Check out the FAQ,Terms of Service & Disclaimers by clicking the
link. Please register
to be able to post. By viewing this site you are agreeing to our Terms of Service and Acknowledge our Disclaimers.
FluTrackers.com Inc. does not provide medical advice. Information on this web site is collected from various internet resources, and the FluTrackers board of directors makes no warranty to the safety, efficacy, correctness or completeness of the information posted on this site by any author or poster.
The information collated here is for instructional and/or discussion purposes only and is NOT intended to diagnose or treat any disease, illness, or other medical condition. Every individual reader or poster should seek advice from their personal physician/healthcare practitioner before considering or using any interventions that are discussed on this website.
By continuing to access this website you agree to consult your personal physican before using any interventions posted on this website, and you agree to hold harmless FluTrackers.com Inc., the board of directors, the members, and all authors and posters for any effects from use of any medication, supplement, vitamin or other substance, device, intervention, etc. mentioned in posts on this website, or other internet venues referenced in posts on this website.
We are not asking for any donations. Do not donate to any entity who says they are raising funds for us.
Announcement
Collapse
No announcement yet.
Discussion thread: H5N1 avian flu in US Dairy Cows - March 24+ - 13 total human cases (poultry & dairy workers) in 2024
Can I ask about your personal read on the risk here? If this virus gets seeded into the cow population and it evolves in cows, what do you think this does to the human risk from H5N1?
[Dugan grimaced.] I think it would definitely impact the risk, for sure. Our current assessment of the risk to the general public health is low. That could change. And so I think we’re remaining very vigilant — if anything, more vigilant in this space.
Apparently none of the affected states have invited the CDC in. The CDC is taking a back seat to all this.
Wow...and super groan. It appears the state industries are running the show. In small states this is a big deal. Only the larger states have the economic power to ignore a particular industry.
Thanks Helen for doing this interview. Very informative.
May 3, 2024 – CDC continues to respond to the public health challenge posed by a multistate outbreak of avian influenza A(H5N1) virus, or “A(H5N1) virus,” in dairy cows and other animals in the United States. CDC is working in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), state public health and animal health officials, and other partners using a One Health approach. Currently, one human case has been confirmed in a person with exposure to presumably infected dairy cows reported by Texas on April 1, 2024[1][2].
CDC’s response to this outbreak of influenza A(H5N1) virus in dairy cattle and other animals most recently includes:
Continuing to support states that are monitoring people with exposure to cows, birds, or other domestic or wild animals infected, or potentially infected with, avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses. Testing of symptomatic people who have exposures is being done by state or local officials, and CDC is conducting confirmatory testing when needed.
Monitoring and testing data are now being reported, and will be updated weekly on Fridays. Since March 2024, at least 220 people have been monitored for A(H5N1) after relevant exposures and at least 30 people have been tested.
Having ongoing discussions with multiple states about state-led field investigations to explore key scientific and public health questions related to the ongoing outbreak. CDC is playing a coordinating role with regard to investigation protocols so that data collection can be standardized across states and results can be pooled. In addition, CDC has multilingual and multidisciplinary epidemiological field teams ready to deploy to support on-site studies if requested.
Continuing work to better characterize the virusfrom the human case in Texas.
Beginning cell and animal laboratory studies, including to:
Learn how the virus reproduces in both human and cow respiratory tract epithelial cells and cow mammary epithelial cells.
Assess the severity of illness and transmissibility of the virus under different scenarios by infecting ferrets and assessing the outcome. Ferrets are used as a model for people because they get sick and spread influenza viruses in a manner similar to humans.
Testing human sera (blood) from people previously vaccinated with pre-pandemic A(H5) vaccines during clinical trials to see how their antibodies cross-react to the virus isolated from the human case in Texas. Data to date – including genetic analysis and testing of ferret antisera from multiple clade 2.3.4.4b candidate vaccine viruses (CVVs) (Reference table below[3]) – suggest vaccination will offer good cross-protection against cattle outbreak viruses. (The human case in Texas was a 2.3.4.4b virus). Antigenic characterization of the virus isolated from the human case in Texas (A/Texas/37/2024) with ferret antisera produced against existing pre-pandemic CVVs confirmed clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5) CVVs have good cross-reactivity to this virus.
For the past 18 years, I've tracked the path of H5N1 and it was the boots on the ground approach that I felt was the answer for monitoring an outbreak that would be life changing to our world. Now, I find myself in the crossroads of this dangerous virus, with no direction for detecting early outbreaks. I'm just floundering, aimlessly. I never ever imagined this scenario. It seems I cannot count on the CDC, for prompt early detection. The pandemic preparation in this Country is dismal.
Well, actually an immunologist with a personal fascination in emerging viruses. I do not work on viruses - so I will not be involved in nomenclature of viruses :-)
Sorry, but I am as surprised as you are on the response, especially the lack of culling and the apparent lack of testing - if all cases in humans that are anecdotically reported are real human cases it will fly under the radar...
I mean really? They let this fly? They would have me by the short hairs if I tried something like that! Thanks Texas!
…..Bird flu continues to appear to pose a "low risk to the general public" for now, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention says. But the agency's scientists ran into roadblocks investigating a human case of this "pandemic potential" virus this year, they said in a new report.
Epidemiologists from the agency were ultimately unable to access a Texas dairy farm where a human was infected with the virus in March, they disclosed in attachments to the report published Friday by the New England Journal of Medicine. That prevented investigators from being able to investigate how workers might have been exposed to the virus on the farm.
That is because the dairy worker who came to a Texas field office for testing "did not disclose the name of their workplace," said Lara Anton, a spokesperson for the Texas Department of State Health Services.
They also were unable to collect follow-up samples from the dairy farm worker or their contacts, which could have revealed missed cases as well as…..
It is a real problem how to communicate the risk of an H5N1 pandemic when all of the government entities are saying the risk is "low".
Well - it isn't zero.
The current diary cattle strain is deadly to domestic cats:
"There have been a large number of reports of infections in domestic cats(8) 2, wild and farmed foxes (9), farmed mink (10), and wild pinnipeds (6) 1. Reported disease in these species is severe, often comprising neurological clinical signs, respiratory distress and death. During mammalian infections the panzootic genotypes very quickly gain mammalian adaptations in their polymerase genes, often within a single mammalian infection (11) 1. Furthermore there is some evidence of limited or even sustained mammal-to-mammal transmission, particularly in mink farm outbreaks (9, 10) 3, and among sea lions and fur seals in South America(6, 12)." link
Any virus that is killing domestic cats is not a good thing for humans.
The individual states appear to be in charge of the situation and so we have a very limited look into the real situation on the ground. A travesty really.
Everyone should be familiar with pandemic issues by now. As usual, assess your individual risk factors, use at least two sources for your news, & use your common sense.
As M. Osterholm said on his latest podcast: "Chance favors only the prepared mind." - Louis Pasteur link
They need to back off': Farm states push back on Biden’s bird flu response
The CDC is locked in a power struggle with key states and agriculture players as it tries to better track the virus and prevent another potential pandemic.
05/06/2024 05:00 AM EDT
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is at odds with state officials and the dairy industry over its on-the-ground response to the avian flu outbreak spreading among dairy cows, complicating President Joe Biden’s efforts to track and contain a virus that has the potential to sicken millions of people.
Many farmers don’t want federal health officials on their property. State agriculture officials worry the federal response is sidelining animal health experts at the Agriculture Department, and also that some potential federal interventions threaten to hinder state and local health officials rushing to respond to the outbreaks.
……
Texas, the first state where the bird flu virus was detected, has not invited the CDC to conduct epidemiological field studies there, even though its health department is open to the research, because, “We haven’t found a dairy farm that is interested in participating,” said Lara Anton, a spokesperson for the Texas Department of State Health Services.…..
On recent conference calls with all 50 state agriculture chiefs and veterinarians, Shah and other senior CDC officials have raised the prospect of sending federal teams to farms to monitor the health of farmworkers and collect other data, including with a survey, according to three state agriculture officials and two other people familiar with the conversation who were granted anonymity to discuss the private calls. State agriculture officials quickly voiced opposition, citing concerns about biosecurity on farms and reluctance among farmers to allow federal officials onto their property.….
CDC - Updated Interim Recommendations for Worker Protection and Use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to Reduce Exposure to Novel Influenza A Viruses Associated with Disease in Humans - April 26, 2024
Updated Interim Recommendations for Worker Protection and Use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to Reduce Exposure to Novel Influenza A Viruses Associated with Disease in Humans
Español (https://espanol.cdc.gov/enes/flu/avianflu/h5/worker-protection-ppe.htm) | Other Languages (https://wwwn.cdc.gov/pubs/other-languages/)
FIRST OPINION As livestock move around the country, so does H5N1. The U.S. needs real-time tracking of livestock movements
May 7, 2024
By Shweta Bansal and Colleen Webb
The presence of H5N1 avian influenza virus, better known as bird flu, among dairy cows in Texas — the second largest producer of dairy cattle — was first confirmed in late March. By then, H5N1 had likely been circulating among dairy cows for months. Six weeks later, the nine states responsible for more than one-quarter of U.S. dairy production, which accounts for 3.5% of the U.S.’s gross domestic product, had each reported H5N1 cases in dairy cows and continue to do so.
Many questions remain open about the transmission of H5N1 among dairy cows and about the possibility of the virus adapting to transmit among humans. Even with the best possible outcomes, this outbreak reveals the precipice on which the U.S. rests with respect to livestock diseases.
In the event of an infectious disease outbreak in livestock, even one that does not directly threaten human health, the costs can be catastrophic. The production of animal products (milk, other dairy products, eggs, and meat) can decrease drastically. Other costs can come from the control efforts or trade bans and loss of consumer demand. Twenty years ago, a single case of “mad cow disease” caused U.S. beef exports to plummet by more than $2.5 billion, and domestic prices fell by 16%.
News of the spread of avian influenza among U.S. dairy cows in late April led cattle futures to fall sharply at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (the largest U.S. exchange for cattle futures). And Colombia, which buys $43 million in beef annually from the U.S., has restricted beef imports, even though no evidence has yet been found of the virus in beef cattle. ....
National-scale movement of farm animals as they transition through the production cycle is a key component of this highly specialized industry and is unlikely to change. In the U.S., beef cattle might be born in one place, raised and fattened in another, then killed and butchered in another. The U.S. livestock industry is geographically dispersed and intensely connected: 60% of cattle born in a year cross state borders...
Livestock markets act much as airports do for humans: they bring together animals (sometimes of multiple species) coming from many different farms, creating opportunities for contact between infected and susceptible animals before being sold and dispersed to other far-flung farms. Feedlots, facilities at which animals are fattened before slaughter or before being returned to the same or different dairy farms for stronger milk production, can also act as hubs for propagating infection.
In response to the evolving H5N1 outbreak, the USDA has placed additional influenza-testing requirements on interstate movements of dairy cows. However, the limited information available about livestock movement indicates that the movements of most cattle (dairy or beef) from or to markets occur within states. While the USDA strategy is essential in limiting the geographical diffusion of H5N1, the disease could be moving long distances within states without detection..... lots more...
Managing diseases in livestock in a country the size of the U.S. is a huge challenge due to the frequent and extensive movement of animals across the nation. That means local animal disease problems quickly become national.
The avian influenza virus that has been infecting dairy cows and spreading alarm in the United States was expected to reach Germany this week. But that’s actually good news. A shipment of samples of the H5N1 virus from Cornell University virologist Diego Diel is destined for the Federal Research Institute for Animal Health in Riems, which has one of the rare high-security labs worldwide that are equipped to handle such dangerous pathogens in cattle and other large animals. There veterinarian Martin Beer will use the samples to infect dairy cows, in search of a fuller picture of the threat the virus poses, to both cattle and people, than researchers have been able to glean from spotty data collected in the field.
Six weeks into the outbreak that has spread to farms in nine U.S. states, the flow of data from those locations remains limited as public health officials sort out authorities and some farms resist oversight. “It’s incredibly difficult to get the right sample sets off the infected farms,” says Richard Webby, an avian influenza researcher at St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital. “It’s clearly a barrier to understanding what’s going on. … That’s why these experimental infections of cows are really going to be super informative.”
....
The results are potentially important but also preliminary, Beer cautions, noting that distinguishing between some types of sialic acids can be difficult. But Webby, one of the preprint’s authors, says it’s obvious the udders are especially hospitable to the virus. “We clearly know the receptors are in there for the avian virus because it's growing like a weed.” The authors also expressed concern that cows, like pigs, could become influenza “mixing vessels” that create dangerous new human strains when avian and mammalian flu viruses that simultaneously infect an animal exchange genes. Beer says he’s more worried, however, about an avian virus slowly adapting.....
.....But the rapid viral growth in cow udders raises concerns that the avian virus could learn to latch on to the mammal-specific virus receptor also in the udder, says Tom Peacock, an influenza virologist at the Pirbright Institute. “It seems a good reason to get this eradicated from cattle as soon as possible.”.....
“The big question right now is whether the virus is mechanically transmitted or can be transmitted from cow to cow via aerosol as well,” says Jürgen Richt, a virologist at Kansas State University.....
...Richt, who runs one such facility, plans to inoculate the nose and mouth of male and female cows with the same strain Diel sent Beer. “Then we will look at what’s happening within the animals,” he says. “We will kill some of them after 4 or 5 days and look where the virus is in the body.” Others will be watched for weeks to see whether they develop antibodies to H5N1 and how long they shed the virus in various ways.,,,,,
I can't even express my feelings about the lack of testing/visibilty. What comes to mind is China.
The feds need to get out their checkbook. It is probably the only thing that will make a difference. Farmer $ relief for H5N1 losses in exchange for access and cooperation. State reimbursement for various H5N1 costs in exchange for assistance with access and information.
Attribution: broadcasted by the World Health Organization
Date: occurred May 6, 2024
snip
Todd Davis, CDC [00:47:06]
So there obviously is a lot of interest in understanding the potential for seroprevalence studies.
Currently, the influenza division is working with state and local public health departments to initiate serology studies in farm workers. So we hope to have more information on this very soon. So those studies are being initiated shortly.
Tweet
I mean really? They let this fly? They would have me by the short hairs if I tried something like that! Thanks Texas!
Comment