Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

[Pathfinder]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Deadly secrets of the laboratory

Michael Brooks
Published 05 February 2012

Excerpt:

The most persuasive counter-argument is that we don't need the bioterrorists to do anything; careless scientists can do the harm all by themselves. Unfortunately, scientists are as human as the rest of us. We occasionally spill tea on the kitchen table and - if working in a biotechnology lab - we also occasionally spill dangerous pathogens. In 2004, two graduate students working in a lab with the Sars virus infected themselves and seven others who didn't work in the lab. One person died as a result.

Working from the recorded frequency of accidental releases from laboratories and the number of labs likely to be researching the virus, two bio-safety experts have calculated that there is an 80 per cent chance that the virus will escape into the environment within four years. Writing in the science journal Nature, they point out that evolution only creates and distributes truly dangerous pathogens once every 30 years. We are creating a much greater risk.

Matter of trust
...
Further exposing scientists' naivety about gaining public support is the revelation that the Dutch researchers weren't even working in the highest-security facilities. Apparently the bio-safety level 3-plus - one notch below the maximum - has been considered adequate until now. Suggestions that the research move to level 4 facilities are likely to be heeded - though probably with a disgruntled sigh.

It's clear that scientists don't understand how much self-governance they get away with. Had the public been generally aware that H5N1 was being weaponised in anything other than the most secure facilities, there would surely have been an outcry. We have come to trust scientists to do the right thing but current discussions suggest this trust has been too easily won.

Full text:

http://www.newstatesman.com/scitech/2012/02/scientists-research-virus

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Michael Brooks, who holds a PhD in quantum physics, is an author, journalist and broadcaster. He is a consultant at New Scientist, a magazine with over three quarters of a million readers worldwide, has a weekly column for the New Statesman and is a Huffington Post UK blogger....

http://www.michaelbrooks.org/

-----------------------------------------------------------------------


Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) 5th Edition

Section II ? Biological Risk Assessment

Excerpt:

Hazardous Characteristics of an Agent



<DIR><DIR>Table 1: Classification of Infectious Microorganisms by Risk Group


</DIR></DIR><TABLE dir=ltr border=1 cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=7 width=430><TBODY><TR><TD height=27 vAlign=top width="33%">Risk Group

Classification

</TD><TD height=27 vAlign=top width="33%">NIH Guidelines for Research involving Recombinant DNA Molecules 2002

2

</TD><TD height=27 vAlign=top width="33%">World Health Organization Laboratory Biosafety Manual 3

rd Edition 20041

</TD></TR><TR><TD height=18 vAlign=top width="33%">Risk Group 1


</TD><TD height=18 vAlign=top width="33%">Agents not associated with disease in healthy adult humans.


</TD><TD height=18 vAlign=top width="33%">(No or low individual and community risk) A microorganism unlikely to cause human or animal disease.


</TD></TR><TR><TD height=54 vAlign=top width="33%">Risk Group 2


</TD><TD height=54 vAlign=top width="33%">Agents associated with human disease that is rarely serious and for which preventive or therapeutic interventions are often available.


</TD><TD height=54 vAlign=top width="33%">(Moderate individual risk; low community risk) A pathogen that can cause human or animal disease but is unlikely to be a serious hazard to laboratory workers, the community, livestock or the environment. Laboratory exposures may cause serious infection, but effective treatment and preventive measures are available and the risk of spread of infection is limited.


</TD></TR><TR><TD height=36 vAlign=top width="33%">Risk Group 3


</TD><TD height=36 vAlign=top width="33%">Agents associated with serious or lethal human disease for which preventive or therapeutic interventions may be available (high individual risk but low community risk).


</TD><TD height=36 vAlign=top width="33%">(High individual risk; low community risk) A pathogen that usually causes serious human or animal disease but does not ordinarily spread from one infected individual to another. Effective treatment and preventive measures are available.


</TD></TR><TR><TD height=42 vAlign=top width="33%">Risk Group 4


</TD><TD height=42 vAlign=top width="33%">Agents likely to cause serious or lethal human disease for which preventive or therapeutic interventions are not usually available (high individual risk and high community risk).


</TD><TD height=42 vAlign=top width="33%">(High individual and community risk)A pathogen that usually causes serious human or animal disease and can be readily transmitted from one individual to another, directly or indirectly. Effective treatment and preventive measures are not usually available.3


</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>
...

Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories


The predominant probable routes of transmission in the laboratory are:
1) direct skin, eye or mucosal membrane exposure to an agent; 2) parenteral inoculation by a syringe needle or other contaminated sharp, or by bites from infected animals and arthropod vectors; 3) ingestion of liquid suspension of an infectious agent, or by contaminated hand to mouth exposure; and 4) inhalation of infectious aerosols. An awareness of the routes of transmission for the natural human disease is helpful in identifying probable routes of transmission in the laboratory and the potential for any risk to the public health. For example, transmission of infectious agents can occur by direct contact with discharges from respiratory mucous membranes of infected persons, which would be a clear indication that a laboratory worker is at risk of infection from mucosal membrane exposure to droplets generated while handling that agent. The American Public Health Association publication Control of Communicable Diseases Manual is an excellent reference for identifying both natural and often noted laboratory modes of transmission.3 However, it is important to remember that the nature and severity of disease caused by a laboratory infection and the probable laboratory route of transmission of the infectious agent may differ from the route of transmission and severity associated with the naturally-acquired disease.4

An agent capable of transmitting disease through respiratory exposure to infectious aerosols is a serious laboratory hazard, both for the person handling the agent and for other laboratory occupants. This hazard requires special caution because infectious aerosols may not be a recognized route of transmission for the natural disease. Infective dose and agent stability are particularly important in establishing the risk of airborne transmission of disease. For example, the reports of multiple infections in laboratories associated with the use of Coxiella burnetii are explained by its low inhalation infective dose, which is estimated to be ten inhaled infectious particles, and its resistance to environmental stresses that enables the agent to survive outside of a living host or culture media long enough to become an aerosol hazard.5
...

http://www.cdc.gov/biosafety/publications/bmbl5/BMBL5_sect_II.pdf

http://www.cdc.gov/biosafety/publications/bmbl5/

[Laidback Al]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Viruses 2012, 4, 276-279; doi:10.3390/v4020276

Editorial

A Plea for Caution: Huge Risks Associated with Lab-bred Flu

Viktor M?ller

A strain of highly pathogenic H5N1 flu has recently been modified to be transmissible among ferrets [1], which is a correlate of potential human-to-human transmission. Another group created a recombinant virus that carries the H5 hemagglutinin gene stitched into the genetic background of the 2009 pandemic flu virus and is also transmissible among ferrets [2] (Box 1). These studies have sparked a major controversy about the publication of the procedures used and the continuation of this research.

I believe that the studies done so far have yielded important insights: in particular, identifying a possible mutational pathway towards adaption to transmission among humans, demonstrating that adaptation to the new host does not necessarily reduce the high mortality associated with the parental strains, and showing that H5N1 ?bird flu? can readily exchange genes with the currently circulating H1N1/09 human influenza virus. These results reinforce the threat posed by the strains of H5N1 flu that are currently circulating in birds, and might provide some chance for ?early warning? if the emergence of the critical mutations can be monitored by global surveillance [1, 2]. However, the same results clearly point out the risks associated with the continued maintenance of these modified strains in the lab. . . .

Open source ? full editorial at: http://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/4/2/276/pdf

[gsgs]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

noone out of 7B ?
there are always some who will try ...

[Laidback Al]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Professor Keim said that it was necessary to slow down the release of scientific information because it was clear that the world is not yet prepared for a strain of highly lethal H5N1 influenza that can be transmitted by coughs and sneezes.

Instead of recommending slowing down the release of information, perhaps Professor Keim should be recommending speeding up the preparations for the next pandemic.

[Pathfinder]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

No way of stopping leak of deadly new flu, says terror chief

US biosecurity board expert warns against details of H5N1 bird flu getting into wrong hands

Steve Connor Wednesday 08 February 2012

...
Professor Paul Keim, chairman of the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, controversially recommended that researchers be stopped from publishing the precise mutations needed to transform the H5N1 strain of birdflu virus into a human-transmissible version.
...
In an exclusive interview with The Independent, he argued it had been necessary to limit the release of the scientific details because of fears that terrorists may use the information to create their own H5N1 virus that could be spread easily between people.

Professor Keim said that it was necessary to slow down the release of scientific information because it was clear that the world is not yet prepared for a strain of highly lethal H5N1 influenza that can be transmitted by coughs and sneezes.

“We recognised that, in the long term certainly, the information is going to get out, and maybe even in the mid term. But if we can restrict it in the short term and motivate governments to start getting busy in terms of building up the flu-defence infrastructure, then we’ve succeeded at a certain level,” he said.

“If we can slow down the release of the specific information that would enable somebody to reconstruct this virus and do something nefarious, even for a while, then that was a good thing.”

By withholding key details of the mutations needed to make an airborne strain of H5N1, this would give time for governments to prepare for and prevent a possible pandemic, he added.

“The infrastructure to stop a pandemic in this area is not there. We just don’t have the capabilities. The very first time we knew that the swine flu virus [coming out of Mexico] was there, it was already in 18 countries. I’m not confident at all that we have the surveillance capability to spot an emerging virus in time to stop it,” he said.

“And even if we did spot it early on, I don’t think we have sufficient vaccines. The vaccines aren’t good enough, and the drugs are not good enough to stop this emerging and being a pandemic.”

Full text:

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/no-way-of-stopping-leak-of-deadly-new-flu-says-terror-chief-6660997.html

[Vibrant62]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Vaccine escaping mutations in the first years of a pandemic were not seen before.

There is a school of thought that 'true' pandemic waves are caused by successive substrains and that each wave is caused by a slightly different (?reassorted? or mutated) virus. It is true that not every pandemic has produced multiple waves, and (as far as we can tell from historic epidemiology) some past pandemic waves have had an interval of a couple of years between them

This whole issue is still poorly understood by scientists.. so I dont think we can be this definitive in our statements just yet, as science has only recently (i.e in the last decade) developed gene sequencing capabilities that can clearly answer these questions. IMHO we have only had one (possibly two) 'true' pandemic waves with pH1N1 thus far, which is why I am waiting to see how pH1N1 behaves once it does mutate away from its current format to produce an immune escape event (as it surely will sooner or later) with a degree of interest.

Nor does immunogeneic escape rest wholly with the H gene configuration; if nothing else pH1N1 has taught us just how much we still dont know.

[Emily]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

did we learn this ?
Cell based vaccine was successfully produced in 2009,
but demand was not so high and eggbased vaccine
was cheaper.
I had been wondering since long, whether they could
produce more cellbased vaccine, if needed.
As they had told us in 2006, why we need cellbased.
And as makes sense, no shortage of eggs, just get
more bioreactors ?!?

Somewhere comes money into the game, as usual.


4.) for USA it was almost in time, some few weeks missing maybe. But there is
room for improvement.
A new pandemic often first shows up in ~April when the Northern winter (China ?) with seasonal
flu wanes. Well, Indonesia,Thailand,Vietnam are almost equator, no winter.

6.) the reassortment would have to be in HA , so a new pandemic inside the old one ?
If it replaces H5, we might be glad.
Vaccine escaping mutations in the first years of a pandemic were not seen before.
There is not much diversity in the pandemic strain to select from.

Dr. R has some comments here about using egg vs cell based cultures for a pandemic bird flu vaccine:
http://www.virology.ws/2011/12/16/a-...uenza-vaccine/

[gsgs]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

did we learn this ?
Cell based vaccine was successfully produced in 2009,
but demand was not so high and eggbased vaccine
was cheaper.
I had been wondering since long, whether they could
produce more cellbased vaccine, if needed.
As they had told us in 2006, why we need cellbased.
And as makes sense, no shortage of eggs, just get
more bioreactors ?!?

Somewhere comes money into the game, as usual.


4.) for USA it was almost in time, some few weeks missing maybe. But there is
room for improvement.
A new pandemic often first shows up in ~April when the Northern winter (China ?) with seasonal
flu wanes. Well, Indonesia,Thailand,Vietnam are almost equator, no winter.

6.) the reassortment would have to be in HA , so a new pandemic inside the old one ?
If it replaces H5, we might be glad.
Vaccine escaping mutations in the first years of a pandemic were not seen before.
There is not much diversity in the pandemic strain to select from.

[Vibrant62]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

I thought it might be useful to summarise where we are at this time in relation to pandemic preparedness and interventions for a future H5N1 pandemic, and what issues remain outstanding. The purpose of this review is to highlight how very important continued research into H5N1 is along with research into new and effective countermeasures, and, how important it is that research continues; IMHO the world in not yet ready to deal with an H5N1 pandemic, and anything that can help to 'buy time' and delay or even prevent a pandemic H5N1 emergence should be welcomed. Again, in my opinion, what should be at issue here is not that the research occurs, but what safety measures are put into place to prevent an inadvertant escape and a proper system of evaluation of risks vs benefits of publication of some of the finer details.

What did we learn from the 2009 pandemic?

Vaccines
I would like to look at the issue of vaccines first; without doubt these are still the best defence we have against a hypervirulent influenza pandemic. However, there are significant issues associated with vaccine defences that were confirmed during the pH1N1 experience, despite the best efforts of all concerned...... whether that be WHO or CDC organisations all the way down to the research teams in the labs.

In summary, these learning points were

1. That vaccines cannot yet provide a global answer in the first year or more of a pandemic due to limited vaccine production capacities. Whilst the world has moved towards cell based production systems, these have had issues and are not yet fully on line or capable of addressing global demand in a short time scale.

See on pH1N1 experience http://www.flutrackers.com/forum/sho...61&postcount=3

2. We are still heavily dependent on egg based vaccine antigen production, which could be a critical issue in the event of an H5N1 pandemic, especially if any human strain is capable of infecting poutry and causing mass die - offs. Sterile egg production is limited at the best of times.

3. From the time of discovery of a pandemic virus it still takes time to reverse engineer the vaccine strain (@3m + - there were significant problems with developing a pH1N1 vaccine strain that would grow in eggs). To counter this the WHO develops H5N1 and other pandemic potential candidate seed vaccine strains; this is in the hope that ones developed ahead of time might be a good match for any emerging pandemic strain and so reduce these vaccine development times. However, if any emerging virus is significantly different to those identified for development as candidate seed vaccine strains, we will be at square one at the time of outbreak.

4. Production of meaningful quantities of vaccine cannot occur for 6 - 9 months after the emergence of a pandemic; by this time the first wave (and possibly a second or more) will have long passed by and done its damage.

5. Once vaccine development issues have been overcome, global annual capacity still has a significant shortfall. There are still the dilemmas presented by vaccine affordability, such that many poorer countries may never gain access to vaccine supplies once they are developed, or may not get sufficient supplies in any meaningful quantities to do much good for their populations. Only countries that can afford to enter into pandemic contracts (or have production capacity on thier territory) can guarantee 'early' (for that read within 12 months) and plentiful vaccine access, although measures have been put in place to reserve a proportion of pandemic vaccines for poorer countries

(see http://www.flutrackers.com/forum/sho...d.php?t=166103).

Adjuvant use can stretch supplies further, but with the recent issues of pandemrix (an adjuvated pandemic vaccine) associated with development of auto-immune disease problems including narcolepsy (I suspect that we will see more auto-immune disease problems that will become visible over time as epidemiology crunches the numbers), such that their use in children and young adults should be questioned ... unless the pandemic is so severe that the benefits outweigh the risks, as was the case for pregnant women with pH1N1

6. If a significant mutation (an immune escape event) or a reassortment event occurs in any emerging pandemic virus, the world has to go back to square one all over again to develop a vaccine that can provide protection.


7. After the pH1N1 pandemic where the world responded as they would for a hypervirulent pandemic, for one that turned out to be 'mild/moderate' I question if there is a) the political will b) the economic will and c) willingness amongst vaccine manufacturers (after broken contracts etc) to make significant further progress to address these outstanding issues.

8. Vaccines, no matter how good a match they may be, are only as effective as their host's immune system capability to transfer vaccination into a long lasting immunity. As studies have repeatedly shown, even vaccines that are an immunogenic 'close match' still only produce immunity in @ 60&#37; of vaccinated individuals aged 18 - 65. Studies have shown even lower levels of protection in older persons as immunosenescence sets in, as well as low protection levels in individuals with compromised immune systems.

In addition to the requirement of an adequate immune response at the time of vaccination to provide influenza immunity, it must also be remembered that even in individuals where vaccination has been effective, vaccination simply primes the immune system to respond to an infection before clinical symptoms set in. It cannot prevent the actual process of infection i.e invasion of virus into the body ... it just primes the bodys response so that the infection is countered rapidly. If this immune response is for any reason impeded, a symptomatic infection can and will still occur. This means that vaccines alone can never be a total global panacea; it is only one half of the equation with the other half being the individuals immune system health and functionality. I would like to look at this issue more in part 2.

My conclusion:[/B] Vaccines are a critical part of the armoury against influenza; however, during the first year or possibly more of a pandemic outbreak they have limited utility due to supply/ production time/ quantity issues.

So what is there that can fill this gap between a pandemic outbreak and vaccine availability/ effectiveness?

At the moment there is only one answer that is 'on the table' and that is oseltamivir or tamiflu. Why only tamiflu?

1. The amantane antivirals rapidly generate resistance in the influenza virus - a single individual will frequently develop a resistant strain over the course of a single infection. Many circulating pandemic candidate viruses already have the genetics that would confer resistance. This rules out 2 out of 4 currently available alternative anti-virals. The issues of resistance are well discussed in the full version of this paper

2. Relenza - the problem with this is it is an inhaled drug, and someone with ARDS or breathing problems is going to find it hard to inhale -a side and apart from producton issues.

3. Peramivir - this is an IV prep so its utility is limited to hospitals.

There is also Ribavirin, which is a highly effective anti-viral that is largely discounted for widespread human use due to its extremely high toxicity and resultant liver damage. This is why no-one seriously considers its widespread use in a pandemic response, even a severe pandemic.

Whilst there are many candidate antivirals in R&D, at the moment, this summarised all of our options for anti-viral drugs; whilst combination therapy could be effective in the short term, it would not be practical (supply/ costs) in a global severe pandemic, and studies indicate that combination use ultimately generates combination resistance.

But its OK isnt it? We still have tamiflu?

Well yes - but as we know from 2007/2008 season when seasonal H1N1 went from 0.1% baseline to 100% resistance in less than 6 months, it is not only likely but probable that widespread and uncontrolled tamiflu usage will produce a resistant substrain.

See http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21483816 for a study that examines the changes that were required to produce seasonal H1N1 taimflu resistance, and http://www.flutrackers.com/forum/sho...59&postcount=1 for further detail on the current evolution of multi-drug resistance.

Worse than this (with regard to H5N1) there is evidence in both Indonesia and elsewhere that resistance markers for tamiflu resistance are emerging in poultry strains that are infecting humans.

See http://www.flutrackers.com/forum/sho...d.php?t=180322.

This raises the spectre of an H5N1 severe pandemic that is either partially or wholly resistant at, or shortly after, emergence. I am not saying that this WILL happen; just that there is a significant risk that it could, and as such, we should plan for this eventuality.

Despite some negative science, Tamiflu's use in human H5N1 cases has shown that it does save lives if used early, even if its justification for use in standard seasonal influenza is perhaps questionable. However, even if tamiflu remains 'the magic bullet' in terms of saving peoples lives in such a pandemic and resistance does not become an issue it has severe limitations:-

1. It must be adminstered early to be effective
2. There are supply/ demand issues
3. It is unaffordable for a very substantial part of the worlds population

So in summary, we are poorly prepared as things now stand. But what could be done? Part 2 to follow.

[sharon sanders]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

I copied the above post from this thread:

How Dangerous is Bird Flu (H5N1) to Global Public Health? Part 2

http://www.flutrackers.com/forum/showthread.php?p=440556#post440556

[Laidback Al]

Re: How Dangerous is Bird Flu (H5N1) to Global Public Health? Part 2

The H5N1 Research Publication Controversy

The debate continues to rage over whether or not the details of the laboratory-created virulent strain of H5N1 should be published (see this FluTrackers link for a full discussion). The heated exchange among the researchers raises many critical issues about scientific research and the protection of the public good.

But in my estimation this debate is a distraction from the real issue at hand - How can the world quickly and efficiently prepare for the next pandemic?

And there will be a next pandemic.

Governments and public health organizations need to focus on new production and delivery strategies for vaccine and encourage researchers to develop new drugs to replace neuraminidase inhibitors for when they are no longer effective. The 2009 H1N1 pandemic demonstrated how ill-prepared the world is to handle a pandemic. Lucky for us it was mild. We may not be so lucky if H5N1 goes pandemic.

Throughout history, humans have always taken the most recent scientific advances and turned then into weapons of death and destruction, starting with the invention of gun powder for fireworks in China in 9^th century and continuing through the nuclear age in the 20^th century with atomic bombs. Even today the world is wrestling with the issue of peaceful nuclear development versus atomic aggression. So the restriction of publication of the H5N1 research may delay, but will certainly not deter, the spread of the details to anyone determined to obtain them.

And the restriction of the data will not stop the next pandemic from occurring.

Once the next pandemic starts, it will not be important if it is a result a bioterrorist plot, a laboratory escape, or a virus born in the wild. What will be important is if the world is prepared for it.

<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml> <o:OfficeDocumentSettings> <o:AllowPNG/> </o:OfficeDocumentSettings> </xml><![endif][if gte mso 9]><xml> <w:WordDocument> <w:View>Normal</w:View> <w:Zoom>0</w:Zoom> <w:TrackMoves/> <w:TrackFormatting/> <w:PunctuationKerning/> <w:ValidateAgainstSchemas/> <w:SaveIfXMLInvalid>false</w:SaveIfXMLInvalid> <w:IgnoreMixedContent>false</w:IgnoreMixedContent> <w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText>false</w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText> <woNotPromoteQF/> <w:LidThemeOther>EN-US</w:LidThemeOther> <w:LidThemeAsian>X-NONE</w:LidThemeAsian> <w:LidThemeComplexScript>KHM</w:LidThemeComplexScript> <w:Compatibility> <w:BreakWrappedTables/> <w:SnapToGridInCell/> <w:WrapTextWithPunct/> <w:UseAsianBreakRules/> <wontGrowAutofit/> <w:SplitPgBreakAndParaMark/> <w:EnableOpenTypeKerning/> <wontFlipMirrorIndents/> <w:OverrideTableStyleHps/> </w:Compatibility> <m:mathPr> <m:mathFont m:val="Cambria Math"/> <m:brkBin m:val="before"/> <m:brkBinSub m:val="&#45;-"/> <m:smallFrac m:val="off"/> <m:dispDef/> <m:lMargin m:val="0"/> <m:rMargin m:val="0"/> <m:defJc m:val="centerGroup"/> <m:wrapIndent m:val="1440"/> <m:intLim m:val="subSup"/> <m:naryLim m:val="undOvr"/> </m:mathPr></w:WordDocument> </xml><![endif][if gte mso 9]><xml> <w:LatentStyles DefLockedState="false" DefUnhideWhenUsed="true" DefSemiHidden="true" DefQFormat="false" DefPriority="99" LatentStyleCount="267"> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="0" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Normal"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="heading 1"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 2"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 3"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 4"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 5"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 6"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 7"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 8"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 9"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 1"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 2"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 3"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 4"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 5"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 6"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 7"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 8"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 9"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="35" QFormat="true" Name="caption"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="10" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Title"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="1" Name="Default Paragraph Font"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="11" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Subtitle"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="22" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Strong"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="20" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Emphasis"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="59" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Table Grid"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Placeholder Text"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="1" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="No Spacing"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 1"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 1"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 1"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 1"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 1"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 1"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Revision"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="34" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="List Paragraph"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="29" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Quote"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="30" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Intense Quote"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 1"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 1"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 1"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 1"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 1"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 1"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 1"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 1"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 2"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 2"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 2"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 2"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 2"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 2"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 2"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 2"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 2"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 2"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 2"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 2"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 2"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 2"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 3"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 3"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 3"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 3"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 3"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 3"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 3"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 3"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 3"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 3"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 3"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 3"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 3"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 3"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 4"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 4"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 4"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 4"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 4"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 4"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 4"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 4"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 4"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 4"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 4"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 4"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 4"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 4"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 5"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 5"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 5"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 5"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 5"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 5"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 5"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 5"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 5"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 5"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 5"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 5"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 5"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 5"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 6"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 6"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 6"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 6"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 6"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 6"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 6"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 6"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 6"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 6"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 6"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 6"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 6"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 6"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="19" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Subtle Emphasis"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="21" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Intense Emphasis"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="31" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Subtle Reference"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="32" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Intense Reference"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="33" SemiHidden="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Book Title"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="37" Name="Bibliography"/> <w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" QFormat="true" Name="TOC Heading"/> </w:LatentStyles> </xml><![endif][if gte mso 10]> <style> /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";} </style> <![endif]--> Let?s shift the focus of this debate from withholding research data to emphasizing the need for worldwide preparation for the next pandemic.

[sharon sanders]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

hat tip Michael Coston -

Monday, February 06, 2012

H5N1 Research: A Plethora Of Positions



BSL-4 Lab Worker - Photo Credit ?USAMRIID

# 6123


While historically politics, religion, or sporting contests can be counted on as being the most divisive of subjects, over the past few months we?ve seen rise to a different bitter line of debate;

Under what circumstances should potentially dangerous life or bioscience research be conducted and/or published?

Although it has been simmering in the background for years, this issue came to the forefront several months ago when Ron Fouchier announced at a scientific conference in Malta that he?d successfully `mutated the hell? out of the H5N1 virus and turned it into a highly transmissible (and still lethal) virus in ferrets.

At the same time, in a different lab half a world away, virologist Yoshihiro Kawaoka accomplished very nearly the same feat, albeit without the high lethality seen in Fouchier?s ferrets.

In November alarm bells were raised by bio-terrorism experts, who warned that this information in the wrong hands could be catastrophic (seeNPR: Bio-Terrorism Concerns Over Bird Flu Research).

Last December, the NSABB - after reviewing the papers from both of these projects - recommended unanimously that key details on how they were conducted be redacted from the publically available journals.

And that has unleashed a firestorm of controversy.

You can find a nice recap of all of this by Debra MacKenzie in this morning?s edition of New Scientist (Doomsday flu decision time: The story so far).

Later this month, in a closed-door meeting in Geneva, a small, select group of scientists will gather to discuss this controversy. The hope is they will forward some recommendations on how to proceed for consideration by the greater international scientific community.

In the meantime, the media is filled with diverse opinions on this subject.

One of the more extreme views comes this morning via John Horgan writing for Scientific American. He gives his list of available options, and finds all of them lacking. He proposes that the `least bad? option is:

Let?s Ban Research That Makes the Bird-Flu Virus and Other Pathogens Deadlier

By John Horgan | February 6, 2012 |

While at the far end of the spectrum in this debate, Horgan echoes many of the same sentiments as Tom Inglesby, Director of the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center.

In a letter to the Editor of the New York Times, Inglesby recently argued:

The potential benefits of the research do not justify the potential dangers, so the research should be discontinued. While in almost all circumstances basic research should be fully disseminated in the science community, in this case the results should not be published in a way that allows them to be replicated by others. If allowed to continue, the research should be performed only in pursuit of concrete, urgent goals under international approval and the greatest possible safety conditions.
TOM INGLESBY
Baltimore, Jan. 24, 2012

The Director of Australia's National Centre for Biosecurity, Professor Ian Ramshaw, warned in an article yesterday in The Canberra Times that potentially dangerous H5N1 research is being conducted in labs with insufficient biosecurity measures, and even states that these mutated viruses should not have been created to begin with.

Killer bug in the system

BY PHILLIP THOMSON
05 Feb, 2012 01:00 AM
THE CANBERRA scientist who argued against details of a new strain of potentially apocalyptic bird flu being published has warned of inadequate security at the lab where the virus was developed and says the virus should not have been developed at all.
(Continue . . . )

A bit ironic, as Professor Ramshaw gained considerable notoriety a decade ago when he and his research team published details on how they created a new, and highly pathogenic form of mousepox.

Comparatively speaking, the above views make the recommendations of the NSABB appear almost centrist, as they only called for the redaction of key elements from two scientific papers, not for a ban into this type of research.

Surprisingly, an opinion published last week by none other than Robert G. Webster, considered to be one of the world?s foremost authorities on influenza, got very little mention in the press.


Mammalian-Transmissible H5N1 Influenza: the Dilemma of Dual-Use Research

1. Robert G. Webster

While conceding that the details of how these two H5N1 experiments were conducted will likely leak out at some point, he nonetheless believes the details on how to create a transmissible H5N1 virus should not be published.

Webster believes this type of research must continue, but also worries that the lower biosecurity level labs (BSL-3) may not have adequate safety measures for containing H5N1.

He has a lot more to say, so by all means follow this link to read it in its entirety.

Last week, in an apparent response to the BSL-3 / BSL-4 debate, the Public Health Agency of Canada issued a Biosafety Advisory for working with transmissible strains of the H5N1 virus, relegating such work to their highest containment (CL-4) labs.

On the other end of the spectrum are researchers and scientists who believe that concerns over the biosafety aspects of these experiments are overblown, and that work on these viruses must continue and the results should be published in their entirety.

Virologist and blogger Professor Vincent Racaniello argues strenuously for this position in his recent mBio article:

Science Should Be in the Public Domain

Vincent R. Racaniello
Department of Microbiology and Immunology, Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons, New York, New York, USA
ABSTRACT

Variants of avian influenza H5N1 virus that are transmitted by the airborne route among ferrets have been identified. The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity has advised against publication of the details of the methods used to obtain these viruses and the amino acid changes that lead to transmission in ferrets. This decision is not based on sound scientific principles and risks setting a precedent that will make it easier to put in place highly restrictive regulations on scientific research and publication.
(Continue . . . )

And similarly, noted microbiologist Peter Palese, in an opinion piece recently published in PNAS ? argued:

H5N1 influenza viruses: Facts, not fear


Peter Palese 2. Taia T. Wang
Abstract
The ongoing controversy over publication of two studies involving the transmission in ferrets of H5N1 (H5) subtype influenza viruses and the recommendations of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity to redact key details in the manuscripts call for an examination of relevant scientific facts. In addition, there are calls in the media to destroy the viruses, curtail future research in this area, and protect the public from such ?frightening? research efforts. Fear needs to be put to rest with solid science and not speculation.
(Continue . . . )

As a non-scientist, I must rely on the opinions and judgments of scientists I trust.

Here, that proves exceedingly difficult, as the range of opinion from people I highly respect covers the gamut ? from preserving the ideals of scientific and intellectual freedom . . . to an outright ban on conducting this type of research.

In this issue we have an honest disagreement among experts, and all sides have at least some solid ground to stand on. And no matter how diverse, I believe these opinions to be heartfelt and sincere.


We are on the cusp of a new era of life sciences, where scientists can manipulate and even create life forms in the laboratory. Although the potential for good that this research offers is immense, there is also the possibility of serious mishap as well.

While we are focused today on the fate of two H5N1 research papers, the real problem runs far deeper;

Our failure to anticipate and deal with the numerous ethical and practical issues that these new bioengineering sciences presents.

The Fouchier and Kawaoka papers have merely brought this issue to a head.

Whether these papers end up published in their entirety or not, the bigger issue is that the international scientific community must come up with a consensus over rules and guidelines for life sciences research.

Otherwise, these bitter debates will form an ongoing rift between scientists, and over time, further erode the public?s confidence in the scientific establishment.




Posted by Michael Coston at <a class="timestamp-link" href="http://afludiary.blogspot.com/2012/02/h5n1-research-plethora-of-positions.html" rel="bookmark" title="permanent link"><abbr class="published" title="2012-02-06T10:49:00-05:00">10:49 AM</abbr>

[Pathfinder]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Killer bug in the system

BY PHILLIP THOMSON
05 Feb, 2012 01:00 AM

THE CANBERRA scientist who argued against details of a new strain of potentially apocalyptic bird flu being published has warned of inadequate security at the lab where the virus was developed and says the virus should not have been developed at all.

Professor Ian Ramshaw also says the new airborne H5N1 virus, modified in a way many believe will transmit it more easily between humans, has not been researched in a laboratory with the highest possible security level.

''With research such as this you better be entirely sure the benefits outweigh the risks,'' Professor Ramshaw said.
...

''The question now has to involve what's going to happen with international controls,'' Professor Ramshaw said.

''Until now they [the international community] have essentially ignored the issue.''

Full text:

http://www.canberratimes.com.au/news/local/news/general/killer-bug-in-the-system/2443947.aspx

------------------------------------------------------
Professor Ian Ramshaw
Professor in Immunology
Centre for Research in Therapeutic Solutions
University of Canberra
ACT 2601 Australia

Education
PhD, Immunology, Australian National University, 1973
MSc, Brunel

Research and Professional Interests


Ian Ramshaw has developed a research career in immunology and the development of vaccines for infectious diseases such as HIV. He developed the prime boost immunisation strategy and cytokine co-expression, both of which have been in clinical trial for HIV-1 preventive and immunotherapeutic vaccines. He has also been studying the effect of co-expressing cytokine genes on the pathogenicity of viruses and published the seminal paper showing increased virulence of poxviruses expressing the gene for IL-4. This was the first example of a genetically manipulated organism showing increased virulence which brought to the fore the potential concerns of bioterrorism. His areas of expertise include:

• Humoral Immunology And Immunochemistry
• Genetic Immunology
• Medical Biochemistry: Lipids
• Immunogenetics (Incl. Genetic Immunology)
• Medical Virology
• Gene And Molecular Therapy

...

http://www.canberra.edu.au/faculties/science/staff/profiles/professor-ian-ramshaw

[Pathfinder]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Scientists studying bird flu must have biosecurity: Canada

The Canadian Press

Date: Saturday Feb. 4, 2012 8:10 AM ET
<!-- dateline -->

TORONTO<!-- /dateline --> ? If Canadian scientists want to conduct research on H5N1 flu viruses modified to enhance their ability to spread, the work will have to be done in laboratories with the top level of biosecurity, the Public Health Agency of Canada says.

The agency said in a statement that any research on the viruses in this country would need to be done in labs designated as Containment Level 4 -- known as BSL4 labs elsewhere. The only Level 4 labs in Canada are located at the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg.

That requirement is a step up from the one governing research on regular H5N1 viruses. Canadian scientists are allowed to work on those viruses in Level 3 laboratories.

Read more: http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/TopStories...#ixzz1lSGhfVbp

-------------------------------------------------------

Public Health Agency of Canada

Biosafety Advisory:
Efficiently Transmissible Engineered Influenza A H5N1 Viruses

February 01, 2012

This biosafety advisory is being provided by the Public Health Agency of Canada (<ABBR title="Public Health Agency of Canada">PHAC</ABBR>) in response to recent publications of efficiently transmissible engineered Influenza A H5N1 viruses. The Pathogen Regulation Directorate (<ABBR title="Pathogen Regulation Directorate">PRD</ABBR>) has developed this advisory based on current scientific evidence available on this pathogen and is subject to review and change as more information becomes available. The Risk Group (<ABBR title="Risk Group">RG</ABBR>) of efficiently transmissible Influenza A H5N1 viruses is RG4.

1. Background

Influenza A H5N1 is a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus that emerged as a human pathogen in 1997 when it was transmitted from avian populations to humans in Hong Kong<SUP>(1,2)</SUP>. Since then, various countries around the world have reported human infections, particularly in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. From 2003 to 2011, 574 human cases and 337 deaths have been confirmed by the World Health Organization; this correlates to a mortality rate of 59%<SUP>(3)</SUP>. H5N1 can cause death in healthy individuals with no pre-existing medical conditions.

In November 2011, three independent studies on H5N1 transmission in ferrets were either published online or submitted for publication. These studies have received a significant amount of attention due to their relative success in producing engineered H5N1 viruses capable of efficient transmission in ferrets, including via the air<SUP>(4-10)</SUP>. Ferrets are considered a good model for studying human influenza viruses<SUP>(11)</SUP>. The engineered transmissible H5N1 viruses are not currently in circulation, but it is widely agreed that if released, the clinical and economic impact could be devastating.

2. Biosafety Requirements

The following table summarizes the containment requirements for laboratories working with efficiently transmissible engineered Influenza A H5N1 viruses. No containment requirements are stipulated for non-proliferative clinical/diagnostic activities based on the fact that this virus is currently not in circulation. Laboratories should refer to the Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines, 3<SUP>rd</SUP> Edition, 2004 for a complete listing of the biosafety requirements.

H5N1 viruses capable of efficient human-to-human transmission, including via aerosols or the airborne route, are considered Risk Group 4 human pathogens and require Containment Level 4 physical containment and operational practices.
<TABLE class="widthFull whiteBG" border=1><THEAD class=bg-colour-grey-light><TR><TH id=t1-1 rowSpan=2>Sample Type and Activity</TH><TH id=t1-5 colSpan=3>Minimum Containment Level Requirements</TH></TR><TR><TH id=t1-2>CL2</TH><TH id=t1-3>CL3</TH><TH id=t1-4>CL4</TH></TR></THEAD><TBODY><TR><TH id=t1-6 class=alignLeft>Non-Proliferative Clinical/ Diagnostic Activities</TH><TD class=alignMiddleCenter colSpan=3 headers="t1-6 t1-5 t1-2 t1-3 t1-4">Not in circulation at this time see Section 3</TD></TR><TR><TH id=t1-7 class=alignLeft>Work Involving Positive Cultures </TH><TD headers="t1-7 t1-5 t1-2"></TD><TD headers="t1-7 t1-5 t1-3"></TD><TD class=alignMiddleCenter headers="t1-7 t1-5 t1-4">●</TD></TR><TR><TH id=t1-8 class=alignLeft>In Vivo Work</TH><TD headers="t1-8 t1-5 t1-2"></TD><TD headers="t1-8 t1-5 t1-3"></TD><TD class=alignMiddleCenter headers="t1-8 t1-5 t1-4">●</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>
3. Additional Risk Considerations

If an efficiently transmissible H5N1 virus was introduced into circulation, a risk assessment would be necessary to determine the regulatory requirements for different types of work, such as non-proliferative clinical/ diagnostic activities.

4. Transportation

Packaging, shipping and transport of specimens containing RG4 pathogens require specific instructions and procedures in accordance with the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulations, Transport Canada. For information on how to transport RG4 pathogens please contact the National Microbiological Laboratory (<ABBR title="National Microbiological Laboratory">NML</ABBR>) at Jay.Krishnan@phac-aspc.gc.ca or Carol.Stansfield@phac-aspc.gc.ca, or contact the 24/7 emergency phone line at (204) 999-7996 due to the stringent notification practices involved.

5. Contact Information

Please note that this advisory is based on currently available scientific evidence and is subject to review and change as new information becomes available. Further biosafety information may be obtained from the <ABBR title="Public Health Agency of Canada">PHAC</ABBR> Pathogen Regulation Directorate, on our website at: Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity or at (613) 957-1779, fax (613) 941-0596 and by email: biosafety_biosecurity@phac-aspc.gc.ca.

http://origin.phac-aspc.gc.ca/lab-bio/res/advi-avis/sbn-asb-2012-01-31-eng.php

[sharon sanders]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

I have posted the latest papers and blogs on this subject. I have posted only snips where there is not expressed consent to copy the entire article. Several papers are published in their entirety because they are open access.

I am greatly dismayed by the tenor of recent comments by some of the participants in this debate. Casting insults is not productive.

I agree mostly with JJackson. Thanks Jonathan for your comments.