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**Vibrant62** · December 8, 2011, 01:22 AM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

I agree with Alert on this one: there are fanatical groups that would like to send humanity back to the stone age if they could - AlQaeda being a notable one of them, as this is one of its (reported) declared objectives. To religious fanatics of all persuasions (every religion has them), there are no innocent people and it would all just be 'the will of god'. There are able medics, scientists and highly qualified individuals all around the world, and past events have shown us that relgious extremism can embrace every level of society - not just the uneducated. Therefore provision of a step by step blueprint must be considered extremely inadvisable.

the difference between say smallpox and H5N1 is that it would be nigh on impossible for them to lay thier hands on smallpox, whereas in the case of H5N1 all they need to do is find an infected bird, which is not hard.

At the same time this research was important because the powers that be needed to KNOW that a human transmissible form of H5N1 is not only a theoretical risk, but eminently possible.

Therefore IMHO the research is both necessary and vital if we are to find effective means to counter such threats that can be available rapidly and to all; what needs temperance is the content of the published research. Critical information such as which specific mutations are required in a virus do not necessarily need to be published to the world at large. All legitimate research is carried out in BioLab 3+ facilities, and accredited researchers in these labs would and could be able to discreetly find out the specifics of the mutations involved to aid thier research. Whilst my scientific curiosity wants to know which mutations were involved, I dont actually need to know this fact - and so long as there is a mechanism for accredited researchers to get this information there is not any reasonable need for this information to be published - so I am for publication, but I am also for restricting this key information with a couple of caveats.
a) in the event of a pandemic outbreak such information should be rapidly and freely made available to all (as it will be all hands on deck at that stage) and b) that the information should be released on demand to accredited scientists.
This may mean that BL3+ lab staff need positive vetting - well is that such a bad thing? There is a balance that has to be struck here.

**gsgs** · December 8, 2011, 06:13 AM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

usually it's reassortment that creates pandemics.

Who will be trying to reassort that manmade H5N1 with
other flus to make it even "better" ?

**Shannon Bennett** · December 8, 2011, 11:38 AM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

I think that the research has already justified itself. It is plain the virus can easily change from being a possible threat to humans to one that is deadly in a very short period of time. If researchers demonstrate how rapidly such a change can occur then perhaps we can get governments to really pour money into vaccine development. In any case, the genie is out of the bottle. The methodology of gene manipulation is taught in every major university in the world. So far a zero sum gain for releasing a deadly virus has won out over any percieved justification for infecting an enemy.

**Emily** · December 8, 2011, 07:24 PM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/art...134409543.html

Debate rages over publishing new bird flu research

By: Helen Branswell, The Canadian Press

Posted: 11/23/2011 1:05 PM
''But I have to say that even if you have very efficient transmission in ferrets you might not have efficient transmission in humans. It's an indicator, but it's not an absolute predictor.``[Nancy Cox, head of the CDC's influenza division]

So some experts still think that until there is efficient h2h spread, we don't have proof there will be from the ferret study. But obviously there must have been plenty of concerns about h2h spread prior to this ferret experiment, since huge amounts of US funding, (that article says the ferret experiment was funded by the NIH, too), have gone into bird flu and other pandemic vaccine research over the past few years.

http://www.worldpoultry.net/news/us-...opment-40.html
US government spends $1 billion for bird flu vaccine development
//05 May 2006

http://homelandsecuritynewswire.info...ne-development

Pentagon shifts $1 billion from WMD-defense efforts to vaccine development
Published 1 September 2010

The Obama administration has shifted more than $1 billion out of its nuclear, biological, and chemical defense programs to underwrite a new White House priority on vaccine development and production to combat disease pandemics; Defense Department projects under the budget-cutting ax include the development and acquisition of biological and chemical detection systems; gear to decontaminate skin and equipment after exposure; systems to coordinate military operations in a chem-bio environment; and protective clothing for military personnel entering toxic areas, the document indicates...

I'm not sure if that second billion got approved, but Nov. 11 this huge plant based pandemic vaccine facility opened up.
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/med...k=MW_news_stmp

And a lot of funding was put into pandemic vaccine development during the early response to the swine flu pandemic.

I'd like to see the ferret experiment result in changes in animal husbandry to create better biosecurity to separate high intensity mammal farming from high intensity bird farming.

**gsgs** · December 8, 2011, 10:44 PM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

they spent $7B in total over 3 years, afair
the exact budgets must be here in another thread

**gsgs** · December 8, 2011, 10:50 PM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Vincent Racaniello wrote on his blog:
>Ferreting out influenza H5N1
>6 December 2011
>A laboratory
>in the Netherlands has identified a lethal influenza H5N1 virus
>strain that is transmitted among ferrets. These findings are under
>review by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity
>(NSABB) to ensure that they do not constitute a threat to human
>health. Meanwhile both the popular and scientific press has been
>calling this a "virus that could change world history". Even

and half of mankind could die. But how likely ? "Noone knows ..."

>the usually restrained Helen Branswell writes that "... the dangerous
>virus can mutate to become easily transmissible among ferrets
>" - and perhaps humans..." Should we be frightened?

yes, but how much ?

>Details
>of Ron Fouchier's experiments are not known because the results
>have not yet been published. Reports at CIDRAP and Science indicate
>that Fouchier was attempting to make the H5N1 virus more transmissible
>in ferrets. This strain of influenza is lethal in birds and humans
>- there have been over 500 human cases with over 50% mortality.
> However, the virus is not readily transmitted among humans. The
>virus is lethal in ferrets but does not transmit among the animals.
> Fouchier selected a transmissible H5N1 variant by ferret-to-ferret
>passage. This experiment involves infecting a ferret, harvesting
>virus from the animal, and infecting another ferret. After ten
>such passages, the H5N1 variant could spread from one ferret to
>another by airborne transmission. The two amino acid changes that
>permit airborne spread among ferrets were identified.

just 2 aa in the whole genome ? Frightening. I remember, in 2005(?) we had the
much cited study that suggested 10 mutations were needed to distinguish
the 1918 virus from avian ones and that H5N1 already is getting some of those

>Scientists
>appear to be responsible for the hype surrounding this experiment.

too much "hype" or too few, who knows. Compare with 2005f

> Fouchier called it "one of the most dangerous viruses you can
>make". Paul Keim, chair of NSABB, "can't think of another
>pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one", and Richard
>Ebright, a molecular biologist at Rutgers University says the
>experiment should not have been done. Martin Enserink writing
>in ScienceInsider says that the virus could change world history,
> and similar proclamations of doom can be found in the popular
>press.

the problem is the typical use of words "can","could","may",...
here, instead of giving probability estimates.
Now, you say "does not mean","not guaranteed" ...which is even
less informative. Then you say "highly unlikely" , but even 1%
would be highly frightening ...

>I cannot fault the press for not having the background
>to interpret these studies,

and I think this is because of the lack of clear words from scientist,
i.e. subjective probability estimates.
And the hesitation and non-insistence of the press to ask for those.

> but scientists should know better
>than to declare that this is a dangerous virus.

you mean, it is not ??? You should know better ...

> First and foremost,
> ferrets are not humans. Every influenza researcher will say that
>ferrets are a good model for influenza - they display similar
>flu-like symptoms, immune responses, and pathological alterations
>such as elevated temperature, weight loss, and histological changes.
> But it would be foolish to conclude that ferret influenza is
>the same as human influenza in all aspects. For example, not all
>influenza virus strains have the same virulence in humans and
>ferrets. A good example is the 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus which
>caused severe infections in some ferret studies, but was relatively
>mild in humans.
>In other words, just because the Fouchier H5N1
>virus is transmissible among ferrets does not mean that it will
>be equally transmissible among humans.

right. And below you write:
" No one can guarantee that Fouchier's
virus would not be lethal and transmissible in humans. "
So it's undecided either way. But it's a clear indication that the
chances are not bad (IMO > 20%) that the same few or other mutations
would make it equally or better transmissable in humans.
And yes, that would not yet give a pandemic ... but maybe 10%
that it would ? Give your estimate !

> The experiment to answer
>this question cannot be done.

It can and it was. E.g. in USA 1918:
Roseman,M.J.,Keegan,W.J.,Goldberger,J,and Lake,G.C.:
Experiments upon volunteers ...
Maybe it is being done in China. And you needn't necessarily
risk human health, some questions can be ansered in simulations
or cell cultures. Animal experiments can answer further questions.
And I think it's worth to be figured out. How much should be
published - that's another question

>Passage of viruses in a different
>host is one strategy for reducing the virulence in humans. This
>concept is explained in this passage from Principles of Virology:
>Less virulent (attenuated) viruses can be selected by growth
>in cells other than those of the normal host, or by propagation
>at nonphysiological temperatures. Mutants able to propagate better
>under these selective conditions arise during viral replication.
> When such mutants are isolated, purified, and subsequently tested
>for pathogenicity in appropriate models, some may be less pathogenic
>than their parent.
>The possibility that passage of the H5N1 virus
>in ferrets will attenuate its virulence in humans has been ignored.

it did not happen in the ferrets. It did not happen in chicken and
mice experiments with H5N1. It did not happen in humans (well,
the current H5N1 in Egypt is less deadly, but not Indonesia,China,..)
It's possible but not very likely IMO (<50%)

>In my view, it is highly unlikely that laboratory-modified viruses
>will be able to cause extensive disease in humans.

now, this is strage. Who else thinks this ?
There are lots of examples. Maybe we should run all viruses through a lab
to make them less dangerous ...

>When humans tinker with viruses, they generally do not know what the virus
>needs to replicate efficiently, cause disease, and transmit in
>humans. Consequently, they are likely to introduce changes that
>attenuate pathogenesis in humans.

OK, maybe you meant that most changes are bad for the virus
statistically. But those are being filtered out.
The changes that survive can as well make it more dangerous,
spread to other organs than the original.

>Nature is far better at producing
>viruses that can kill -

nature has no interest to kill. The virus wants to replicate,
but killing is usually a disadvantage here.
In fact influenza mainly evolves in mallards and there it is most often
not much pathogenic. When it jumps to other species, that is "accidental"
and may cause severe disease, but the virus doesn't benefit and after
years,decades,centuries of evolution in those species it usually
becomes less virulent.

>to think that we can duplicate the enormous
>diversity and selection pressures that occur in the wild is a
>severe case of scientific hubris.

they were quite successful. Apparently nature didn't yet find
those 2 or 5 mutations.

>Another aspect of this story
>that deserves comment is the review by the NSABB. That body is
>charged with reviewing experiments that would render a vaccine
>ineffective; confer resistance to antimicrobial agents; enhance
>the virulence of a pathogen or make a non-pathogen virulent; increase
>transmissibility of a pathogen; enable evasion of detection; and
>enable weaponization of a biological agent or toxin. It is not
>clear to me how this committee could make some of these conclusions
>without data from human experiments. Nevertheless, why would the
>NSABB recommend against publication of Fouchier's data? Could
>the sequence of the ferret adapted H5N1 be used for bioterrorism?
>It seems unlikely: it is not known if the virus would be pathogenic
>and transmissible in humans.

"unlikely" could just only be <50% ...
Not yet satisfying.

>Bioterrorists do not want to carry
>out an experiment; they want to instill terror.

all terrorism is experiment. They never know whether it works
as planned.

>Why use a laboratory
>modified H5N1 strain when the sequence of the 1918 influenza virus,
> known to be a lethal and transmissible human virus, is readily
>available?

is it ? Is it still dangerous to humans ?
H5N1 is another HA, so pandemic potential, while for H1 we have some immunity.
H5N1 is also much more deadly.

>Ebright calls the 1918 virus "the most effective
>bioweapons agent now known".
>No one can guarantee that Fouchier's
>virus would not be lethal and transmissible in humans. But the
>same could be said about any number of laboratory modified viruses,

the same = "No one can guarantee".

> none of which have attracted the attention of the NSABB or the
>press. When dealing with viruses, both caution and restraint are
>necessary qualities.

But only influenza does these pandemics.
And H5 is a candidate

>This article is based on the conversation
>with Rich Condit and Alan Dove on TWiV 159 and 160.

**Laidback Al** · December 9, 2011, 12:09 AM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Originally posted by gsgs View Post

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ontFlipMirrorIndents/> <w:OverrideTableStyleHps/> </w:Compatibility> <m:mathPr> <m:mathFont m:val="Cambria Math"/> <m:brkBin m:val="before"/> <m:brkBinSub m:val="--"/> <m:smallFrac m:val="off"/> <m:dispDef/> <m:lMargin m:val="0"/> <m:rMargin m:val="0"/> <m:defJc m:val="centerGroup"/> <m:wrapIndent m:val="1440"/> <m:intLim m:val="subSup"/> <m:naryLim m:val="undOvr"/> </m:mathPr></w:WordDocument> </xml><![endif]-->>The possibility that passage of the H5N1 virus
>in ferrets will attenuate its virulence in humans has been ignored.

It did not happen in the ferrets. It did not happen in chicken and
mice experiments with H5N1. . . .

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oNotPromoteQF/> <w:LidThemeOther>EN-US</w:LidThemeOther> <w:LidThemeAsian>X-NONE</w:LidThemeAsian> <w:LidThemeComplexScript>X-NONE</w:LidThemeComplexScript> <w:Compatibility> <w:BreakWrappedTables/> <w:SnapToGridInCell/> <w:WrapTextWithPunct/> <w:UseAsianBreakRules/> <w

ontGrowAutofit/> <w:SplitPgBreakAndParaMark/> <w:EnableOpenTypeKerning/> <w

ontFlipMirrorIndents/> <w:OverrideTableStyleHps/> </w:Compatibility> <m:mathPr> <m:mathFont m:val="Cambria Math"/> <m:brkBin m:val="before"/> <m:brkBinSub m:val="--"/> <m:smallFrac m:val="off"/> <m:dispDef/> <m:lMargin m:val="0"/> <m:rMargin m:val="0"/> <m:defJc m:val="centerGroup"/> <m:wrapIndent m:val="1440"/> <m:intLim m:val="subSup"/> <m:naryLim m:val="undOvr"/> </m:mathPr></w:WordDocument> </xml><![endif]--> It is my understanding that the attenuation of virulence in a novel virus only occurs after it reaches some kind of equilibrium in the host population. Many people may get sick and die before a novel H5N1 virus attenuates sufficiently to become as benign as a seasonal flu (and seasonal flu still kills hundreds of thousands of people around the world each year).

Originally posted by gsgs View Post

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oNotPromoteQF/> <w:LidThemeOther>EN-US</w:LidThemeOther> <w:LidThemeAsian>X-NONE</w:LidThemeAsian> <w:LidThemeComplexScript>X-NONE</w:LidThemeComplexScript> <w:Compatibility> <w:BreakWrappedTables/> <w:SnapToGridInCell/> <w:WrapTextWithPunct/> <w:UseAsianBreakRules/> <w

ontGrowAutofit/> <w:SplitPgBreakAndParaMark/> <w:EnableOpenTypeKerning/> <w

ontFlipMirrorIndents/> <w:OverrideTableStyleHps/> </w:Compatibility> <m:mathPr> <m:mathFont m:val="Cambria Math"/> <m:brkBin m:val="before"/> <m:brkBinSub m:val="--"/> <m:smallFrac m:val="off"/> <m:dispDef/> <m:lMargin m:val="0"/> <m:rMargin m:val="0"/> <m:defJc m:val="centerGroup"/> <m:wrapIndent m:val="1440"/> <m:intLim m:val="subSup"/> <m:naryLim m:val="undOvr"/> </m:mathPr></w:WordDocument> </xml><![endif]-->>to think that we can duplicate the enormous
>diversity and selection pressures that occur in the wild is a
>severe case of scientific hubris.

they were quite successful. Apparently nature didn't yet find
those 2 or 5 mutations.

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oNotPromoteQF/> <w:LidThemeOther>EN-US</w:LidThemeOther> <w:LidThemeAsian>X-NONE</w:LidThemeAsian> <w:LidThemeComplexScript>X-NONE</w:LidThemeComplexScript> <w:Compatibility> <w:BreakWrappedTables/> <w:SnapToGridInCell/> <w:WrapTextWithPunct/> <w:UseAsianBreakRules/> <w

ontGrowAutofit/> <w:SplitPgBreakAndParaMark/> <w:EnableOpenTypeKerning/> <w

ontFlipMirrorIndents/> <w:OverrideTableStyleHps/> </w:Compatibility> <m:mathPr> <m:mathFont m:val="Cambria Math"/> <m:brkBin m:val="before"/> <m:brkBinSub m:val="--"/> <m:smallFrac m:val="off"/> <m:dispDef/> <m:lMargin m:val="0"/> <m:rMargin m:val="0"/> <m:defJc m:val="centerGroup"/> <m:wrapIndent m:val="1440"/> <m:intLim m:val="subSup"/> <m:naryLim m:val="undOvr"/> </m:mathPr></w:WordDocument> </xml><![endif]--> This is an important observation -- the number of critical mutations is not unlimited. The ferret research along with other research suggest that between 2-10 mutations (or reassortments) are all that is necessary for H5N1 to become a transmissible human influenza virus. Perhaps a virologist can attached some probabilities to this occurring in the wild, but with H5N1 endemic in poultry populations in several countries, such a constellation of mutation occurring naturally should not be ruled out a priori.

**tetano** · December 9, 2011, 03:03 AM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Controversial Studies Give a Deadly Flu Virus Wings

Science 2 December 2011:
Vol. 334 no. 6060 pp. 1192-1193
DOI: 10.1126/science.334.6060.1192

News & Analysis

Infectious Diseases
Controversial Studies Give a Deadly Flu Virus Wings

Martin Enserink

Scientists have created an H5N1 avian influenza strain that has been genetically altered and is now easily transmissible between ferrets, the animals that most closely mimic the human response to flu. Flu researchers believe it's likely that the pathogen, if it emerged in nature or were released, would trigger an influenza pandemic, quite possibly with many millions of deaths. The virus's creators say the research, which has been submitted for publication, promises major public health benefits. Knowing exactly what makes H5N1 a virus with pandemic potential is useful because scientists can look out for such changes in the wild and prepare countermeasures. But the work is the subject of a heated debate among scientists, biosecurity experts, and U.S. government officials.

Just a moment...

http://www.sciencemag.org/content/334/6060/1192.summary

**Veg** · December 10, 2011, 12:06 AM

Contagious H5N1 in laboratory

AFP via Yahoo – 10 hrs ago

snip

"We need to be very vigilant. This is something that we talked about a lot this morning," French Health Minister Xavier Bertrand said on the sidelines of a meeting of the Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI) in Paris.

snip

EU Health Commissioner John Dalli told journalists he had received assurances from Dutch authorities that the virus was secure.

"The Dutch authorities confirmed that the virus itself is stored in a very secured way and that the necessary permits were given and that the researchers are bound by a code of conduct," Dalli said.

"One of the issues ... is to ensure that any information coming from this research is well controlled and without sensitive details about mutation being given," he said.

Fouchier said in a statement his team had discovered that transmission of the virus was possible between humans "and can be carried out more easily than we thought."

"In a laboratory, it was possible to change the H5N1 into a virus ... that can easily be spread through the air. This process (mutation) could also happen naturally," Fouchier said.

http://news.yahoo.com/world-vigilant-dutch-lab-mutates-killer-virus-174852522.html

**gsgs** · December 10, 2011, 01:13 AM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Laidback Al wrote:

> It is my understanding that the attenuation of virulence in a novel virus only occurs after
> it reaches some kind of equilibrium in the host population. Many people may get sick
> and die before a novel H5N1 virus attenuates sufficiently to become as benign as a
> seasonal flu (and seasonal flu still kills hundreds of thousands of people around the world each year).

it usually takes longer. Decades, centuries.

> This is an important observation -- the number of critical mutations is not unlimited.
> The ferret research along with other research suggest that between 2-10 mutations
> (or reassortments)

not reassortments

> are all that is necessary for H5N1 to become a transmissible human influenza virus.

for ferrets

> Perhaps a virologist can attached some probabilities to this occurring in the wild,

it took them 10 passages with selection in the lab. Could be one isolated tribe in Borneo or such,
with enhanced transmission by contact in children ... they don't know what it is ...
10 passages = 50days. We already have it widely circulating in Indonesian swine, but mild.
Maybe they already have some of these mutations there ?
Repeat the experiment in swine !

> but with H5N1 endemic in poultry populations in several countries, such a constellation
> of mutation occurring naturally should not be ruled out a priori.

yes, but it didn't happen in poultry so far. Birds are a bit different, except maybe quail

**Vibrant62** · December 10, 2011, 03:33 AM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Re: attenuation. If we look at the result of infections in birds i.e multiple die offs interspersed by periods of attenuation, followed by mass die offs which are caused by regular viral mutation and evolution amongst wild bird hosts, there is no reason to suppose that the experience in humans will be any different. It will be bad indeed if H5N1 successfully makes the leap to humans to become a humanised virus. This is why continued research to find an effective universal vaccine or therapies that can attenuate infection without emergence of resistance are so important, and why research MUST continue in this area and continue to receive adequate funding, and in every country no matter how bad the global economic situation is. An H5N1 pandemic would not be over in a single season; it would pose an ongoing problem for many years. Just look at what happens to ducks/ wild bird populations in asia periodically... never mind the chickens..

H5 viruses are unique amongst the influenza family because they contain polybasic cleavage sites (well not quite - so do H7 and H9 viruses, but the number of cleavage sites possible is lower) - i.e they dont just have one key to enter a cell and infect it, they have a whole bunch of them. When one key fails because the lock gets barred, it still has a number of other keys - and potentially other target cells - for initiating infection. This is why it is so deadly, and why it is such a threat.

**gsgs** · December 10, 2011, 10:05 PM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

can't they just reduce the cleavage site ?
It doesn't seem to happen in nature, while increasing it does happen.
Test it in ferrets !

that would also give them better publicity ;-)

**Gert van der Hoek** · December 20, 2011, 10:42 AM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

"the new H5N1 variants must be restricted to BSL-4 labs" ?

Fears grow over lab-bred flu

Scientists call for stricter biosafety measures for dangerous avian-influenza variants.

Declan Butler

20 December 2011

- snip -

Both experiments were conducted in labs rated at ‘biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) enhanced’ (see ‘ Safety by degrees’). Such labs require scientists to shower and change clothes when leaving the lab, and include other safety features such as negative air pressure and passing exhaust air through high-efficiency particulate air filters. This should be quite sufficient to provide protection against an accidental release of the virus, some virologists say.

“Current biosafety rules are adequate for safely doing such transmission experiments with H5N1 viruses or any other influenza virus,” says Peter Palese, a virologist at Mount Sinai School of Medicine in New York.

Requiring the more stringent protocols of BSL-4 facilities would hamper the research needed to develop countermeasures against an H5N1 pandemic, says Masato Tashiro, a virologist at the National Institute of Infectious Diseases in Tokyo, because it would limit the number of researchers able to work with the virus. As such, he believes that the work should be done in BSL-3 enhanced facilities.

High security
But others say that to protect not only the researchers working on the viruses, but also society at large, the new H5N1 variants must be restricted to BSL-4 labs. These labs have far tougher safety and security measures, such as requiring workers to wear positive air pressure suits and undergo more rigorous decontamination; some also have additional security measures, such as video surveillance and bomb-proofing. Corralling this research in BSL-4 facilities would also immediately limit the proliferation of the viruses in labs, because only a few dozen such facilities exist worldwide, says Ebright. Indeed, one regulatory official, who requested anonymity, says that he is most concerned about the H5N1 mutants being handled in BSL-3 labs in countries with weak biosafety cultures or competences.

Deborah Middleton, an H5N1 researcher at the high-containment facilities at the Australian Animal Health Laboratory in Geelong, says that the characteristics of the new variants “fulfil the criteria of a BSL-4 pathogen”, adding that she believes they would probably be handled as such in her institution. Indeed, the original experiments to create the viruses should also have been conducted in a BSL-4 facility, argues Hervé Raoul, director of the Jean Meriéux-INSERM BSL-4 lab in Lyons, France.

Past experience suggests that the risk of the new variant H5N1 escaping from a lab is far from negligible. Over the past decade, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) has accidentally infected staff at four high-containment labs in mainland China, Taiwan and Singapore, variously rated as BSL-3 and BSL-4. A US National Research Council report released in September detailed 395 biosafety breaches during work with select agents in the United States between 2003 and 2009 — including seven laboratory-acquired infections — that risked accidental release of dangerous pathogens from high-containment labs.

Read more - Nature

thanks to Helen Branswell

**Pathfinder** · December 20, 2011, 12:15 PM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Outbreak: super-flu research to be published?

<IFRAME style="POSITION: absolute; FILTER: alpha(opacity=0); VERTICAL-ALIGN: top; TOP: 0px; LEFT: 0px" id=shorturl_iframe height=20 src="http://on.rt.com/s/iframe1.html" frameBorder=no width=100 scrolling=no></IFRAME>Published: 20 December, 2011, 20:02

A man-made virus that could wipe out half humanity has been deemed a terrorist threat. And while the scientists behind the Frankenstein-flu hoped their research would help find a cure, critics fear they have developed the ultimate bio-weapon.

When virologist Ron Fouchier and his team of scientists first "mutated the hell out of? the H5N1 bird flu virus and presented their findings this past September, fear spread like contagion across the Internet.

But it is not just panic-prone bloggers who are up in arms about the latest virus.

Microbiologist and US National Science Advisory Board (NSABB) chair Paul Keim did not mince his words when describing the potentially deadly bug.

"I can't think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one," Keim, who has worked on anthrax for many years, told the science insider journal. "I don't think anthrax is scary at all compared to this."

Despite the widespread panic, the Dutch team who engineered the deadly strain at the Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam still hope to publish their findings in the American Journal of Science.

However, sensing the imminent threat of making the results of their investigation public, the NSABB is now reviewing the paper to determine whether it should ever see the light of day, the Daily Mail reports.
One senior scientific advisor to the US Government also expressed his grave concerns.

?The fear is that if you create something this deadly and it goes into a global pandemic, the mortality and cost to the world could be massive. The worst-case scenario here is worse than anything you can imagine,? the paper cites.

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Outbreak: Man-made super-flu formula to be published?

http://rt.com/news/super-flu-terrorist-threat-251/

A man-made virus that could wipe out half humanity has been deemed a terrorist threat. And while the scientists behind the Frankenstein-flu hoped their research would help find a cure, critics fear they have developed the ultimate bio-weapon.

**Gert van der Hoek** · December 20, 2011, 01:23 PM

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Tuesday, December 20, 2011

Press Statement on the NSABB Review of H5N1 Research

The U.S. government remains concerned about the threat of influenza, for the risks it poses seasonally, as well as its potential to cause a pandemic. Our domestic and global influenza surveillance efforts have become increasingly capable, along with expanded vaccine manufacturing capacity and assistance to other countries in their efforts to detect and respond to a pandemic. To enhance the detection of and response to influenza outbreaks, the U.S. government supports a broad range of domestic and global preparedness and response efforts that include research on better diagnostics, vaccines, and therapeutics.

Currently, H5N1 avian influenza virus — the strain commonly referred to as "bird flu" — rarely infects humans and does not spread easily from person to person. However, many scientists and public health officials are concerned that the virus could evolve in nature into a form that is transmissible among humans — an event that could potentially make this deadly virus an extremely serious global public health threat. Thus research on factors that can affect the transmissibility of the H5N1 virus is critically important to international efforts to prepare and prevent threats to public health.

While the public health benefits of such research can be important, certain information obtained through such studies has the potential to be misused for harmful purposes. The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) — an independent expert committee that advises the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and other Federal departments and agencies on matters of biosecurity — completed a review of two unpublished manuscripts describing NIH-funded research on the transmissibility of H5N1. These manuscripts — which describe laboratory experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility in mammals – concluded that the H5N1 virus has greater potential than previously believed to gain a dangerous capacity to be transmitted among mammals, including perhaps humans, and describe some of the genetic changes that appear to correlate with this potential.

Following its review, the NSABB decided to recommend that HHS ask the authors of the reports and the editors of the journals that were considering publishing the reports to make changes in the manuscripts. Due to the importance of the findings to the public health and research communities, the NSABB recommended that the general conclusions highlighting the novel outcome be published, but that the manuscripts not include the methodological and other details that could enable replication of the experiments by those who would seek to do harm.

The NSABB also recommended that language be added to the manuscripts to explain better the goals and potential public health benefits of the research, and to detail the extensive safety and security measures taken to protect laboratory workers and the public.

HHS agreed with this assessment and provided these non-binding recommendations to the authors and journal editors.

Recognizing the significant potential benefit of the information about the experimental details to the global influenza surveillance and research communities, the U.S. government is working to establish a mechanism to allow secure access to the information to those with a legitimate need in order to achieve important public health goals. The U.S. government is also developing a proposed oversight policy that would augment existing approaches to evaluating research that has the potential to be misused for harmful purposes.

The NSABB supports the overall goals of the National Institutes of Health, in conducting safe, ethical and informative research to enhance health, lengthen life, and reduce the burdens of illness and disability. To learn more about the NSABB, visit www.biosecurityboard.gov.

About the National Institutes of Health (NIH): NIH, the nation's medical research agency, includes 27 Institutes and Centers and is a component of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. NIH is the primary federal agency conducting and supporting basic, clinical, and translational medical research, and is investigating the causes, treatments, and cures for both common and rare diseases. For more information about NIH and its programs, visit www.nih.gov.

NIH

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Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

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