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  • CIDRAP- Role of wild birds in US H5N2 outbreaks questioned

    Source: http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-persp...aks-questioned

    Role of wild birds in US H5N2 outbreaks questioned
    Filed Under:
    Avian Influenza (Bird Flu)
    Robert Roos | News Editor | CIDRAP News
    |
    Mar 18, 2015

    The notion that wild birds played a key role in bringing highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses from Asia to western North America and more recently to the Midwest has been implicit in government statements about recent outbreaks. But some wildlife disease experts are warning against jumping to easy conclusions.

    The story goes back to last November and December, when an HPAI H5N2 virus struck several poultry farms in southern British Columbia. Those outbreaks triggered increased surveillance for avian flu in the United States, and a matching virus showed up in December in a wild northern pintail duck in northwestern Washington state. At the same time, a Eurasian strain of H5N8 virus was found in a captive gyrfalcon in the same area.

    Subsequently the H5N2 virus surfaced in several backyard poultry flocks and wild birds in Oregon and Idaho as well as Washington. And this month it popped up on a western Minnesota turkey farm and shortly afterward on two Missouri turkey farms, an Arkansas turkey farm, and a backyard flock in Kansas. The H5N2 strain is described as a product of mixing (reassortment) between the Eurasian H5N8 virus and native North American avian flu viruses.

    In a Mar 11 announcement about the Arkansas outbreak, the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) said, "These virus strains can travel in wild birds without them appearing sick. People should avoid contact with sick/dead poultry or wildlife."

    Last week the USDA reported that the Minnesota, Missouri, and Arkansas H5N2 isolates looked more than 99% similar to the Washington pintail duck virus, based on partial genetic sequencing of the virus's hemagglutinin and neuraminidase proteins. The apparent implication was that migratory birds may have brought the virus to those states.

    Wild bird chase?

    But not so fast, say experts like David Stallknecht, PhD, of the University of Georgia's College of Veterinary Medicine, and Michele Carstensen, PhD, wildlife health program supervisor in the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR). They point out, among other things, that migratory birds don't migrate from west to east or from north to south in late winter.
    "This could all have been from wild birds?nobody can say it's impossible," said Stallknecht. "But we do need some proof. . . . People seem to be willing to accept things without a whole lot of proof."
    He said it is unknown how the H5N8 strain that gave rise to H5N2 reached North America. Noting that the H5N2 outbreaks in British Columbia marked the "index case" or first appearance of the virus, he said, "How much proof do we have of wild bird involvement with that virus in North America? None."
    Referring to the mixing of H5N8 with North American viruses, he said, "Why do we make the jump to wild ducks to explain this? Reassortment could also occur in a backyard flock of domestic ducks after a more direct introduction [of H5N8] via people." He suggested that travelers could possibly have brought the virus to Canada from Asia.
    He cautioned that this is "pure speculation," but added that the idea that wild birds introduced the parental H5N8 virus to North America is also speculative. "It is based on circumstantial evidence that is rapidly becoming accepted dogma."
    Carstensen said the notion that wild birds could have brought the H5N2 virus from Minnesota to Missouri is "beyond me. . . . They [migratory birds] go from south to north this time of year." Arkansas and Kansas, on the other hand, are close enough to migratory-bird wintering grounds to make a connection with wild birds more plausible, she added.
    There could be "totally different causes" for the outbreaks in Minnesota and the more southerly states, Carstensen suggested.
    Two positive tests in Minnesota

    She and her colleagues have been testing fecal samples from wild birds found near the site of the outbreak in western Minnesota. A total of 148 samples, in three batches, have been tested for the presence of any avian flu virus. Only 2, both from mallards, tested positive, but the viral subtypes were not determined, she reported today. The samples have been sent to a USDA lab for the subtype determination.
    If the viruses turn out to be H5 or H7 strains, their pathogenicity will be determined, which would take several weeks, Carstensen said. She noted that a number of H5 and H7 viruses were found in Minnesota wild birds in recent years, but they were all of low pathogenicity.
    Even if wild birds did bring the H5N2 virus to Minnesota, she said, "It still has to get from the birds to the farm. The birds don't go there; it would have to be people or vehicles. The farm doesn't have any reports of waterfowl there at all."
    Stallknecht said that whether the source of the virus was wild birds or human activity makes no difference in how to respond to and control the virus, but it does make a difference in other ways.
    "Biosecurity is everything now, regardless of the source," he said via e-mail. "With regard to future risks for introductions of exotic viruses (flu or otherwise), however, it might be nice to know what really happened here."
    See also:
    Mar 11 CIDRAP News story on Arkansas outbreak
    Mar 6 USDA report to World Organization for Animal Health on Minnesota H5N2 outbreak
    Mar 10 CIDRAP News story on second Missouri outbreak
    USDA list of recent HPAI detections in wild birds
    USDA avian flu update page with summary of recent findings

  • #2
    "How much proof do we have of wild bird involvement with that virus in North America? None."
    " He suggested that travelers could possibly have brought the virus to Canada from Asia.
    He cautioned that this is "pure speculation," but added that the idea that wild birds introduced the parental H5N8 virus to North America is also speculative. "It is based on circumstantial evidence that is rapidly becoming accepted dogma."
    It's good to see some scientists are questioning this 'dogma.' Gsgs observed an evolutionary freeze and compares it to a case in Europe where human movements were likely responsible.

    https://flutrackers.com/forum/forum/...295#post724295

    Here's a caution against blaming wild birds back in 2006:

    http://scienceblogs.com/grrlscientis...a-story-about/
    _____________________________________________

    Ask Congress to Investigate COVID Origins and Government Response to Pandemic.

    i love myself. the quietest. simplest. most powerful. revolution ever. ---- nayyirah waheed

    "...there’s an obvious contest that’s happening between different sectors of the colonial ruling class in this country. And they would, if they could, lump us into their beef, their struggle." ---- Omali Yeshitela, African People’s Socialist Party

    (My posts are not intended as advice or professional assessments of any kind.)
    Never forget Excalibur.

    Comment


    • #3
      > Last week the USDA reported that the Minnesota, Missouri, and Arkansas H5N2 isolates
      > looked more than 99% similar to the Washington pintail duck virus, based on partial genetic
      > sequencing of the virus's hemagglutinin and neuraminidase proteins. The apparent implication
      > was that migratory birds may have brought the virus to those states.

      as a rule of thumb, expect about 50 mutations in such new H5 avian strains in the genome
      per year, which is 0.38%, so 99% similar is no surprise and doesn't tell much, you have
      to be more precise.

      > "This could all have been from wild birds?nobody can say it's impossible," said Stallknecht

      ... and Robert Roos made the headline : Role of wild birds in US H5N2 outbreaks questioned
      that wild birds brought Asian H5 to America is not being questioned, afaik
      The subsequent spread inside USA is still unresolved, at least in public.
      Stallknecht may have some additional evidence, additional sequences, we don't know.

      > He said it is unknown how the H5N8 strain that gave rise to H5N2 reached North America.
      > Noting that the H5N2 outbreaks in British Columbia marked the "index case" or first
      > appearance of the virus, he said, "How much proof do we have of wild bird involvement
      > with that virus in North America? None."

      no "proof", but evidence. If "proof" comes in portions ("how much") then I'd say that there
      is quite some proof. Meaning, that I'd bet Stallknecht that this will be generally accepted
      within the next years.

      > Reassortment could also occur in a backyard flock of domestic ducks

      but this is much less likely. Reassortment in American mallard sequences is frequent,
      reassortment in American poultry is rare. Introduction of mallard viruses into poultry
      is rare - how much rarer is introduction of 2 different strains into poultry at the
      same time, so they can reassort ?

      > He suggested that travelers could possibly have brought the virus to Canada from Asia.

      then, why are there so many mutations ? Where are the Asian viruses being close to the traveler's ?
      How the reassortment with American wild bird origin sequences ? It doesn't make sense.
      And I assume that Stallknecht knows this. So, why does he make such statements ?

      > "It still has to get from the birds to the farm. The birds don't go there; it would have
      > to be people or vehicles.

      the birds don't go, they fly. And they leave droppings. Compare with the Dutch surveillance
      after the H5N8 in Europe. They have the matching sequences from wild birds and poultry.
      99.9%, not just 99%.




















      I'm interested in expert panflu damage estimates
      my current links: http://bit.ly/hFI7H ILI-charts: http://bit.ly/CcRgT

      Comment


      • #4
        emily, no "freeze" in H5N2 or H5N8, afaik. That thread which you quoted was from early 2015
        and the possible freeze was about the Korea sequences, not the American.
        In contrary, there are some more mutations in American H5N8/H5N2 than I'd expected.
        These freezes are rare and usually freezed strains don't establish and evolve.
        Often they are just some sequencing or dating error.
        The Bernard Mathews / Hungary virus was just a striking example
        for a well documented and tested freeze. I don't remember
        any similar case ... well, we had a few strange Chinese sequences
        from sparrows and pikas or Vietnamese from eggshells,
        also one from Thailand afair.
        Then we had that slow evolution, se the thread in my workroom,
        i.e. in segment 1 1975-2000, which _did_ establish in H5N1 evolution/origin.
        I'm interested in expert panflu damage estimates
        my current links: http://bit.ly/hFI7H ILI-charts: http://bit.ly/CcRgT

        Comment


        • #5
          sorry in french,

          vu ce qui se passe en France, il est s?r qu'aussi longtemps que les maillons primaires de la production aviaire ne serons pas s?r et que les citoyens n'aurons pas ?t? correctement ?clair?s, il ne faut jamais ?voquer la situation des animaux sauvages.


          Le dossier des influenzas est le sujet pour aborder le concept de "one health" et franchement vu le comportement des humains , des humains des corps m?dicaux, des premiers maillons des producteurs de volailles, de la non information des citoyens sur les dangers, les animaux sauvages :


          c'est plus une partie de la solution que le probl?me ...


          La solution est soci?tale et mondiale, mais cela existe une soci?t? et un ensemble de soci?t? , apte, ? ce stade, ? regarder sainement ce type de dossier?



          L'O.M.S, l'O.I.E et la F.A.O devraient avoir honte ...



          le pire , ? mon sens, c'est le C.D.C, car, vu les moyens ? disposition, depuis aussi longtemps, pourquoi en est-on encore ? ce stade ?



          ? moins qu'il faille admettre que les influenzas sont devenus une rente de situation de bien des institutions ...

          Comment


          • #6
            if it transmits from farm to farm, then you would expect some mutations that first
            appeared on one farm (while some other poultry on that farm did not have it)
            and then the same mutation also appears on another farm later.
            I have not seen that yet with H5N8/H5N2
            Those who are against the wild-bird-spreading-theory have an opportunity
            here to find some real evidence ...
            I'm interested in expert panflu damage estimates
            my current links: http://bit.ly/hFI7H ILI-charts: http://bit.ly/CcRgT

            Comment


            • #7
              on sait quoi du portage des canards d'?levage US:


              Pekins are the most popular type of duck in North America for Commercial Meat Duck Production. Breeding stock from France is imported to give our customers the most efficient, meaty and profitable duck. Pekins are the fastest growing breed and dress very well after processing because of their white feathers. These birds are successfully used by some of our customers for pasture grown ducks. They are not bred for this type of growing, but do well due to the natural hardiness and disease resistance of all ducks.

              Buy different Duck Breeds online from Metzer Farm. We have live ducks and baby ducklings for sale online. Find the best duck breeds depending if you want a duck specifically for egg or meat production, foraging, show duck, or a pet.


              il a ?t? mis quoi en oeuvre en terme de mesures de bios?cutit? suite aux ?v?nements sur dinde ?

              Comment


              • #8
                Originally posted by gsgs View Post
                if it transmits from farm to farm, then you would expect some mutations that first
                appeared on one farm (while some other poultry on that farm did not have it)
                and then the same mutation also appears on another farm later.
                I have not seen that yet with H5N8/H5N2
                Those who are against the wild-bird-spreading-theory have an opportunity
                here to find some real evidence ...

                In the section on the genetics of the Clade 2.3.4.4 HPAI H5N2/H5N8 viruses found in the US, the Epi Report (July, 2015 version) released by the USDA said: "Turkey H5N2 viruses from AR, IA, MN, ND, SD, and WI contain a change in the HA1 protein at a putative antigenic site (HA S141P; numbering per mature H5 HA) (Table 11); such substitutions may be more easily sustained in small virus populations (e.g. poultry flock) but may or may not persist." i.e. the virus found in some of the farms share closer genetic relationships than to wild birds. Table 35 of the report has a nice breakdown of the mutations and whether the virus came from chicken/turkey or wild sources.

                The complete report can be downloaded here: http://bit.ly/1MpNiWu

                The above is not to say that wild birds did not have a role in the spread of the virus. The same USDA report also noted: "Molecular analysis suggests that independent introductions and ?common source? exposures are occurring in several States concurrently."




                Comment


                • #9
                  Welcome Hon!

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    I updated my genbank download on 2016/03/24


                    gb160324 , 436334 sequences
                    gb160324.a , 393705 sequences
                    gb160324.b , 41221 sequences
                    gb160324.c , 1026 sequences
                    gb150324,r , 382 sequences
                    gb160324,ra , 363 sequences
                    gb160324.rb , 19sequences
                    gb160324.d , 39 sequences
                    gb160324.av , 143654 sequences
                    gb160324.hu , 226962 sequences
                    gb160324.sw , 49547 sequences
                    gb160324.eq , 7468 sequences
                    gb160324.re , 8703 sequences

                    bitsh1 , 16196 - 17050 sequences (Avian+rest)
                    bitsh2 , 16190 - 17069(aligned) sequences
                    bitsh3 , 16137 - 17044 sequences
                    bitsh4 , 26488 sequences
                    bitsh5 , 15780 - 16643 sequences
                    bitsh6 , 19471 sequences
                    bitsh7 , 16907 - 18091 sequences
                    bitsh8 , 16485 - 13919+3584 sequences

                    4:1019+596+3089+2113+6930+2207+2783+184+6839+1166+ 686+286+204+21+16+117=28256
                    6:5294+5744+1375+346+450+2523+1049+2246+1420=20447

                    ----------------------------------------
                    143654 - 103400(45961)




                    potentially problematic: file,nr,access,length,my segment (typesz1), gb-segment
                    a,136927,EU333950,453,2,6
                    a,144146,EF660197,450,2,4
                    a,275489,DQ234276,460,B,7
                    a,286980,AY664802,477,7,1
                    a,289924,DQ118295,407,1,5
                    b,024701,GU064893,251,A:H5,6
                    ra,9,CQ840447,23,1,7
                    ra,10,CQ840478,23,8,7
                    rb,2,CQ840457,20,-,7


                    ------------------================================================== ============

                    H5N8,H5N2 in North America :
                    85+(18+62)+78+85+(23+63)+(21+70)+81+82 sequences,
                    including the 8 index sequences for the 8 segments

                    23177 58c1.ll1 85 85
                    5080 58c2.ll1 18 80
                    16823 58c2.ll2 62
                    21230 58c3.ll1 78 78
                    24353 58c4.ll1 85 85
                    6889 58c5.ll1 23 86
                    16538 58c5.ll2 63
                    5861 58c6.ll1 21 91
                    19546 58c6.ll2 70
                    22867 58c7.ll1 89-8 81
                    24605 58c8.ll1 98-16 82



                    it looks mainly like spread by wild birds :
                    to most poultry variants they found a matching wild-bird sequence

                    Snow Goose/Missouri
                    Canada Goose/Kansas
                    Bald Eagle/Idaho
                    Cooper's Hawk/Minnesota
                    Snowy Owl/Wisconsin

                    I'm interested in expert panflu damage estimates
                    my current links: http://bit.ly/hFI7H ILI-charts: http://bit.ly/CcRgT

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      merci,

                      d?sol? en fran?ais:

                      mon impression est que les souches, dite hyper-virulentes, sur certains sujets d'?levage s?lectionn?s ne sont pas tr?s stables dans la Nature. Plus cela est s?v?re, moins cela a des chances de pouvoir perdurer et surtout se d?placer.


                      Les souches plus stables, donc moins virulentes pour l'esp?ce v?hicule, circulent dans les faunes sauvages et ont des pics de pr?sence en fonction du comportement de reproduction et ou de migration. Quand la population est porteuse, il y a bien une phase de contamination et donc d'acquisition de l'immunit? et ou du statut de portage sain.


                      Lorsque l'on introduit dans un environnement particulier une souche dite peu virulente, les techniques d'?levage, dont la concentration ( en agriculture biologique ou pas d'ailleurs) , permettent une gigantesque multiplication virale avec ou sans symptome, car elle atteint une population sans immunit? pour ce virus:


                      Dans ce cas, la chance de l'apparition d'une souche plus probl?matique est plus proche de 1 que de z?ro. Ceci me fait dire que les populations d'?levage sont plus les lieux ou l'?mergence d'un pathog?ne plus probl?matique peut advenir surtout si on souhaite que pendant au moins deux mois les animaux soient dehors, sans immunit?.


                      Cela me fait penser au dossier listeria monocytog?nes.


                      Les mesures d'hygi?ne ne sont et ne serons qu'une partie de la solution.


                      Maintenant si les techniques de qualification des unit?s de s?lection et de multiplication ne sont pas correctes, donc si elles ne portent pas sur tous les influenzas et que l'homme amplifie la circulation naturelle par le commerce, cela va devenir totalement ing?rable. La circulation peut se faire par une autre esp?ce.


                      En France, on a eu droit il y a peu ? un film:

                      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w_ZF...layer_embedded



                      Le couvoir de la Bidouze est orienté vers la production de canetons mulets issus de vielle race de canards. Le canard Criard, Kriaxera en Basque, Cridassé en Gascon.


                      la non connaissance de la technique de qualification de son unit? par l'accouveur pr?sent?, ? ce stade de la crise en France, cela me semble terrorisant:


                      c'est quoi un professionnel ?


                      il est urgent de mettre un peu de science dans ce dossier , notamment, pour rassurer ceux qui y travaillent.




                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Bonjour bertrand789. La plupart d'entre nous peut lire fran?ais.

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          merci,

                          alors je vous offre cela ( peut ?tre cela doit ?tre d?plac?, mais je ne sais pas faire )

                          on vient de signaler ceci:


                          Pr?l?vements effectu?s in the cadre de surveillance de la ProgrammeE Sur une Bande de 700 oies reproductrices.
                          Le LNR a confirm? la pr?sence du virus H5N3 Faiblement pathog?ne.

                          H5N3
                          http://www.oie.int/wahis_2/public/wa...reportid=19992



                          mince, vu ceci:

                          sachant qu'il a ?t? d?velopp? :

                          - des vaccins virus vivant



                          mais aussi cela:

                          _des vaccins virus vecteur vivant





                          et ce que l'on sait du commerce de la g?n?tique animale,

                          ce pauvre producteur a un troupeau atteint par une souche naturelle p^r?sente dans l'environnement ( aucune donn?e accessible, ? ce stade) ou une souche vaccinale .


                          J'ai cherch? ? savoir ce matin, mais c'est secret d?fense...


                          Il me semble urgent que les vrais scientifiques ?clairent ces dossiers rapidement ...



                          En tout cas un pauvre laborantin, sans bibliographie pertinente accessible peut , il me semble, faire bien des erreurs.


                          amicalement
                          Bertrand







                          University of Florida, Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences Extension outreach is a partnership between state, federal, and county governments to provide scientific knowledge and expertise to the public. The University of Florida (UF), together with Florida A&M University (FAMU), administers the Florida Cooperative Extension Service.




                          Comment


                          • #14

                            bertrand, je ne suis pas s?r de ce que vous voulez dire.
                            le commerce de la volaille est un danger particulier pour le d?veloppement de nouvelles souches dangereuses?
                            Eh bien, ce tr?s fil, et l'histoire H5N1 est plus sur le danger de
                            ?volution chez les oiseaux sauvages.
                            Chez les volailles, nous voyons souvent la conversion de la mutation ? faible parcours -> haute-pat, cependant.
                            [Mais en France, je pense que la mutation est arriv? chez les oiseaux sauvages, car il
                            sont 3 NAs diff?rents - France devrait publier les s?quences! ]
                            Nous avons eu la discussion sur la vaccination des volailles par le virus H5N1 plus t?t.
                            Il a ?t? controvers?, principalement parce que le virus H5N1 serait plus difficile
                            pour d?tecter dans les troupeaux vaccin?s, affaire.
                            Et oui, je me souviens il y avait aussi une souche en Egypte et un en Chine
                            qui est soup?onn? d'avoir acquis beaucoup de mutations ? cause de la vaccination.

                            ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                            bertrand, I'm not sure what you want to say.
                            Poultry trade is a special danger for the development of new dangerous strains ?
                            Well, this very thread, and the H5N1 history is more about the danger of
                            evolution in wild birds.
                            In poultry we often see the conversion-mutation low-path --> high-pat , though.
                            [But in France, I think that mutation happened in wild birds, since there
                            are 3 different NAs - France should publish the sequences ! ]

                            We had the discussion about vaccinating poultry with H5N1 earlier.
                            It was controversial, mainly because H5N1 would be more difficult
                            to detect in vaccinated flocks, afair.
                            And yes, I remember there was also a strain in Egypt and one in China
                            that is suspected to have acquired lots of mutations due to vaccination.





                            ===============================================

                            translated with https://translate.google.com/

                            thank you, sorry in French:

                            my impression is that the stem, called hyper-virulent, some breeding topics selected are not
                            very stable in nature. It is more severe, the less it is likely to be able to continue and especially
                            moving.
                            The most stable strains, so less virulent species for vehicle circulating in wild fauna and the
                            presence of peaks depending on the reproductive behavior or migration. When the population
                            is infected, there is much contamination phase and therefore acquisition of immunity and or
                            status of healthy carrier.
                            When introduced into a special environment called a mild strain, breeding techniques,
                            the concentration (in organic farming or not elsewhere), allow a massive viral replication
                            with or without symptom because it reaches a population no immunity for this virus:
                            In this case, the chance of the emergence of a more problematic strain is closer to 1 than zero.
                            This makes me say that breeding populations are more places or the emergence of a more
                            problematic pathogen can happen especially if you want that for at least two months the
                            animals are outside without immunity.
                            This reminds me of Listeria monocytogenes folder.
                            The hygiene is not and will be part of the solution.
                            Now if the technical qualification of selection and multiplication units are not correct,
                            so if they do not cover all influenzas and man amplifies the natural circulation by trade,
                            it will become totally unmanageable. Traffic can be done by another species.
                            In France, it was right there just a movie:





                            not the knowledge of technical qualification of its unity by the hatchery presented at this
                            stage of the crisis in France, it seems terrifying:
                            What is a professional?
                            it is urgent to put some science on this issue, in particular, to reassure those who work there.

                            # 13 Today, 11:02 AMmerci,
                            then I offer it (maybe it should be moved, but I do not know how)

                            Samples taken in the ProgrammeE the supervisory framework On a strip of 700 breeding geese.
                            The NRL confirmed the presence of H5N3 Low pathogenic virus.

                            H5N3 http://www.oie.int/wahis_2/public/wa...reportid=19992

                            thin, saw this:
                            knowing that it was developed:
                            - Live virus vaccines

                            but also that:
                            _of live vector vaccine virus

                            and what is known of the trade of animal genetics,
                            poor producer has a herd reaches a natural p ^ r?sente strain in the environment
                            (no available data at this point) or a vaccine strain.
                            I tried to find out this morning, but it's top secret ...
                            It seems urgent that real scientists illuminate these files quickly ...
                            In any case a poor lab without access relevant bibliography can, it seems,
                            do many mistakes.
                            friendly Bertrand

                            A recreation and extension of the official K-State 2011 template.

                            [2015] Newcastle Disease Virus-Vectored H7 and H5 Live Vaccines Protect
                            Chickens from Challenge with H7N9 or H5N1 Avian Influenza Viruses

                            [2015] Poultry Vaccines for Use on Organic Farms
                            University of Florida, Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences Extension outreach is a partnership between state, federal, and county governments to provide scientific knowledge and expertise to the public. The University of Florida (UF), together with Florida A&M University (FAMU), administers the Florida Cooperative Extension Service.

                            [2008,2015] Investigating Vaccination Failure in Poultry Flocks1

                            [2015] Refining the approach to vaccines against influenza A viruses with pandemic potential
                            I'm interested in expert panflu damage estimates
                            my current links: http://bit.ly/hFI7H ILI-charts: http://bit.ly/CcRgT

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Merci,

                              le d?but de la crise, en France, vient en fait de ce bout de message ?voquant deux textes ? lire dans le d?tail:

                              voici l'article qui ?voquait les "grippes" non d?tect?es ni par les producteurs, ni les v?t?rinaires, dans les fili?res fois gras, notamment, bulgares
                              http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/1...irv.12368/epdf <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/irv.12368/epdf>


                              maintenant sur les choix strat?giques, il faut aller ici:


                              http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/dise...illance_en.htm <http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/diseases/controlmeasures/avian/eu_resp_surveillance_en.htm



                              je suis connu, il parait, de trois g?n?rations de veilleurs INRA. J'avais annonc? ce qui se produit en France suite aux publications chinoises et cor?ennes du C.D.C d'une qualit? rare sur les canards. Cela avait ?t? trait? avec le plus grand m?pris.

                              Quand je dis des choses c'est toujours en disposant des liens pour appuyer mes propos. Si j'ai un profond respect pour une structure comme l'O.I.E, bien des choses ont ?volu? et ?voluerons encore. Il me semble que la segmentation peu et hyper a certes un int?r?t mais a aussi bien des inconv?nients . Le commerce de canetons et d'oie , aux dires du premier document a permis la libre circulation au moins de faiblement pathog?nes, alors pourquoi cela ne se serait fait qu'entre la Bulgarie la Hongrie et la France ?



                              Cette crise a d?montr? que les certificats v?t?rinaires, depuis un certain nombre d'ann?es , qui permettent la circulation des animaux vivants et ou des oeufs embryonn?s et qui reposent sur la qualification du couvoir, avait une valeur que l'on peut mettre en doute .


                              Ces documents sont ?mis suite ? la qualification du couvoir d'origine et de ses fournisseurs, je cherche en vain la m?thode O.I.E de qualification de tels lieux en Europe , en France et dans le monde, bien s?r avec la d?marche pour des animaux sous s?questre et la d?marche pour des animaux avec parcours ext?rieur . En France on ?voque que ces lieux sont certifi?s. Si la certification vaut garantie , ce serait tr?s nouveau...


                              C'est le nombre de cas de d?tenteurs de reproducteurs et de couvoirs concern?s qui a justifi? les d?cisions actuelles.



                              Concernant la vaccination, j'ai ?crit que dans des lieux ou l'on sait que la faune sauvage est porteuse de x influenzas pour les animaux qui aurons un parcours ext?rieur de plus de deux mois , cela devrait ?tre plus envisag? . En tout cas si en France la crise des canards atteint les fili?res poulets de chair et poules pondeuses en ext?rieur ( r?ponse d?but juin) l'ambiance va ?tre d?testable...


                              Comme les virus animaux circulent soit par le commerce dit certifi?s et non contr?l?s, soit par les animaux sauvages avec une bien plus grande lenteur, il me semble raisonnable vu la surface du monde ou les vaccins sont d?ploy?s et visiblement pour tr?s longtemps d'?tre pr?t, ou m?me d'anticiper.

                              Certains rapprochements de leaders dans le monde des vaccins et du mat?riel indiquent que des d?cisions strat?giques sont en oeuvre ...

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