FAOAIDEnews
Avian Influenza Disease Emergency

Update on the Avian Influenza situation (As of 23/03/2004) – Issue no. 9

The information summarized below is gathered from official and non official sources, which are quoted in the text. AIDE news is prepared by the FAO Technical Task force on Avian Influenza.



New Topic: Assistance from other countries

Many donors have decided to commit emergency funds to help governments to control HPAI outbreaks in their respective countries. This assistance can be financial, in kind or through technical assistance. It appeared to several donors that it could be useful to gather information on the support provided. FAO has decided to collect this information through its representations in Asian countries and to publish it in AIDE news. The data presented in this issue (Annex 2) are most probably incomplete. However, we hope they give a first rough magnitude of donors' assistance. Furthermore, we wish to thank all donors and governments for their anticipated cooperation in providing additional and complementary information.

1. Summary of the situation

Avian Influenza (confirmed):

As of 23/03/04, Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) - H5N1 has been reported in Viet Nam, Thailand, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Japan, Republic of Korea, Indonesia and China. The number of countries affected remains the same since the last issue 8.

- **Republic of Korea**: New cases of bird flu were reported in Chickens at a farm in Yangju on 21/03/04. Chicken deaths have been reported since 04/03/04 in Yangiu but had been attributed to a liver disease. 400,000 chickens and ducks at 20 farms within a 3-kilometer radius have been culled in Yangju. Among wild birds tested in Republic of Korea (99 magpies and one crow), one magpie in Yangsan (near an infected farm reported in January) was found positive for avian influenza. (21/03/04 – source: newspaper websites)

- **Japan**: Three crows found dead in Kameoka city (Kyoto prefecture), and one of them found positive to avian Influenza virus. (17/03/04 – source: gphin, Japanese government and newspaper websites).

- **Indonesia**: Large areas in Sumatra and Kalimantan are suspected to be affected by the disease, and high mortalities in poultry have been reported in other islands such as Lombok, Sumbawa and Flores. Additional information on outbreak locations are required to have a better understanding of the disease situation in the country and ways of spreading. (March 2004 - source: FAO).

- **Thailand**: Avian influenza virus was detected in 3,000 chicken samples in Utradit, Chon Buri, and Chiang Rai provinces. More than 20,000 chicken deaths were also reported in Sansai district of Chiang Mai province. Currently 11 provinces are under surveillance: Chiang Rai, Chacherngsao, Kampangphet, Rai-Et, Khon Khaen, Uthaithani, Utradit, Chiang Mai, Ayudhya, Chon Buri and Nakonpathom provinces. (15/03/04 - source: gphin, FAO)

- **Cambodia**: Test results on samples taken from poultry in Siem Reap, Kandal and Takeo provinces on 21/02/04 were released on 17/03/04 and confirmed the presence of H5N1. (17/03/04 - source: gphin, FAO)

- **Viet Nam**: No new outbreak reported in poultry since 26/02/04. However a fatal human case of a 12-year-old boy was reported in Tay Ninh province (20/03/04 - source: ProMed, newspaper website, OIE).



Areas affected in Cambodia

- **Netherlands**: 22,000 chickens were culled at a farm in Uithuizermeeden (Eemsmond municipality, Groningen province) as a precautionary measure on 12/03/04 after routine test showed antibodies against avian influenza. No clinical signs were observed. 600 ducks were also culled at a farm in Lopik (Utrecht province) and 1000 birds at a farm in Steenbergen after test results indicated antibodies against avian influenza. (15/03/04 - source: gphin, ProMed, FAO)

Under investigation / rumours and suspicions / other information:

- **Mongolia**: 17 birds including 5 crows found dead around Erdenetsagaan soum county of Suhbaatar aymag province. Further information has been requested. (11/03/04 - source: gphin)

- **Japan**: Japan's National Institute of Animal Health studied the viruses found in one outbreak in South Korea (December 2003) and four in Japan (2004), the gene sequence of the viruses matched by more than 99 percent. (19/03/04 – source: MAFF press release)

Control strategies currently in implementation (see annex):

- Vaccination has been implemented in: China (Central & Southern areas), Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, and Pakistan. Preventive vaccination is planned in Myanmar (source: reported during the regional meeting).

2. Countries affected (as of 23/03/2004)

area	date declared to OIE	type	animals affected	human case	additional information	
					info.	source[1)]
Republic of Korea	17/12/03	H5N1	layer, duck; virus isolated: magpie	no		Government; web media
Viet Nam	8/01/04	H5N1	chicken, quail, duck, muscovik duck	yes		gphin[2)]
Japan	12/01/04	H5N1	chicken, crow	no		gphin, government
Taiwan province of China	20/01/04	H5N2	chicken, duck, pheasant	no	low pathogenic	gphin; meeting report
Thailand	23/01/04	H5N1	virus isolation: chicken, duck, goose, quail, turkey, stork	yes		gphin, FAO; government[3)]
Cambodia	24/01/04	H5N1	Chicken, duck, goose, turkey, guinea fowl, wild bird	no		FAO; government
Hong Kong SAR	26/01/04	H5N1	Peregrine falcon	no		gphin
Lao, PDR	27/01/04	H5N1	Chicken, duck and quail	no		FAO; government
Pakistan	28/01/04	H7N3 H9N2	layer	no	Only H7 is currently considered Highly Pathogenic	FAO; government
Indonesia	06/02/04	H5N1	Chicken, duck and quail	no	chicken have been dying since August	gphin, FAO; government
China	06/02/04	H5N1	virus isolation: chicken, duck, goose, quail, pigeon , pheasant, black swan	no		FAO; government

1) Official (OIE) and non official Information (ProMed, press agencies, FAO tracking systems…)
2) Gphin: Global Public Health Intelligence Network (Health Canada)
3) FAO; government: FAO representative in concurrence with Government sources

Continued:

area	date declared to OIE	type	animals affected	human case	additional information	
					info.	source[1)]
United States of America	11/02/04	H7N2	Chicken	no	Low pathogenic	**Delaware** Department of Agriculture Statement; FAO
		H2N2	Chicken	no	Low pathogenic	ProMed; **Pennsylvania** Department of agriculture website
	23/02/04	H5N2	Chicken	no	High pathogenic	**Texas** Animal Health Commission and USDA website; FAO
		H7	Chicken	no	conducting study	**Maryland** Department of Agriculture News Release; FAO
Canada	19/02/04	H7N3	Chicken	no	Low pathogenic	gphin[2)]
	09/03/04	H7N3	Chicken	no	High pathogenic	gphin
Netherlands			Chicken	no	antibody against avian influenza found	FAO; gphin

1) Official (OIE) and non official Information (ProMed, press agencies, FAO tracking systems…)
2) Gphin: Global Public Health Intelligence Network (Health Canada)

3. Actions taken – follow-up

FAO/OIE cautious about declaring victory over avian flu in Asia
~Virus still not under control despite improvements -in-depth investigations are crucial~
(FAO/OIE joint press release, 19/03/04).

Asian countries that declare victory over avian influenza should base such statements on in-depth investigations, FAO and the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) urged in a joint statement. OIE and FAO are ready to provide international experts to assess the epidemiological situation.

Collaboration between countries and the international community is essential to ensure that the avian influenza virus really is under control and that effective preventive and control measures have been put in place in each affected country and its neighbours. The crisis is still not over. In countries such as Indonesia, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand, further outbreaks could still flare up. The virus could spread again within and between countries. As long as the H5N1 virus is not fully under control, the potential threat to human health remains. National control campaigns are an important first-line of defence against the virus, which needs to be further strengthened.

Appropriate precautionary measures have to be put in place to ensure that infected zones become free from infection and remain so. Before countries resume restocking, they must apply strong surveillance and biosecurity measures, to ensure that potential new infections are discovered and contained immediately. The absence of the virus has to be proved by virus search and serological surveys. In countries applying vaccination programmes, non-vaccinated susceptible chickens, so-called "sentinel animals", should be used. The movement of poultry and contaminated goods must be carefully monitored to avoid the reintroduction of the virus from affected areas. Contact between wild and domestic birds has to be minimised.

According to OIE international standards, countries can claim to be free from avian influenza under certain conditions and in any case six months after the occurrence of the last outbreak.

FAO and OIE also called for further investigation into how the epidemic started. To avoid future outbreaks, we need a clear understanding of how the disease began…

The full text is available on: http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2004/38927/index.html and http://www.oie.int/eng/press/en_last.htm

- **China-ASEAN Special Meeting on HPAI Control. Beijing, 2 March 2004**
  A meeting on Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Control with Ministers, Senior Officers and Experts from China, ten ASEAN countries, FAO, OIE and WHO was organized in Beijing by the Government of the People's Republic of China to develop collaboration between China and ASEAN (of Southeast Asian Nations) countries in order to improve the efficiency of the control of this transboundary disease. The meeting released a Joint Press Statement titled China-ASEAN Special Meeting on HPAI Control. The full text is available in the previous issue of AIDE news.

- **FAO/OIE Emergency Regional Meeting on Avian Influenza Control in Animals in Asia (26-28 February).** The meeting assessed the situation two months into the crisis, main constraints faced by countries. “Halting the Spread of Avian Influenza in Asia and Promoting Recovery”, a Working Document as a framework for coordinated action at national, regional and global level and in the sh

- Dr. D. Swayne (USA), Pathologist, Avian influenza and other exotic or emerging poultry diseases, Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory, USDA/Agricultural Research Service, OIE expert in collaboration with FAO, Mission to Thailand 9-17/02/2004

[China]
- Dr. L. Sims (Australia), international expert in disease management and Avian Influenza. Mission to China. Ongoing.
- Dr. H. Wagner, FAO Regional Office (Bangkok) Senior Animal Production and Health Officer. Mission to China. 29/02 – 02/03/04
- Dr. J. Domenech, FAO (Rome) Chief, Animal Health Service, Mission to China. 01 – 02/03/04

[Cambodia]
- Dr. C. Benigno, FAO RAP (Bangkok) Animal Health Officer. Mission to Cambodia 9 – 14.02.2004
- Dr. D. Geale (New Zealand), Programme Coordinator for Exotic Disease Response, MAF, expert in epidemiology and emergency management. Mission to Cambodia. 21/2 – 12/03/04

[Indonesia]
- Dr. S. Morzaria, FAO Regional Office (Bangkok) Animal Health Officer. Mission to Indonesia. 8 – 17.02.2004
- Dr. H. Westbury (Australia), international expert in epidemiology. Mission to Indonesia. 16/02 – 10/03/04.

[Viet Nam]
- Dr. T. Forman (Australia), international expert in epidemiology and emergency management. Mission to Viet Nam. 15/02 – 07/03/04
- Dr. P. Blanc (France), international expert in project analysis. Mission to Viet Nam. 17/02 – 04/03/04
- Dr. G. Freeland (UK), international expert in project analysis. Mission to Viet Nam. Ongoing.
- Dr. H. BENARD (New Zealand), international expert in epidemiology and emergency management. Mission to Viet Nam. Ongoing.

[Pakistan]
- Dr. P. Roeder, FAO EMPRES Animal Health Officer (Virology). Mission to Pakistan 21/01/2004 - 1/02/2004
- Dr. J. Lambers (Netherlands), international expert in poultry diseases and epidemiology. Mission to Pakistan. 20/02 – 11/03/04
- Dr. I. Claassen (Netherlands), international expert in vaccine production and regulatory aspects of disease control. Mission to Pakistan. 15 – 25/02/04

4. Avian Influenza Questions and Answers (full text available on the AGA Web site)

Q: Which disinfectant should I use against avian influenza?

Soapy water and detergents are first choice for many items!!

The avian influenza virus is easier to destroy than many viruses since it is very sensitive to detergents which destroy the fat containing outer layer of the virus. This layer is needed to enter cells of animals and therefore destroys the infectivity. The virus survives well in water and simple washing may assist the virus to enter into areas where it is picked up by other birds. Therefore any washing to remove contamination should always be with detergents (soapy water) or specific disinfectants.

The biggest danger is bird droppings - the virus likes moist, dirty conditions so it is essential to thoroughly disinfect items that have been in contact with bird droppings - cages, shoes, clothes before working with poultry/entry to a place where poultry are kept.

Simple hygienic measures can reduce risk - but national authorities are encouraged to prepare and communicate specific guidance of each type of poultry enterprise…

More information is now available on:
http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/subjects/en/health/diseases-cards/avian_qa.html#7

5. Resources available

Relevant articles/publications:

- The use of vaccination as an option for the control of Avian Influenza (I. Capua, S Marango) – 71st OIE General Session (May 2003). Available at:
  http://www.fao.org/docs/eims/upload/153564/A_71_SG_12_CS3E.pdf

- Information for shipping international diagnostic specimens to the International Reference Laboratories (see appendix 2 of AIDEnews issue 5 or 6, available at:
  http://www.fao.org/ag/AGA/AGAH/EMPRES/index.asp)

- FAO/EMPRES Manual on procedure for disease eradication by stamping out
  (Available at: http://www.fao.org//DOCREP/004/Y0660E/Y0660E00.HTM)

- FAO AIDE News (Vol. 1 - 8)
  (Available at: http://www.fao.org/ag/AGA/AGAH/EMPRES/index.asp)

- Avian influenza: update on European response
  (Available at: http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ew/2004/040205.asp#1)

- Study shows high level of avian to human transmission of influenza A (H7N7) during outbreak in the Netherlands 2003.
  (Available at: http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ew/2004/040226.asp#5)

Relevant Web sites:

FAO Avian Influenza fact sheet:
http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/subjects/en/health/diseases-cards/avian.html

OIE web site:
http://www.oie.int/eng/en_index.htm

OIE Technical Disease Cards:
http://www.oie.int/eng/maladies/fiches/a_A150.htm

WHO Avian influenza frequently asked questions web site:
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/avian_faqs/en/

WHO Advice to international travellers:
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2004_01_26/en/

EU Public Health web site:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/health/ph_threats/com/Influenza/influenza_en.htm

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Annex 1

- Control strategies currently in implementation -

Source of information: OIE reports, press releases, government and media reports, gphin.

Area	Control measures	
Republic of Korea	- Stamping out - Movement control (3km) - No vaccination - Surveillance (10km)	- Import ban - Quarantine - Screening - Disinfection (include vehicles) - Zoning and check points
Viet Nam	- Modified stamping out - Movement control (10km) - Screening - lifting movement control - lifting market restriction	- Quarantine - Disinfection - Compensation - Control of wildlife reservoirs - Public awareness
Japan	- stamping out - Movement control (30km) - No vaccination - Surveillance	- Import ban - Quarantine - Disinfection - Screening - vaccine bank planed
Taiwan province of China	- Stamping out	- Import ban
Thailand	- Stamping out (5km / 1km) - Movement control (50km) - Surveillance (50km/5-10km) - No Vaccination - Daily reporting	- Quarantine - Screening - Zoning - Compensation planned - 21 days surveillance programs - 30 days and 5 month phases
Cambodia	- Stamping out (3km) - Movement control - Surveillance (3-10km)	- Disinfection - Quarantine - Import ban - Disinfection/Treatment
Hong Kong, SAR	- Vaccination - Surveillance in markets - Use sentinels	- Import ban - Early detection programme - Wild bird survey - Test pigeon before marketing
China	- Stamping out (3km) - Vaccination (3-8km) - Movement control - Market control - Trucking back - lifting isolation measures	- Import ban - Disinfection - Quarantine - compensation planned - Vehicle check at main cities - Wild bird watch / disinfection
Lao, PDR	- Selective stamping out - Movement control - Surveillance (10km)	- Import ban - Quarantine - Disinfection - Public awareness
Pakistan	- Stamping out (voluntary) - Movement control - Vaccination (voluntary)	- Import ban - Quarantine - Zoning - Control wild reservoirs - Proper disposal of dead birds - Biosecurity
Indonesia	- Modified stamping out (1km) - Movement control of poultry, its products and farm waste - vaccination - surveillance - Tracking back	- Quarantine - Zoning - compensation planned - Biosecurity - Monitoring and evaluation - no restocking for 30 days - Public awareness
United States of America	- Stamping out - Movement control - Surveillance	- Import ban - Quarantine - set hotline - market control - preparing a new testing program
Canada	- Stamping out - Movement control - Surveillance (Random testing)	- Import ban - Quarantine

Annex 2

- Donors Assistance –

Many donors have decided to commit emergency assistance to help governments to control HPAI outbreaks. FAO AIDEnews is collecting information on donor assistance (financial, in kind or technical assistance) through FAO representations in Asian countries (summary provided below). The data shown in this issue might be incomplete. Therefore, we wish to thank all donors and governments for their anticipated cooperation in providing additional and complementary information. This table was kindly prepared by TCEO.

Recipient countries:

Cambodia

Donors	Amount (US$)	Description
FAO TCP	$390,000	TCP/CMB/3002 Emergency assistance for the control of avian influenza
Asian Development Bank	$91,940	Non-Trust Fund, under general coordination of FAO (for training, equipment and public awareness activities)
Australia	$50,000	AusAID through FAO Trust Fund
China	$50,000	Direct contribution to government (no details given)
France	$57,600	French Cooperation through FAO Trust Fund
Germany	$50,000	GTZ through FAO Trust Fund
Japan	$99,380	Non-Trust Fund, grant assistance for grass-roots human security project for antiviral medicines
WHO	$3,000	In the form of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) supplies and lab training for the Department of Animal Health and Production's investigating teams and Human Flu Vaccine purchase. Combined PPE training by WHO human health and lab consultants and Ministry of Health officials.

(As of 04/03/04. source: FAO representation in Cambodia)

China

Donor	Amount (US$)	Description
FAO TCP	$390,000	TCP/CPR/3004 Emergency assistance for the control of avian influenza

(As of 04/03/04. source: FAO Emergency Operations Service)

Indonesia

Donors	Amount (US$)	Description
FAO TCP	$390,000	TCP/INS/3001 Emergency assistance for the control of avian influenza
Australia	$250,000	Human health protection through WHO
China	$100,000	Vaccines and training
Germany	$61,000	OSRO/INS/402/GER through FAO Trust Fund for purchase of anti sera and training (Euro 50,000)
Japan	$78,906	From Grass Roots Aid Fund for protective gears through the Ministry of Agriculture
	$113,000	Public awareness campaign activities
	$10,000	From JICA/Indonesia for training workshops
Netherlands	N/A	May provide veterinary experts in support of FAO operations.

USA	N/A	Support through the provision of laboratory analysis available in Atlanta

(As of 05/03/04. source: FAO representation in Indonesia)

Lao PDR

Donors	Amount (US$)	Description
FAO TCP	$390,000	TCP/LAO/3002 Emergency assistance for the control of avian influenza
Asian Development Bank	$50,000	(In-kind) Direct procurement of Personnel, Protective clothing and equipment
China	$50,000	Re-establishing poultry breeding farms
USA	$250,000	Direct contribution to WHO Regional Office (Manila)
WHO		Support for one veterinarian for a 2 month mission

(As of 20/02/04. source: FAO Emergency Operations Service)

Pakistan

Donors	Amount (US$)	Description
FAO TCP	$390,000	TCP/PAK/3002 Emergency assistance for the control of avian influenza
China	$50,000	(No details given)

(As of 11/03/04. source: FAO representation in Pakistan)

Viet Nam

Donors	Amount (US$)	Description
FAO TCP	$390,000	TCP/VIE/3003 Emergency assistance for the control of avian influenza
Asian Development Bank	$50,000	Protective gear
EU	Euro 800,000	Protective clothing, lab equipment
Germany	$15,000	Protective gear
Japan	$200,000	Tamiflu (anti-viral drug)
WHO		unspecified

(As of 08/03/04. source: FAO representation in Viet Nam)

Regional

Donor	Amount (US$)	Description
FAO TCP	$400,000	TCP/RAS/3004 Emergency regional coordination assistance for control of avian influenza in southeast Asia

(As of 23/02/04. source: FAO Emergency Operations Service)

* in kind: Payment made in the form of goods and services, rather than cash.