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Source: ProMed
Archive Number 20110825.2590
Published Date 25-AUG-2011
Subject PRO/EDR> Chemical weapons - Syria: alert
CHEMICAL WEAPONS - SYRIA: ALERT
*******************************
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
Date: Tue 23 Aug 2011
Source: Foreign Policy [edited]
As Syria descends into chaos, its stockpiles of chemical weaponry
could turn into a proliferation nightmare.
The continued unrest in Syria, coupled with US President Barack
Obama's call for President Bashar al-Assad to leave power, has thrown
the future of the country into flux. Among the most troubling
uncertainties is the fate of Syria's chemical weapons arsenal, which,
if not protected properly, could fall into the wrong hands, with
catastrophic results.
Syria is one of a handful of states that the US government believes
possess large stocks of chemical agents in militarized form -- that
is, ready for use in artillery shells and bombs. The arsenal is
thought to be massive, involving thousands of munitions and many tons
of chemical agents, which range, according to CIA annual reports to
Congress, from the blister gases of World War I -- such as mustard gas
-- to advanced nerve agents such as sarin and possibly persistent
nerve agents, such as VX gas.
In the hands of Assad -- and his father Hafez before him -- these
weapons have been an ace-in-the-hole deterrent against Israel's
nuclear capability. The Assad regime, however, has never openly
brandished this capability: It did not employ chemical weapons in the
1982 Lebanon War against Israel, even after Israeli warplanes
decimated the Syrian Air Force. Nor have they been deployed, or their
use threatened, in attempting to bring Assad's current domestic
antagonists to heel. And although Syria is accused of providing
powerful missiles to Hezbollah, including some of a type that carried
chemical warfare agents in the Soviet arsenal, Assad has not
reportedly transferred lethal chemical capabilities to the
Lebanon-based Shiite organization.
So despite their many faults and deplorable record on human rights,
the Assads have treated their chemical arsenal with considerable care.
But as the country potentially descends into chaos, will that hold
true?
Let's start with the possibility of civil war. According to
researchers at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
open sources indicate that there are at least 4, and potentially 5,
chemical weapons production facilities in Syria. One or 2 are located
near Damascus, the other 3 situated in Hama, Latakia, and al-Safir
village, near the city of Aleppo. Hama is one of the hotbeds of the
Syrian revolt, which Assad's tanks attacked in early August [2011] and
where, more recently, fighting has severely damaged the city's
hospitals. Latakia is another center of unrest; it was shelled by the
Syrian Navy in mid-August [2011]. Aleppo, Syria's 2nd-largest city,
has also seen significant demonstrations.
If anti-Assad insurgents take up arms, the chemical sites, as symbols
of the regime's authority, could become strategic targets. And, if
mass defections occur from the Syrian army, there may be no one left
to defend the sites against seizure. This could lead to disastrous
outcomes, including confiscation of the chemical weapons by a radical
new national government or sale of the weapons as war booty to
organized nonstate actors or criminal groups.
In such chaos, no one can predict who might control the weapons or
where they might be taken. With these chemical weapons in the hands of
those engaged in a possible civil war, the risks that they would be
used would increase substantially. The problem would be worsened
further if some possessors were not fully aware of the extent of the
weapons' deadly effects.
And let's imagine that Assad is eventually removed: What leaders would
gain control of these weapons after he departed? Saudi-backed Sunni
groups? Iranian-backed Shiite organizations? Whoever they might be, it
is unclear that the newcomers would follow the Assads' cautious-use
doctrine and refusal to share chemical weapons with nonstate groups,
or that the new leaders would be able to maintain strict security
measures at the chemical sites.
Meanwhile, it's possible that an existential threat will cause the
Assad regime to abandon its previous policy of restraint regarding
chemical weapons. It is not a huge leap from attacking civilians with
tank fire, machine guns, and naval artillery to deploying poison gas,
and the shock effect and sense of dread engendered by even limited use
could quash a citywide uprising within an hour.
The options available to the United States to minimize these risks are
limited at best. Washington has certainly warned Assad against using
the weapons domestically. But with Assad already at risk of indictment
for crimes against humanity, and given his likely belief that the
United States will not intervene militarily due to its commitments
elsewhere -- including its politically unpopular and still opaque
involvement in Libya -- US warnings may have little deterrent effect.
[Byline: Leonard Spector]
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
[One of the real concerns in regard to these failing countries is the
uncontrolled weapons acquisitions by both individual rebels and by
their organisations. These could well be passed on to others whether
inside the country or in the region, adding to the unrest and
disequilibrium. If we add weaponised chemical stocks to this scenario
it has the potential to go from a worried concern to a nightmare.
For the inexperienced, these chemicals are dangerous to handle. So we
can expect that they may be tracked by lethal accidents and spillages.
So, we need to be alert. To quote this article: "... according to CIA
annual reports to Congress, from the blister gases of World War I --
such as mustard gas -- to advanced nerve agents such as sarin and
possibly persistent nerve agents, such as VX gas." - Mod.MHJ
The locations mentioned in the article above can be seen on the
HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map of Syria at
. - Sr.Tech.Ed.MJ]
[see also:
Ricin - International BT alert 20110816.2487
1999
----
Sarin gas, sequelae - Japan (Tokyo) (02) 19990327.0480
Sarin gas sequelae - Japan (Tokyo) 19990203.0157]
.................................................m hj/mj/dk
*################################################# #########*
************************************************** **********
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
************************************************** **********
Donate to ProMED-mail. Details available at:
************************************************** **********
Visit ProMED-mail's web site at .
Send all items for posting to: promed@promedmail.org (NOT to
an individual moderator). If you do not give your full name
name and affiliation, it may not be posted. You may unsub-
scribe at .
For assistance from a human being, send mail to:
.
################################################## ##########
################################################## ##########
Archive Number 20110825.2590
Published Date 25-AUG-2011
Subject PRO/EDR> Chemical weapons - Syria: alert
CHEMICAL WEAPONS - SYRIA: ALERT
*******************************
A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
Date: Tue 23 Aug 2011
Source: Foreign Policy [edited]
As Syria descends into chaos, its stockpiles of chemical weaponry
could turn into a proliferation nightmare.
The continued unrest in Syria, coupled with US President Barack
Obama's call for President Bashar al-Assad to leave power, has thrown
the future of the country into flux. Among the most troubling
uncertainties is the fate of Syria's chemical weapons arsenal, which,
if not protected properly, could fall into the wrong hands, with
catastrophic results.
Syria is one of a handful of states that the US government believes
possess large stocks of chemical agents in militarized form -- that
is, ready for use in artillery shells and bombs. The arsenal is
thought to be massive, involving thousands of munitions and many tons
of chemical agents, which range, according to CIA annual reports to
Congress, from the blister gases of World War I -- such as mustard gas
-- to advanced nerve agents such as sarin and possibly persistent
nerve agents, such as VX gas.
In the hands of Assad -- and his father Hafez before him -- these
weapons have been an ace-in-the-hole deterrent against Israel's
nuclear capability. The Assad regime, however, has never openly
brandished this capability: It did not employ chemical weapons in the
1982 Lebanon War against Israel, even after Israeli warplanes
decimated the Syrian Air Force. Nor have they been deployed, or their
use threatened, in attempting to bring Assad's current domestic
antagonists to heel. And although Syria is accused of providing
powerful missiles to Hezbollah, including some of a type that carried
chemical warfare agents in the Soviet arsenal, Assad has not
reportedly transferred lethal chemical capabilities to the
Lebanon-based Shiite organization.
So despite their many faults and deplorable record on human rights,
the Assads have treated their chemical arsenal with considerable care.
But as the country potentially descends into chaos, will that hold
true?
Let's start with the possibility of civil war. According to
researchers at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
open sources indicate that there are at least 4, and potentially 5,
chemical weapons production facilities in Syria. One or 2 are located
near Damascus, the other 3 situated in Hama, Latakia, and al-Safir
village, near the city of Aleppo. Hama is one of the hotbeds of the
Syrian revolt, which Assad's tanks attacked in early August [2011] and
where, more recently, fighting has severely damaged the city's
hospitals. Latakia is another center of unrest; it was shelled by the
Syrian Navy in mid-August [2011]. Aleppo, Syria's 2nd-largest city,
has also seen significant demonstrations.
If anti-Assad insurgents take up arms, the chemical sites, as symbols
of the regime's authority, could become strategic targets. And, if
mass defections occur from the Syrian army, there may be no one left
to defend the sites against seizure. This could lead to disastrous
outcomes, including confiscation of the chemical weapons by a radical
new national government or sale of the weapons as war booty to
organized nonstate actors or criminal groups.
In such chaos, no one can predict who might control the weapons or
where they might be taken. With these chemical weapons in the hands of
those engaged in a possible civil war, the risks that they would be
used would increase substantially. The problem would be worsened
further if some possessors were not fully aware of the extent of the
weapons' deadly effects.
And let's imagine that Assad is eventually removed: What leaders would
gain control of these weapons after he departed? Saudi-backed Sunni
groups? Iranian-backed Shiite organizations? Whoever they might be, it
is unclear that the newcomers would follow the Assads' cautious-use
doctrine and refusal to share chemical weapons with nonstate groups,
or that the new leaders would be able to maintain strict security
measures at the chemical sites.
Meanwhile, it's possible that an existential threat will cause the
Assad regime to abandon its previous policy of restraint regarding
chemical weapons. It is not a huge leap from attacking civilians with
tank fire, machine guns, and naval artillery to deploying poison gas,
and the shock effect and sense of dread engendered by even limited use
could quash a citywide uprising within an hour.
The options available to the United States to minimize these risks are
limited at best. Washington has certainly warned Assad against using
the weapons domestically. But with Assad already at risk of indictment
for crimes against humanity, and given his likely belief that the
United States will not intervene militarily due to its commitments
elsewhere -- including its politically unpopular and still opaque
involvement in Libya -- US warnings may have little deterrent effect.
[Byline: Leonard Spector]
--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
[One of the real concerns in regard to these failing countries is the
uncontrolled weapons acquisitions by both individual rebels and by
their organisations. These could well be passed on to others whether
inside the country or in the region, adding to the unrest and
disequilibrium. If we add weaponised chemical stocks to this scenario
it has the potential to go from a worried concern to a nightmare.
For the inexperienced, these chemicals are dangerous to handle. So we
can expect that they may be tracked by lethal accidents and spillages.
So, we need to be alert. To quote this article: "... according to CIA
annual reports to Congress, from the blister gases of World War I --
such as mustard gas -- to advanced nerve agents such as sarin and
possibly persistent nerve agents, such as VX gas." - Mod.MHJ
The locations mentioned in the article above can be seen on the
HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map of Syria at
. - Sr.Tech.Ed.MJ]
[see also:
Ricin - International BT alert 20110816.2487
1999
----
Sarin gas, sequelae - Japan (Tokyo) (02) 19990327.0480
Sarin gas sequelae - Japan (Tokyo) 19990203.0157]
.................................................m hj/mj/dk
*################################################# #########*
************************************************** **********
ProMED-mail makes every effort to verify the reports that
are posted, but the accuracy and completeness of the
information, and of any statements or opinions based
thereon, are not guaranteed. The reader assumes all risks in
using information posted or archived by ProMED-mail. ISID
and its associated service providers shall not be held
responsible for errors or omissions or held liable for any
damages incurred as a result of use or reliance upon posted
or archived material.
************************************************** **********
Donate to ProMED-mail. Details available at:
************************************************** **********
Visit ProMED-mail's web site at .
Send all items for posting to: promed@promedmail.org (NOT to
an individual moderator). If you do not give your full name
name and affiliation, it may not be posted. You may unsub-
scribe at .
For assistance from a human being, send mail to:
.
################################################## ##########
################################################## ##########