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2 Studies - Protective Effect of Maritime Quarantine in South Pacific Jurisdictions, 1918?19 Influenza Pandemic

Commonground

Senior Moderator
http://www.cdc.gov/eid/content/14/3/468.htm

Volume 14, Number 3?March 2008

Dispatch

Protective Effect of Maritime Quarantine in South Pacific Jurisdictions, 1918?19 Influenza Pandemic

Melissa A. McLeod,* Michael Baker,* Nick Wilson,* Heath Kelly,? Tom Kiedrzynski,? and Jacob L. Kool?
*University of Otago, Wellington, New Zealand; ?Victorian Infectious Diseases Reference Laboratory, Melbourne, Australia; ?Secretariat of the Pacific Community, Noumea, New Caledonia; and ?World Health Organization Office for the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji

Abstract
We reviewed mortality data of the 1918?19 influenza pandemic for 11 South Pacific Island jurisdictions. Four of these appear to have successfully delayed or excluded the arrival of pandemic influenza by imposing strict maritime quarantine. They also experienced lower excess death rates than the other jurisdictions that did not apply quarantine measures.

Recent pandemic plan development by many countries suggests the international concern about pandemic influenza (1). However, no work has been published to date to inform such planning by evaluating islands' border control practices to prevent the arrival of pandemic influenza. Yet border control is potentially easier to study for islands than for states with porous land borders, and for many island states with limited health and economic resources border control may provide the only practical defense against the introduction of pandemic influenza.

The Study

We aimed to identify the features that distinguished successful from unsuccessful border control attempts to exclude pandemic influenza from South Pacific Island jurisdictions (including the "continental" island of Australia) during the 1918?19 influenza pandemic. Jurisdictions were defined as countries, territories, or states within federal systems that had the capacity to implement their own border control measures. Although island jurisdictions in the Pacific are widely dispersed geographically, it appears that nearly all were at some risk for the spread of pandemic influenza from ship-borne contact. The details of ship-borne spread of this pandemic in the Pacific have been well documented (2,3). Indeed, we have only been able to identify 1 area in the South Pacific that had no reported arrival of the pandemic in the 1918?1922 period, i.e., the geographically remote Lau and Yasawa Islands (in the Fiji Group) (2).

Data on quarantine, pandemic arrival, and pandemic-attributable health effects were accessed through a systematic search of Medline, Embase, Australasian Medical Index, and Web of Science. Archival data were accessed directly from the National Archives (in Wellington, New Zealand, and Canberra, Australia) and from government departments and websites for New Zealand; Australia; the Secretariat for the Pacific Community Headquarters in Noumea, New Caledonia; and the World Health Organization.

Our literature search identified 35 articles and documents that included information on the use of border control in 11 of 25 South Pacific Island jurisdictions. An additional 21 archival documents were reviewed. Four jurisdictions in this region met our definition of strict maritime quarantine (monitoring all passengers and crew for at least 1 day before disembarking was permitted). These jurisdictions were American Samoa (5 days' quarantine) and Continental Australia, Tasmania, and New Caledonia (all 7 days' quarantine). All of these jurisdictions delayed the arrival of the pandemic by implementing their own full maritime quarantine (2?7) (Figure), although in the case of New Caledonia the quarantine was imposed by Australia. In each of these jurisdictions, local health officials credited the success in delaying influenza to strict maritime quarantine.

While it was in force, the maritime quarantine used by American Samoa from November 23, 1918, appeared to exclude pandemic influenza (2). Once influenza did reach this jurisdiction in 1920, no recorded deaths were attributed to influenza (in a population of ≈8,000) (8). In contrast, influenza spread rapidly through Western Samoa (now named Samoa). The impact was amplified by a lack of medical assistance and by food shortages in the area. Western Samoa had the worst death rate for any country or territory recorded in the 1918 pandemic, losing 19%?22% of its population (2).

Continental Australia implemented a maritime quarantine in October 1918. The arrival of influenza was delayed until early January 1919 (14), 3 months after the pandemic had appeared in New Zealand, where no systematic form of border control was in effect. The Australian island state of Tasmania instituted a strict maritime quarantine beginning January 27, 1919, once the Australian state of New South Wales had reported cases of pandemic influenza (4). Pandemic influenza did not penetrate into Tasmania until August 1919, and when it did, the chief health officer noted that it was a milder infection than experienced on mainland Australia. The resulting death rate for Tasmania of 0.81/1,000 population (6) was one of the lowest recorded worldwide.

New Caledonia was protected from the pandemic until 1921 by the strict 7-day quarantine of outbound vessels from Australian ports that began in late 1918 (11,15). Visiting ships from Sydney and Wallis Island were the eventual source of an influenza outbreak that began on July 17, 1921 (11).

Partial quarantine (as defined by the routine release, without quarantine, of asymptomatic passengers) proved unsuccessful in both Fiji and Tahiti in French Polynesia in 1918 (2,16). The other island jurisdictions that were identified as using no measures of border control (see circles in Figure) experienced the arrival of pandemic influenza at similar times.

The Figure also shows the death rates attributed to pandemic influenza per 1,000 total population compared with the date of the first recorded cases (for those jurisdictions for which date of first case and mortality data in the second wave of the 1918 pandemic were available). The jurisdictions of Australia, Tasmania, New Caledonia, and American Samoa appear to have benefited from a lower death rate resulting from delay in the arrival of influenza. Also, the lower death rates in some of these countries may have been partly attributable to such factors as preexisting levels of immunity, various socioeconomic characteristics of the populations (e.g., differing levels of poverty), and demographic factors (e.g., crowding and rurality). Unfortunately, limitations of available historical data prevented exploring these issues.
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References:
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http://www.cdc.gov/eid/content/14/3/468.htm
 
Re: Protective Effect of Maritime Quarantine in South Pacific Jurisdictions, 1918?19 Influenza Pandemic

Re: Protective Effect of Maritime Quarantine in South Pacific Jurisdictions, 1918?19 Influenza Pandemic

hat tip Senior Moderator Fla Medic -

Can Island Nations Effectively Quarantine Against Pandemic Flu?


# 2888


For those who live in New Zealand, or on smaller Pacific or Caribbean islands, it is an important question.

Nations that share borders - particularly porous borders - with other nations, or that have multiple points of entry or see large numbers of incoming arrivals, would have a much harder time preventing (or even delaying) the entry of a pandemic virus to their shores.

But for island nations, the prospects are somewhat brighter.

During the 1918 Spanish flu, a few Pacific islands managed to prevent, or at least delay, entry of the virus by enforcing strict quarantines.

A dispatch printed in the March, 2008 edition of the CDC's Journal of Emerging Infectious Diseases provides some historical perspective.




(See above for study and link - Fla1)



Today we get a new study that models the efficiency of quarantining arrivals on unaffected island nations during an influenza pandemic.

This research is based on having the ability to enforce strict quarantines, and a modest number of arrivals (8,000). As the number of arrivals goes up, the chances of someone harboring the virus getting through increases.


By instituting a 9 day quarantine on arriving visitors, or a 6-day quarantine along with using rapid influenza testing, the authors believe that such a quarantine might `contribute substantially to preventing the arrival of pandemic influenza (or at least delaying the arrival date).'




Quarantine for pandemic influenza control at the borders of small island nations

Hiroshi Nishiura , Nick Wilson and Michael G Baker
BMC Infectious Diseases 2009, 9:27doi:10.1186/1471-2334-9-27
Published:
11 March 2009



Abstract (provisional)


Background

Although border quarantine is included in many influenza pandemic plans, detailed guidelines have yet to be formulated, including considerations for the optimal quarantine length. Motivated by the situation of small island nations, which will probably experience the introduction of pandemic influenza via just one airport, we examined the potential effectiveness of quarantine as a border control measure.

Methods

Analysing the detailed epidemiologic characteristics of influenza, the effectiveness of quarantine at the borders of islands was modelled as the relative reduction of the risk of releasing infectious individuals into the community, explicitly accounting for the presence of asymptomatic infected individuals. The potential benefit of adding the use of rapid diagnostic testing to the quarantine process was also considered.
Results

We predict that 95% and 99% effectiveness in preventing the release of infectious individuals into the community could be achieved with quarantine periods of longer than 4.7 and 8.6 days, respectively. If rapid diagnostic testing is combined with quarantine, the lengths of quarantine to achieve 95% and 99% effectiveness could be shortened to 2.6 and 5.7 days, respectively. Sensitivity analysis revealed that quarantine alone for 8.7 days or quarantine for 5.7 days combined with using rapid diagnostic testing could prevent secondary transmissions caused by the released infectious individuals for a plausible range of prevalence at the source country (up to 10%) and for a modest number of incoming travellers (up to 8000 individuals).
Conclusions

Quarantine at the borders of island nations could contribute substantially to preventing the arrival of pandemic influenza (or at least delaying the arrival date). For small island nations we recommend consideration of quarantine alone for 9 days or quarantine for 6 days combined with using rapid diagnostic testing (if available).
 
Re: 2 Studies - Protective Effect of Maritime Quarantine in South Pacific Jurisdictions, 1918?19 Influenza Pandemic

see also an earlier thread about Tristan da Cunha, 1968

Japan is apparantly actually planning to iolate in a pandemic
with only a few ports and airports open.

Britains considered the chances as low
 
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