is normally considered walking distance of much of anything so this is going to take some adjusting for everyone. One car will not be as convenient. Schedules with have to be made and appointments still have to be kept. If there is a conflict alternatives will have to be found or sacrifices will have to be made.
 
Re: AIG

Warren Buffett also describes this problem pretty aptly in his latest newsletter...

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/01/business/01buffett.html?_r=2&hp

"""In his letter, Mr. Buffett explained that the danger of derivatives was not merely the difficulty in assessing their value; rather, it was the ?web of mutual dependence? they create among financial institutions. Derivatives contracts keep various parties entangled for years, which, as he vividly explained, can create real hazards once those assets start deteriorating.

?Participants seeking to dodge troubles face the same problem as someone seeking to avoid venereal disease,? he wrote. ?It?s not just whom you sleep with, but also whom they are sleeping with.? """

hattip Rickk

http://www.istockanalyst.com/article/viewarticle/articleid/3079957

http://www.scribd.com/doc/6070015/AIG-and-the-Derivative-Nightm


AIG - Propping Up A House of Cards

Sunday, March 01, 2009 2:45 PM - www.istockanalyst.com

"Joe Nocera is one of the best business writers out there - a long time writer at Fortune he moved over to the New York Times a few years ago; he writes about 1 article a week but they are excellent, informative reads. Below is a background on what happened to the clusterstock that is AIG in layman's terms - and why we are not near done bailing it out. And essentially how the "financial innovation" of one branch of the business is killing the entire body.

Via New York Times

"Next week, perhaps as early as Monday, the American International Group is going to report the largest quarterly loss in history. Rumors suggest it will be around $60 billion, which will affirm, yet again, A.I.G.?s sorry status as the most crippled of all the nation?s wounded financial institutions. The recent quarterly losses suffered by Merrill Lynch and Citigroup ? ?only? $15.4 billion and $8.3 billion, respectively ? pale by comparison.

At the same time A.I.G. reveals its loss, the federal government is also likely to announce ? yet again! ? a new plan to save A.I.G., the third since September. So far the government has thrown $150 billion at the company, in loans, investments and equity injections, to keep it afloat. It has softened the terms it set for the original $85 billion loan it made back in September. To ease the pressure even more, the Federal Reserve actually runs a facility that buys toxic assets that A.I.G. had insured. A.I.G. effectively has been nationalized, with the government owning a hair under 80 percent of the stock. (remember our big secret - shhhh... stuff on the Federal Reserve balance sheet is "safe" - it's a magical place called Bentopia where all toxic assets turn into beautiful butterflies - and we'll make a profit off the butterflies someday too) Donn Vickrey, who runs the independent research firm Gradient Analytics, predicts that A.I.G. is going to cost taxpayers at least $100 billion more before it finally stabilizes, by which time the company will almost surely have been broken into pieces, with the government owning large chunks of it. A quarter of a trillion dollars, if it comes to that, is an astounding amount of money to hand over to one company to prevent it from going bust. Yet the government feels it has no choice: because of A.I.G.?s dubious business practices during the housing bubble it pretty much has the world?s financial system by the throat.

So why is AIG - a single insurance company THAT important? I mean... there are plenty of insurance companies out there.... why is AIG "the chosen"?

If we let A.I.G. fail, said Seamus P. McMahon, a banking expert at Booz & Company, other institutions, including pension funds and American and European banks ?will face their own capital and liquidity crisis, and we could have a domino effect.? A bailout of A.I.G. is really a bailout of its trading partners ? which essentially constitutes the entire Western banking system."
 
Re: AIG

I only caught a bit of the news segment on tv tonight regarding AIG; but I believe the AIG rep was in the process of painting a rosy picture of the company selling off its assets, assuring the public all would be well.

I thought about this article I just saw on Reuters:

March 1 (Reuters) - American International Group Inc (AIG.N) has said it plans to sell assets to pay back the U.S. government after a massive rescue, but the insurer has had little success in disposing of businesses so far. AIG planned to sell all assets except its U.S. property and casualty business, foreign general insurance and an ownership interest in some foreign life operations.

Some of the deals the insurer has announced:

DATE PROPERTY BUYER PRICE
Sep 29 London airport stake, GIP, Not known
Nov 26 Unibanco AIG Seguros/ Unibanco/ Not known

AIG Brasil - crossholdings, AIG,

Dec 1 AIG Private Bank, Aabar Investments, $254 mln
Dec 3 TMV interest, Tenaska, Not known
Dec 22 Hartford Steam, Munich Re , $742 mln
Jan 13 AIG Life of Canada, BMO Financial Group, $308 mln
Jan 19 Commodity index, UBS, Up to $150 mln
Feb 5 AIG Retail Bank/Card (Thai), Bank of Ayudhya , $58.7 mln
Feb 13 AIGFP's energy/infra assets, Not known, $60.5 mln

Some major properties AIG had on the market:

PROPERTY PRICE ESTIMATE STATUS**
American International Assurance, $15-$20 bln*, U.S. may take stake
(AIG's flagship life insurer for SE Asia)
American Life Insurance Co $8-11.2 bln** U.S. may take stake
(Unit operates in more than 50 countries)
Aircraft lessor ILFC, $7.5 bln***, Auction ongoing
U.S. auto insurance, $2 bln** Not known
Tokyo's Otemachi building, $1 bln**, Auction ongoing
Asset management business, $500 mln** , Auction ongoing

* Analyst estimates
** Based on sources familiar with the matter, media reports
*** Book value as of Sept. 30

http://www.reuters.com/article/mergersNews/idUSN0133563320090301?feedType=RSS&feedName=mergersNews
 
Re: AIG

http://www.rgemonitor.com/financemarkets-monitor/256004/the_real_scandal_of_aig

The Real Scandal of AIG

Robert Reich | Mar 16, 2009

The real scandal of AIG isn't just that American taxpayers have so far committed $170 billion to the giant insurer because it is thought to be too big to fail -- the most money ever funneled to a single company by a government since the dawn of capitalism -- nor even that AIG's notoriously failing executives, at the very unit responsible for the catastrophic credit-default swaps at the very center of the debacle, are planning to give themselves over $100 million in bonuses. The scandal is that even at this late date, even in a new administration dedicated to doing it all differently, Americans still have so little say over what is happening with our money.

The administration is said to have been outraged when it heard of the bonus plan last week. Apparently Secretary of the Treasury Tim Geithner told AIG's chairman, Edward Liddy (who was installed at the insistence of the Treasury, in the first place) that the bonuses should not be paid. But it turns out that most will be paid anyway, because, according to AIG, the firm is legally obligated to pay them. The bonuses are part of employee contracts negotiated before the bailouts. And, in any event, Liddy explained, AIG needs to be able to retain talent.

AIG's arguments are absurd on their face. Had AIG gone into chapter 11 bankruptcy or been liquidated, as it would have without government aid, no bonuses would ever be paid (they would have had a lower priority under bankruptcy law that AIG's debts to other creditors); indeed, AIG's executives would have long ago been on the street. And any mention of the word "talent" in the same sentence as "AIG" or "credit default swaps" would be laughable if laughing weren't already so expensive.

This sordid story of government helplessness in the face of massive taxpayer commitments illustrates better than anything to date why the government should take over any institution that's "too big to fail" and which has cost taxpayers dearly. Such institutions are no longer within the capitalist system because they are no longer accountable to the market. To whom should they be accountable? As long as taxpayers effectively own a large portion of them, they should be accountable to the government.

But if our very own Secretary of the Treasury doesn't even learn of the bonuses until months after AIG has decided to pay them, and cannot make stick his decision that they should not be paid, AIG is not even accountable to the government. That means AIG's executives -- using $170 billion of our money, so far -- are accountable to no one.
 
Re: AIG

Such institutions are no longer within the capitalist system because they are no longer accountable to the market. To whom should they be accountable?

For too long we have accepted the idea that the only accountability of many companies is simply that they produce and perpetuate wealth, no matter what the cost to people.

Until we incorporate the concepts of social responsiblity into business SOP, no amount of regulations or bail-outs will cure what ails business.

.
 
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